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“This timely analysis should be of great interest to those who share 
concern over maintaining U. S. dominance in the science and 
technology fields.  World leadership in nurturing and developing 
science and technology expertise has remarkably contributed to U. S. 
superiority in advanced defense weaponry and overall competence in 
systems engineering.” 
 
Vice Admiral Michael Colley, United States Navy, is a retired 
submariner who has long championed the importance of U. S. 
science and technology superiority.  He was Director of the 
Division of Mathematics and Science at the Naval Academy and 
Deputy Commander of the U. S. Strategic Command.  He also 
commanded the submarine force in the Pacific theater during the 
first Gulf war. 
• • • 
“This book addresses a systemic problem that has developed over 
the past few decades. The book details the history of the development 
of the problem and lays out a rational set of actions required to 
begin to solve the problem.  It addresses an issue currently facing the 
whole country, not just the DOD. For those interested in science and 
technology it is a must read.” 
 
Dr. James Colvard is currently a Fellow of the National 
Academy of Public Administration and a visiting professor at 
Virginia Tech. During his long and distinguished career of 
federal service, Dr. Colvard held many important positions 
including Technical Director of the Naval Surface Weapons 
Center, Deputy Chief of the Naval Material Command, Director 
of Civilian Personnel Policy and EEO of the Navy and Deputy 
Director of the Office of Personnel Management during the 
Reagan Administration. He also served as associate director of 
the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. 
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• • • 
“A wide-ranging synthesis of the current literature, From Science to 
Seapower forcefully demonstrates the need to maintain a robust 
science and technology effort within the DOD.” 
 
Dr. George Dieter is a member of the National Academy of 
Engineering, a former Dean of the College of Engineering and  
now Glen L. Martin Professor of Engineering at the University 
of Maryland,  College Park.  
 
• • • 
“From Science to Seapower addresses aspects of a potential crisis in 
safeguarding continued superiority of our naval technology in a 
world of rapidly changing threats to our national security. Finding 
the right new balance point in providing resources for technology 
unique to our naval supremacy compared with dependence on what 
is available from surging new global commercial sources has to be an 
absorbing task for naval technical leadership.  From Science to 
Seapower brings insight, data and commitment to this important 
question.” 
 
Dr. Millard Firebaugh, Rear Admiral United States Navy (ret.), 
was Chief Engineer and Deputy Commander for Design and 
Engineering at the Naval Sea Systems Command. Since retiring 
from the Navy he has held executive positions involved in 
advanced technology, including seven and a half years at 
General Dynamics, Electric Boat Corporation, where he was 
Vice President Innovation and Chief Engineer. Currently, he is 
President and Chief Operating Office of SatCon Technology 
Corp. Dr. Firebaugh is a member of the National Academy of 
Engineering. 
• • •        
“This book is ringing a bell and I hope it is echoing within the 
Pentagon’s corridors.  It argues persuasively for investment in an 
increasingly competitive, globalized and complex technology future.  
And it implies, while there is no power like that of the American 
marketplace, that certain technologies will not be fielded if their 
development is left simply to profit motive. The DOD lab system, 
cheaper than alternatives and better, by a million miles, in many 
technological situations, needs a few top level champions … now.  I 
recommend this book to federal administrators in and outside of the 
Endorsements ix 
Defense Department, students, members of the Congressional 
enterprise and to leaders in the American technology industry.” 
  
Paul G. Gaffney II, Vice Admiral United States Navy (ret.), is 
currently president of Monmouth University in West Long 
Branch, New Jersey. Before retiring, Gaffney had a long and 
distinguished military career during which he held numerous 
important positions including that of president of the National 
Defense University in Washington, D.C., and that of Chief of 
Naval Research in which position he was responsible for the 
Navy’s science and technology investment. 
 
• • • 
“American preeminence in science and technology has been 
fundamental to both the security of our nation and the vitality of our 
economy for many years.  From Science to Seapower identifies 
growing challenges to that preeminence that demand our collective 
attention.” 
 
Mike Hayes, Brigadier General United State Marine Corps (Ret.) 
served on active duty for 33 years, commanding Marines during 
two tours in Vietnam, as well as at Quantico, Parris Island, Camp 
Pendleton, Panama and Okinawa.  He is currently the Director of 
Military and Federal Affairs for the State of Maryland. 
 
• • •  
“A succinct and convincing overview of the crucial workforce and 
investment issues faced in the Department of Defense science and 
technology enterprise.” 
 
Dr. Robert C. Kolb is a former Executive Director of the Space 
and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego, California.  
During his 37 years in Navy Laboratories, he held many 
leadership roles in Science and Technology including serving as 
Chair of the DOD Information Systems Technology Reliance 
Panel. 
 






“This book is an important contribution to the discussion of the 
future of DOD laboratories.  While addressing primarily 
Department of Navy laboratories, the problems, issues, frustrations, 
as well as proposed solutions apply equally to all DOD S&T 
activities.” 
 
Dr. Donald Lamberson, Major General United States Air Force 
(ret), has spent the majority of his active duty and post-
retirement career in USAF Laboratory and Acquisition 
positions.   At the time of his retirement in 1989 he was Assistant 
Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Acquisition. 
• • • 
“By far, the best document I’ve read for both justifying an in-
house government R&D capability and laying out the challenges of 
developing and sustaining a government R&D cadre.  Terms in the 
glossary can be changed from Navy to DOD, Army, Air Force, 
NASA or DOE and the conclusions would be the same.  This book 
also helps industry better comprehend why it needs a first-rate in-
house government scientific and engineering community - to assess 
the value and credibility of technological options and enable industry 
to better support the warfighter.  The conclusions with regard to 
revitalization of the national security research workforce apply 
across-the-board both within and outside the government.  The 
authors make an eloquent case that both industry and the 
government benefit from public-private technological 
partnership.  This document offers strong, logical arguments, well-
documented findings and thoughtful conclusions.  No problem 
worrying about return-on-investment - the book will pay for itself.” 
 
Dr. Malcolm R. O'Neill, Lieutenant General United States Army 
(ret.), is currently Vice President and Chief Technical Officer of 
Lockheed Martin Corporation. During his military career, 
he held numerous prominent positions including Director of the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization; Deputy Director, 
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization; and Commander, 
Army Laboratory Command. A native of Chicago, Illinois, 
O'Neill received his B.S. in physics from De Paul University and 





 Two months before its use, the thermobaric warhead used with great 
success in Afghanistan had been little more than an idea.  A remarkably 
rapid transition from concept to reality—a process that usually takes 
years—occurred in large part because of the work done by explosives 
scientists at the Indian Head, Maryland Division of the Naval Surface 
Warfare Center (NSWC). Some ten years earlier, they had developed the 
formula for an experimental explosive they called PBXIH-135. Although 
initial tests proved promising, the explosive had never been transitioned 
into an actual weapon. 
 Fortunately, however, when the emergency arose, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and the Department of the Navy (DON) had “in-house” 
not only the seeds for the critical capability, but also the best explosives 
experts in the world.  In fact, scientists at Indian Head developed almost 
90 percent of the explosives used in American weapons today.  
Altogether, in 67 days, some 100 employees at the Division completed a 
process the DON’s in-house laboratories and centers have been 
performing for six decades: the transition from science to seapower—or 
in this case, air power. 
 Although the thermobaric warhead is only one example of hundreds 
of weapons and other materiel the DOD’s in-house laboratories and 
centers have conceived and produced, these technical institutions remain 
an under-appreciated—in fact sometimes unknown, at least by the 
general public—element of U.S. national security.  Since the end of 
World War II, the scientists and engineers (S&Es) at these centers have 
researched, developed, tested, and evaluated the technology that evolves 
into the weapons, weapons systems, apparatus, supplies, and equipment 
that underpin the most sophisticated and effective defense systems the 
world has ever known. 
 Rear Admiral Jay Cohen, the Chief of Naval Research echoed these 
observations in his congressional testimony of March 2003: “The 
effectiveness of the war-fighting systems employed by the Navy and 
Marine Corps of the Future depends as much on investment in these 




dedicated, capable civil servants as it does on the size of the science and 
technology budget itself. The past decade's frequent downsizings, 
coupled with the declining number of American students-particularly 
women and minorities, pursuing mathematics, engineering and physical 
science degrees-has left us with a dwindling pool of scientists and 
engineers available to become the next generation of researchers. This 
situation jeopardizes our ability to perform essential research in support 
of, ultimately, Sailors and Marines.” 
 This book describes the nature and extent of these and some other 
major threats to the vitality of DOD’s in-house S&T enterprise, and 
offers recommendations that could help either to reverse the most 
disturbing trends or to address some of the underlying causes of long-
term problems. It synthesizes a wide-ranging array of literature on a 
variety of workforce, funding, and science and technology (S&T) 
innovation topics. Although the focus is primarily on DON laboratories 
and centers, many of the sources discussed and conclusions drawn apply 
DOD-wide. 
 Of course, efficiencies aimed at producing savings should always be 
sought. The end of the Cold War justified some defense drawdown, and 
the DOD has always contracted out most of its R&D to the private 
sector. But a quest aimed at cost-cutting, combined with dubious articles 
of faith concerning the value of privatization should not and, indeed, 
cannot be deified to the point of destroying the in-house core 
competencies that concrete evidence has time and again demonstrated to 
be at the heart of our national defense. These core competencies should 













 The defense technology base, a coalition of public and private 
partners working to ensure U.S. military preeminence, grew from 
America’s experience in World War II.  This coalition successfully 
prosecuted a massive effort, as academic, industrial, and Federal 
Government research and development centers worked together to 
support the war.  The success of this partnership led to increasing 
reliance on federally funded research and development in the post-War 
period.  Indeed, throughout the Cold War, a technological superiority 
sufficient to overcome numerical disadvantages in men and materiel was 
the bedrock of deterrence. 
 Today, the vitality of the defense science and technology (S&T) 
effort is threatened.  Funding necessary to execute long-term research 
and development (R&D) continues to dwindle.  In addition, as a 
generation of highly capable scientists and engineers (S&Es) nears 
retirement, there are fewer and fewer young technologists to replace 
them, and the Department of Defense (DOD) in-house centers have been 
hamstrung in their efforts to provide challenging work, state of the art 
facilities, and even public recognition that could attract a new generation 
of top-quality S&Es.  All of this means not only that the in-house talent 
pool grows shallower, but also that invaluable corporate memory or 
“deep smarts” that retirees possess will not be transferred to the next 
generation, and thus lost forever. 
 There are numerous causes contributing to this situation. A decade of 
downsizing, consolidations, and closures, an outsourcing fad which has 
resulted in costs for new military systems spiraling out-of-control, and 
short-sighted cutbacks in discretionary funding have strained these 
centers’ ability to provide cutting-edge work and otherwise engage 
proactively in employment of premier talent.  Similarly, many of the 
reductions, aimed at improving short-term efficiency, have crippled the 
centers’ capacity to execute work that is by its nature long-term.  In the 
Department of the Navy (DON), these realities exist in tandem with 
military construction (MILCON) and Working Capital Fund (WCF) 
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requirements, which obstruct purchases of modern S&T equipment.  And 
centralization across the DOD, aimed at enhancing accountability, in 
many cases actually impedes system responsiveness in the S&T 
community. 
 The bow wave of senior S&Es moving through the system towards 
retirement, along with continued funding cuts and outsourcing, not only 
imperil the centers’ ability to develop the core competencies that defense 
analysts have for decades considered essential, but also jeopardize the 
technological superiority upon which America’s national security 
depends.  Basic and applied research are the seeds from which future 
military capabilities grow.  And while all kinds of trend data suggest the 
U.S. will not have enough qualified S&Es to perform such research, 
other countries are training exponentially increasing numbers of them, 
offering attractive opportunities for students while building increasingly 
sophisticated technical infrastructures. College enrollment and post-
graduate degrees conferred in those countries have skyrocketed, while 
the numbers in the U.S. remain the same or are decreasing. In addition, 
off-shoring practices of many U.S. companies further contribute to 
technical infrastructure development elsewhere.  In short, the science and 
engineering (S&E) talent pool for other countries is getting considerably 
deeper. 
 The negative effects of these trends—which are still in their early 
stages—are already obvious.  For example, various indicators of 
technical outputs (papers published, citations of those papers, patent 
citations and applications, patents granted, patent citations to S&E 
articles) show other countries clearly gaining on the U.S., some of them 
rapidly.  Defense commentators who focus on simply a snapshot of the 
current situation are unjustifiably confident. Just as a snapshot taken half 
way through a horse race is not a good predictor of which horse will 
ultimately win the race, a snapshot of today’s global trends will not 
reveal where the U.S. may be headed in the future.  Further analysis of 
the global picture also indicates America’s current leadership position 
stems from dominance in biomedical research and clinical medicine, 
which are certainly important, but less so to the DOD. 
 In fact, a shift in Federal funding toward these medically related life 
sciences mirrors the shift away from funding for the basic and applied 
sciences, and has ominous implications for national defense and other 
areas.  Overemphasis on medically related fields has occurred at the 
expense of fields focused on research necessary for the DOD.  Many 
disciplines suffering cutbacks depend most directly on Federal funding, 
and are imperative to national defense and other areas because of the 
increasingly interdisciplinary nature of scientific and technological 
advances. 
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 Such developments are all the more unsettling in light of what is 
occurring in many other countries.  Trends in two fields, nanotechnology 
and energetic materials (EMs), show how some countries have 
resourcefully focused their R&D investments, while the U.S. has 
shortsightedly under funded areas crucial to the smaller, cheaper, more 
lethal smart weapons on which the DOD appears to be focusing. 
 Intertwined with these troubling workforce and funding reductions is 
a dramatically altered environment that demands adjustments in 
managing the transition from science to seapower.  Post-Cold War 
threats and changes in the way innovation occurs have combined to 
render obsolete many of the methods by which the DOD has traditionally 
overseen this process.  New “innovation networks” and “technology 
generation networks,” new types of cooperative agreements, and 
interdisciplinary collaboration all indicate that today’s S&Es need more 
interdisciplinary education, more total education, and more continuing 
education opportunities than ever before.  The scientists and engineers 
who work in S&T in the future will need to have PhD-level credentials to 
sit at the global S&T table. 
 Just when new workforce paradigms are needed, however, influences 
operating in the current environment militate against creating them, and 
in fact further enlarge the circle of negative effects.  For one, work at the 
labs and centers is not recognized and awarded by means such as 
membership in national academies.  Two, the new National Security 
Personnel System (NSPS) is headed towards a one-size-fits-all 
arrangement that will not have the flexibility needed for the S&T 
community.  Further, center directors do not have the flexibility or 
institutional mechanisms to incentivize high performers and thereby 
counteract freezes, downsizing, outsourcing, and centralization.  These 
factors, along with others, have combined to affect the military 
component of the S&T enterprise, discouraging naval officers from 
pursuing careers in science and technology.  The talent pipeline, then, is 
shrinking on both the military and civilian sides. 
 For over six decades, investments in DOD in-house S&T have 
conferred remarkable benefit-to-cost. The labs and centers have created 
budget savings and increased the reliability of weapons and warfare 
systems. They have created efficiencies in operations, manufacturing 
processes, and maintenance—the very things today’s critics of S&T 
investment want emphasized.  Their “yardstick” or “smart buyer” 
capability has offered objective advice about the work DOD contracts 
out to the private sector, and has time and again prevented costly 
acquisition errors. 
 Further, the labs and centers not only deliver basic and applied 
research that pays off in the long term, but also respond rapidly to threats 
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and battlefield problems.  Even after a decade of cutbacks, the DON 
warfare centers and corporate laboratory have provided timely, critical 
support to soldiers engaged in the war on terror.  Thermobaric warheads 
used in the tunnels of Afghanistan, the Hellfire Missile, and the 
“Dragonshield” polymer coating that protects High-Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles are just a few examples of such support.  
The improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and similar devices used in 
Iraq have created an even more urgent demand for new technological 
breakthroughs with benefits difficult to reduce to a cost ratio: saving the 
lives of U.S. troops. 
 In fact, there are some indications that the DOD will once again turn 
to its in-house laboratories and centers.  Many have observed that 
outsourcing itself carries burdensome costs.  Further, the private sector is 
increasingly reluctant to invest in certain kinds of research the DOD 
must have. Also, globalization and changes in academia and the defense 
industrial base signify an escalating need for defense in-house 
laboratories.  We believe that addressing these future challenges requires 
achieving four overarching goals: 
 
• First, there must be a sufficiently large community of S&T 
“prospectors” who can participate as peers with colleagues 
throughout the global community, thereby ensuring that the 
fruits of the worldwide S&T enterprise can also be applied to 
U.S. interests. 
• Second, the DON must develop and implement a human capital 
strategy for its in-house S&T community that will work on 
today’s most important problems. The strategy should result in 
4,000 new Ph.D.s by 2015. 
• Third, S&T funding should be increased to 3 percent of overall 
DON total obligation authority, and it should be maintained at 
that level in constant, inflation-adjusted dollars through 2015 to 
ensure revitalization of the workforce and provide the 
intellectual capital base for the Navy-After-Next. 
• Fourth, the DON must support and emphasize technical 
excellence, and appoint visionary civilian leaders who have the 
authority and responsibility for the technical output of their 
organizations. 
 
To achieve these goals, the following recommendations are offered: 
• Expand the Office of Naval Research (ONR) Global activities to 
include all the major players on the international S&T scene. 
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• Bring on board within the DON 500 S&Es per year over the next 
ten years to pursue research and technology areas of critical 
importance to developing future military capabilities. 
• Institute a DON S&T community expectation that career path to 
journeyman level requires a Ph.D. or equivalent education. 
• Create a DOD S&T Academy, equivalent in prestige to the 
National Academies of Science and Engineering. 
• Increase the annual DON S&T budget to three percent of DON 
Total Obligation Authority (TOA) and reallocate amongst 
community members (academia, in-house centers and industry) 
to ensure viability of each sector. 
• Provide a $50 million laboratory and equipment-funding source 
in the DON S&T account to be focused on S&T frontiers. 
• Launch an aggressive DON-wide program to ensure inter-
generational transfer of corporate knowledge. 
• Create an S&T Governance Council chaired by the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition 
(ASN (RDA) with membership that includes all major 
stakeholders, including the ONR, the Naval Research Laboratory 
(NRL), the Warfare/Systems Centers and University-Affiliated 
Research Centers (UARCs). 
• Establish Senior Executive Service (SES) level Technical 
Director (TD) positions at the warfare/systems center division 
sites, and invest them with authority and responsibility for the 
entire technical output of the organization. 
• Institute within military career paths a cadre of “Military 
Technology Officers”. 
As will be seen, these recommendations are closely aligned to those 
made in several recent studies carried by groups such as the National 
Academies. While they are neither unique, nor the only ones that could 
be made, it is considered that they are sufficient to provide a roadmap to 
help the DON rebuild its in-house technical institutions, namely its 
laboratories and centers. This is a task of great importance because these 
institutions, along with their private sector defense technology base 
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1.1 The New National Security Paradigm 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the sole 
world superpower.  Even so, the years following the end of the Cold War 
have witnessed a rapidly shifting global security environment, one now 
filled with threats such as weapons of mass destruction in the hands of 
rogue states and non-state players such as al-Qaeda. 
 Congress authorized the U.S. Commission on National Security for 
the 21st Century based on a conviction that the entire range of national 
security policies and processes required examination in light of these 
new circumstances.  In its September 1999 Phase I report, the 
Commission issued a prescient warning: “we should expect conflicts in 
which our adversaries … will resort to forms and levels of violence 
shocking to our sensibilities.1  Indeed, within two years of the 
Commission’s warning, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 
graphically demonstrated the need for a new national security strategy. 
These events also gave urgent impetus to a sweeping new defense 
transformation effort aimed at revolutionizing the way the DOD buys 
weapons, fights wars, and manages its military and civilian personnel. 
 The new national security paradigm, focused on fighting a global 
war on terrorism (GWOT), has several implications.  For one, there will 
likely be less emphasis on acquiring large numbers of major weapons 
systems and more emphasis on novel technologies that address threats 
such as “dirty nukes” and improvised explosive devices IEDs. In 
addition, solutions will come more frequently from innovation gleaned 
from a globalized S&T base that is growing daily, and many will result 
from breakthroughs that inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary 
research have enabled. Solutions must be found quickly because threats 
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are capable of evolving quickly, and the costs of failure may be 
incalculable. Nevertheless, solutions must be cost effective, because 
DOD’s research, development, tests and evaluation (RDT&E) resources 
are limited and will more likely decline rather than grow in the future. 
1.2 Paradigm Lost? 
 From the foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that new 
breakthroughs in S&T will be required to prevail in this war on 
terrorism, and the U.S. must maintain its technological leadership in the 
world.  This in turn requires a supply of world-class scientists and 
engineers (S&Es) adequate for future national security needs. The 
Commission mentioned above also connected U.S. national security to a 
strong national S&T effort underpinned by a well-educated science and 
engineering workforce, and stated in stark terms: 
 
The harsh fact is that the U.S. need for the highest quality 
human capital in science, mathematics, and engineering is not 
being met….  This [situation] is not merely of national pride or 
international image.  It is an issue of the utmost importance to 
national security.  
 
 The issue of whether we have enough or the right kinds of S&Es to 
maintain our S&T leadership is controversial.2,3,4  Indeed, there is a 
vigorous and contentious on-going national policy debate about the 
subject, and authoritative voices on various sides of the question.  They 
include the National Academies of Science and Engineering, the 
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), the President's 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), and the 
Council on Competitiveness to mention only a few.  Some, such as 
RAND’s Science and Technology Policy Institute, cite supply and 
demand data, unemployment statistics, and the lack of wage pressure to 
argue that we have an overabundance of S&Es.5 Others put forth a more 
nuanced picture, suggesting, “some of the numbers and trends about 
enrollments and degrees are at odds with the conventional wisdom, 
whereas others show a cyclical pattern with both slumps and spurts.”6  A 
number of these divergent viewpoints were presented in a pan-
organizational summit sponsored by the Government-Industry-
University Research Roundtable of the National Academies.7  One 
conclusion that emerges from this debate is that your answer depends 
upon the question you ask. 
 It is indisputable, however, that the DOD and other national security-
related entities such as the Department of Energy (DOE) and the 
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Department of Homeland Security depend heavily on the physical 
sciences and engineering, where the data show declines in both federal 
funding and production of S&Es.  Focusing on aggregate numbers masks 
these trends.  It should be of serious concern to the U.S national security 
enterprise where there is a growing problem in both the public and 
private sector in finding qualified technical personnel who have required 
security clearances or who are eligible to obtain one. 
 The National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), one of 
America’s leading defense industry associations, has found an 
astonishing shortage of key specialized workers, both in the defense 
industry and in the DOD.  A 2004 NDIA survey found that almost 9 
percent of all funded S&E positions in the defense and aerospace 
workforce are unfilled due to a lack of qualified candidates 8 and unlike 
the situation with respect to the general population of S&Es, this 
shortage has created significant wage pressure.  For example, DOD 
contracts generally allow for a 3.5 percent annual inflation for salaries, 
but compensation for aeronautical and electrical engineers with security 
clearances is soaring by 10 to 15 percent annually.  Often, efforts to 
contain these costs have squeezed out innovation by curtailing company 
Independent Research and Development (IRAD) investments. 
 Several workforce and other trends contribute to this dwindling pool 
of cleared or clearable S&Es.  Foremost is a lack of interest among 
American-born youth, especially women and minorities, in the physical 
sciences, mathematics, environmental sciences, and engineering, at both 
the undergraduate and graduate levels.  A second cause is a graying 
federal workforce in which more than half of all workers can retire in 
five years.  Government wide, 60 percent of federal employees are over 
45, compared with 31 percent in the private sector.  Within the DOD, 
some 43 percent of all civilian workers will be eligible to retire within 
five years.  Within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), S&Es over 60 outnumber those under 30 by 3 to 1, a situation 
largely the result of forced downsizing in the 1990s.9  Nationally, over 
half of all S&E degreed workers are 40 or older.  Unless there is an 
increase in degree production, the pool will dwindle more, as baby-boom 
generation retirements increase dramatically over the next 20 years.  A 
third cause is a long-term decline in the overall Federal investment in 
R&D as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), especially in 
the physical sciences and engineering.  This situation has worsened as a 
result of reduced DOD S&T funding throughout the 1990s, reductions 
that occurred despite the importance of these fields to developing new 
military capabilities. 
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1.3 Counting the Costs 
 The negative consequences of diminishing numbers of cleared or 
clearable S&Es are many.  The decline erodes the expertise of the 
DOD’s Service-operated laboratories and centers.  Not only has this has 
contributed to various, costly problems plaguing major defense 
acquisition programs,10 but it hinders the overall ability of the centers to 
carry out what have been three particularly important roles for them 
since World War II: conducting long-term, high-risk research private 
industry is unwilling to pursue; being a quick responder in times of 
crisis; and measuring technical competence. 
 This latter “yardstick” or “smart buyer” function is particularly 
critical now, as the DOD has already contracted out much of its 
development and acquisition work and plans to outsource even more.  
Ironically, increased outsourcing hinders the Department’s capability to 
be a smart buyer at the same time it increases the importance of that 
capability.  To be a smart buyer, the Service laboratories and centers 
must themselves be knowledgeable performers of hands-on technical 
work.  Yet since the end of the Cold War they have undergone almost 
continuous personnel and infrastructure cuts, with overall civilian staff 
reductions often reaching 40 percent or more. 
 In spite of the problems resulting from continued outsourcing and 
reductions—problems well understood and documented since the early 
1960s—even more reductions are likely.  Many cuts so far have been the 
result of four rounds of the congressionally-mandated base realignment 
and closure (BRAC) process, and a fifth round will result in even more 
reductions.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that 
personnel reductions accounted for more than 80 percent of all past 
BRAC savings,11 and with the DOD claiming the current round will 
achieve savings as great as all four previous rounds combined, the 
burden of cuts will surely fall on civilian personnel.12  Moreover, because 
many of the past reductions targeted overhead and support staff, there are 
fewer of them to eliminate, so many of the cuts will fall on the technical 
staffs in the laboratories and centers.  Given their experience from 
previous BRAC rounds (and considering the graying of the work force), 
many S&Es will likely retire rather than relocate.  This could have the 
unintended consequence of damaging vital expertise areas, including 
some already at or below critical mass, and in which there is no viable 
private sector alternative. 
 Consider the following BRAC 1995 example of what could happen 
this time around:  “The process led to considering closure of the Indian 
Head Laboratory, an East coast site, to move its workload to a West 
coast site with a test range.  Since most scientists and engineers do not 
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relocate with the work, closing it would have devastated a center of 
critical expertise.  That would have cost lives.  Only Indian Head had the 
ability to develop the thermobaric warhead, sparing U.S. troops the 
bloody prospect of tunnel-to-tunnel combat in Afghanistan.”13 
1.4 Reconstructing R&D 
 The loss of internal technical competence in the laboratories and 
centers has become a major concern to many military and civilian leaders 
who oversee DOD’s S&T enterprise.  Among the strongest advocates for 
rebuilding the Department’s technical know-how is Dr. Ronald Sega 
who, until recently, was the Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering (DDR&E).  Dr. Sega advocated the creation of the Science 
& Math Advancing Research and Technology (SMART) scholarship 
program to encourage U.S.-born students to seek degrees in science and 
engineering (the program is fashioned in part after the highly successful 
National Defense Education Act of 1958, which was prompted by the 
launch of Sputnik and subsequent fears that the U.S. was falling behind 
in the space race).  In December 2004, the DDR&E, the Aerospace 
Industries Association (AIA), the NDIA, and an interagency working 
group of the NSTC’s Subcommittee on National Security R&D, hosted a 
joint Industry-Academia-Government workshop called “National 
Security Workforce: Challenges and Solutions.”  It brought together key 
stakeholders in national security to address ways to find, excite, attract, 
recruit, and retain skilled workers, technicians, scientists, engineers, and 
mathematicians critical to U.S. national security. 
 The question today is not whether we have enough S&Es for our 
national security workforce needs: there is a problem.  The real question 
is what we, as a nation should do about it. Subsequent chapters will 
elaborate these issues, especially those involving the in-house 
laboratories and centers owned and operated by the DON.  They will also 
propose S&T as a new enterprise, and offer recommendations for 
addressing the other issues that will be discussed. 
 The solutions we suggest are certainly not the only ones.  The 
important thing, and the aim of this book, is to stimulate an earnest and 
urgent dialogue about the problem and potential solutions.  The time to 
address the issues is now, while the trouble signs are clearly present but 
have not yet developed into a real crisis.  There are no quick fixes, and 
acting later will greatly increase the costs.  Put simply, acting now will 
provide a much greater benefit-to-cost (BtC) on a critical element of the 
investment in defense. 
Chapter 2 
 




2.1 The Defense Technology Base: An Essential Public-
Private Partnership 
 The defense technology base consists of three sectors: academia and 
not-for-profits, industry, and in-house government laboratories and 
centers.  Historically, the DOD has relied on universities primarily for 
basic and applied research, an arrangement with many benefits.  
Universities perform the largest share of the overall basic research 
program, a feature that provides access to some of the world’s best minds 
and newest ideas, and also allows DOD to utilize laboratories and other 
research facilities it does not have to support unilaterally.  Funding 
universities also involves students in defense work and provides in-house 
laboratories and centers with one of their most important recruiting tools, 
thereby giving DOD access to the next generation of technologists, 
engineers, and managers.  Similarly, DOD invests in academia to “to 
build long term loyalty and interest in DOD problems.  A cadre of the 
nations’ best minds, knowledgeable of military problems and willing to 
consider research of importance to national security, has time and again 
proved invaluable both in resolving enigmas and opening new 
opportunities.  Academics also maintain contact with their international 
colleagues in ways that are different in scope and nature from those of 
government and industry.”1   
 As the defense technology base developed, the DOD set up 
agreements with several UARCs and established several Federally-
funded research and development centers (FFRDCs).  FFRDCs had 
expertise in such emerging areas as radar, space, satellites, and 
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operations research, and were often operated by major universities, since 
faculty played a major role in their start-up.  The Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory provided an early model of a university-operated facility, 
while the RAND Corporation was an early model for many of the non-
profit technical centers, the so-called “think tanks.”  Both extend the 
capabilities of the DOD in-house effort through their ability to attract top 
technical and managerial talent to work on national security problems, 
which they do under broad charters to their DOD sponsors. 
 Universities or privately organized, not-for-profit corporations 
operate FFRDCs through long-term contracts with the Federal 
government. DOD currently sponsors eleven FFRDCs managed by eight 
parent organizations. Each falls under one of three categories: studies 
and analysis centers, systems engineering and integration centers, and 
research and development laboratories.2 
 UARCs came into being when the DON entered into a number of 
memoranda of understanding with certain universities to establish and 
host laboratories to support research in important areas. In the 1990s the 
DON reaffirmed its strategic relationship and commitment to four 
university laboratories to serve as centers of excellence for critical DON 
and national defense science, technology, and engineering. These four 
are the Applied Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University, the 
Applied Research Laboratory at the Pennsylvania State University, the 
Applied Physics Laboratory at the University of Washington, and the 
Applied Research Laboratories at the University of Texas Austin. 
 The UARCs operate under sole -source, multi-task Naval Sea 
Systems Command (NAVSEA) delivery order contracts to perform work 
primarily for Navy task sponsors. However, they may also conduct 
research for the DOD and other government agencies under the 
NAVSEA umbrella, for programs conducted jointly with the Navy or 
which have Navy relevance. The special nature of their contractual 
relationship to the DON allows the UARCs to provide independent 
technical evaluation to, and serve as technical direction agents for, their 
DOD sponsors. In addition to their technical work, “they share their 
parent universities’ public service education and research objectives, 
and couple their national security interests to their academic skills and 
resources.”3 UARCs are particularly important because they help train 
new S&Es skilled in areas of importance to the DON. 
 The other crucial partners in the defense technology base are 
companies from both the defense and commercial industrial sectors.  
DOD’s in-house laboratories and centers are highly mission-oriented and 
generally concerned with the entire life cycle of weapons or warfare 
systems, but only industry manufactures, on a large-scale basis, the 
products that are the ultimate objective of the development and 
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acquisition process.  And while intellectual value is available from a 
wide range of sources, industry is best equipped to field hardware and 
support it long term.  In the past, industry has provided a number of 
comparative advantages to DOD.  Examples include: 
• Integrated technology, systems engineering, and manufacturing 
expertise, leading to faster fielding of improved capabilities 
• A wide range of technological, design, engineering, and 
manufacturing skills (developed for civilian as well as military 
products), expanding the range of ideas and options for solving 
military problems 
• Non-governmental international connections, increasing the 
availability of technologies and reducing the possibility of 
technological surprise 
• Flexible access to top talent 
• An ability to project needs.4 
 The last key element of the defense technology base, but by no 
means the least, is the community of in-house laboratories and centers 
operated by the military Services.  They have a rich history, the roots of 
some stretching back more than 150 years.  Historically, the Navy early 
on understood the importance of S&E in the conduct of war.  It was also 
among the first to recognize that “the nature of scientists and ‘big 
science’ requires institutional environments to foster creativity and 
support formulation of ideas and discovery.”5 Accordingly, early on it 
began establishing a community of engineering centers, test stations, 
proving grounds, weapons laboratories, and similar facilities to cultivate 
these creative environments. 
 The importance of DOD’s in-house technical community has 
repeatedly been demonstrated and recognized.  For example, in October 
1961, at the height of the Cold War, Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara declared, “in-house laboratories shall be used as the primary 
means of carrying out Defense Department Research and Development 
Programs.”6 Some 15 years later, John Allen, Deputy Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering, succinctly commented, “No way has 
been found to preserve the combination of current technical expertise 
and long-term corporate memory other than setting up an organization 
wherein individuals can maintain a lasting and close association with 
their Service while staying involved in technology, in short, an in -house 
laboratory.”7 
 A study by the White House’s Office of Science and Technology 
Policy, in response to a directive by President Clinton, articulates the 
laboratories’ principal job and value: “the fundamental responsibility for 
DOD laboratories is to conduct science and technology programs in 
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support of national security….  DOD laboratories are best able to 
translate between technological opportunities and the warfighters’ 
needs, integrate technologies across life cycles and generations of 
equipment, respond rapidly to DOD needs, provide special facilities, and 
offer the necessary technical support to the services to make them smart 
buyers and users of technology.”8 
2.2 The DON Laboratory/Center Community 
 Today, a community of geographically dispersed warfare and 
systems centers, along with the NRL, provides most of the internal 
technical competence to support DON efforts to develop, acquire, and 
support weapons and weapons systems for the Navy and Marine Corps.  
This community includes the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), 
Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC), Naval Air Warfare Center 
(NAWC), and the Space and Naval Warfare System Command 
(SPAWAR) Systems Centers (SSCs) in San Diego, California and 
Charleston, South Carolina. 
 This community emerged from the 1991 BRAC round when, on 
January 2, 1992, the DON formally established several warfare-oriented 
centers and a streamlined corporate laboratory (NRL) through realigning 
and/or closing 36 existing R&D, test and evaluation, and engineering 
centers. When they created this technical community, planners 
envisioned each warfare/system center would embody within its 
respective area all the in-house capabilities necessary to support naval 
systems throughout their life cycle—from S&T all the way through to in-
service engineering of deployed systems.9  
 Having a unique mission in a specific warfare or programmatic area, 
it was decided to assign each center to the systems command with which 
its mission most closely aligned.  The NAWC was therefore 
organizationally aligned with the Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR), NSWC and NUWC with NAVSEA, and the SSCs with 
SPAWAR.  The NRL reports through the Chief of Naval Research 
(CNR) to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV).  Both the 
centers themselves and their missions are products of a long and complex 
evolution resulting from changes in the defense environment throughout 
and since the end of the Cold War.10, 11, 12, 13 
 The SECNAV established a two-tiered group mechanism to oversee 
and coordinate this community, Figure 2.1.14 First, the Navy 
Laboratory/Center Coordinating Group (NLCCG) consisted of the 
military commanders and civilian directors of the warfare/systems 
centers and the NRL.15 Second, members of the Navy Laboratory/Center 
Oversight Council (NLCOC), chaired by the ASN (RDA), included the 
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Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, the commanders of the naval systems commands, and 
other senior DON representatives. Its main job was to provide broad 
oversight of the RDT&E, in-service engineering, and fleet support efforts 
of the NLCCG. In November 2002, the NLCCG membership was 
expanded to include the ASN (RDA) and the commanding general and 
TD of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory which reports to the 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).16 
 
Originally Chartered under SECNAVINST 5400.16 of 18 December 1992. 
This instruction was cancelled in 2004.
NLCCG  MEMBERS
CHIEF OF NAVAL COMMANDANT              
OPERATIONS MARINE CORPS                        
NAVAIR                   NAVSEA        SPAWAR     CNR MCCDC          
DASN(RDT&E)
AIR            SURFACE    UNDERSEA      SPACE & NAVAL WARFARE RESEARCH      WARFIGHTING
LABORATORY   LABORATORY
ASSISTANT SECY OF THE NAVY  (RDA)
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WARFARE    WARFARE WARFARE SYSTEMS CENTERS
CENTER        CENTER CENTER
DIVISIONS SAN DIEGO, CHARLESTON
WD           AD                                               
 
Figure 2.1: NLCCG Organizational Relationships  
 As previously noted, the warfare/systems centers carry out a broad 
spectrum of technical work that ranges from basic research through full-
scale development of weapons and weapon systems and their in-service 
support.  In doing so, these centers work to ensure: the warfighter gets 
rapid, direct technical support; the warfighter’s needs drive technology 
investments; a corporate memory exists as a resource (stewardship role); 
unique facilities are maintained (national investment role); there are 
unique system engineering capabilities that span multiple warfare areas 
(interoperability role); and there is a technical broker unaffected by profit 
motive (yardstick/smart buyer role) and who can be a “supplier-of-last-
resort if necessary.” 
 While the warfare/systems centers add value across the entire 
spectrum of the DON’s development, acquisition, and support process, 
they are in a position to make a unique contribution in that they are best 
suited to connect the fruits of S&T effort conducted both in-house and in 
the private sector to create future military capability for the Fleet. 
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 The DOD’s S&T program consists of three Budget Activities: Basic 
Research (BA 1), Applied Research (BA 2), and Advanced Technology 
Development or ATD (BA 3). Even though S&T funding is only about 
six percent of the centers’ total business base, it still represented $843 
million in FY 2004 dollars.  About a quarter of the centers’ total business 












Figure 2.2: FY 04 Center Business Base by Appropriation ($13,982 
million) (Source: NLCCG Database) 
 The DON uses the term “Discovery and Invention” (D&I) to 
characterize Budget Activities 1 and 2. This effort includes scientific 
study and experimentation in the physical, engineering, environmental, 
and life sciences related to long-term naval needs, and efforts (short of 
major developments) to solve specific naval problems.  DON ATD effort 
supports work to transition the fruits of D&I from the centers into 
military application in the field.  Not all of S&T funding received by the 
centers is executed in-house. Some of it is contracted out to the private 
sector to obtain support for their mission work. In FY 2004 only 39 
percent of this funding was expended internally. 
 Regardless of its size, the centers’ S&T funding is crucial to their 
ability to meet their uniquely-assigned roles and missions. It provides the 
“seed corn” for both the manpower and ideas that lead to next-generation 
military capabilities. Put another way, S&T historically is where new 
technologies and their potential applications are explored, developed, and 
transitioned.  It is also vital in that it supplies much of the funding 
centers use to attract and retain top-quality S&Es, particularly those with 
Ph.D.s. 
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The DON’s Shrinking S&E Workforce 
 
 In spite of their importance, the warfare/system centers have been 
buffeted by several rounds of consolidation, closure, realignment, and 
personnel downsizing, as many in DOD believe the private sector should 
do work once considered inherently governmental.  Consider, for 
example, the 1997 testimony before the House Armed Services 
Committee of Dov Zakheim, until recently the Defense Department’s 
Comptroller: “the DOD should be more ruthless about cutting defense 
laboratories.  There is little these laboratories offer that the private 
sector can't match.  While some capabilities are unique to the [DOD], 
these are far fewer than their proponents will admit, and many hark back 
to technologies that have long since been bypassed in the private 
sector...the need for a large defense laboratory structure is simply 
indefensible….”18  John White, Deputy Secretary of Defense in the 
Clinton administration, and John Deutch, who served as Clinton’s 
Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology, both asserted that the laboratories “are 
widely judged to be incapable.”19 In addition to being inaccurate, such 
disparaging remarks have affected the image of the in-house laboratories 
and centers, adding to their difficulties in attracting and retaining top-
flight technical staff. 
 While many of the personnel cuts following the end of the Cold War 
were inevitable, the way they were implemented was problematic.  Most 
cuts followed the rules of the DOD’s industrial-era Civil Service System 
(CSS), making it all but impossible to target staff reductions and reshape 
center workforces strategically.  Moreover, most of the downsizing 
focused on efficiency—cutting costs.  Little attention was paid to the 
impact of the cuts on effectiveness—performing missions.  Nor was there 
much concern over the impact of these reductions on the remaining 
human capital in the centers.  Figure 2.3 compares changes in the 
NLCCG business base from FY 1991 – FY 2004.  After an initial 
decline, the funding has rebounded vigorously along with the rest of the 
defense budget, so that by FY 2002, the community had a business base 
in inflation-adjusted dollars that actually exceeded its FY 1991 total.  
Over this same period, however, the workforce (civilian plus military) 
followed a different path.  Initially, its decline mirrored the decline in the 
center’s business base as would be expected in an industrial fund setting.  
However, instead of tracking the turn-around in workload, workforce 
numbers continued to fall, reaching a reduction of about 43 percent 
relative to the FY 1991 baseline. In part, this disparity between business 
and workforce base trends reflects the DOD’s increased emphasis on 
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outsourcing. It also reflects a common belief among many defense policy 






















Figure 2.3: NLCCG Community Personnel and Workload Trends 
(Source: NLCCG Data; OSD Comptroller Green Book of April 2005) 
 
 Some warfare/system centers have been reduced in size more than 
others.  Figure 2.4 breaks down the personnel reductions for each of the 
centers and for NRL over this same timeframe.  The NAWC experienced 
the largest reduction (58 percent) in personnel followed by the NUWC 
(47 percent).  These numbers largely reflect the declines in emphasis in 
air and submarine warfare relative to other warfare areas following the 
end of the Cold War. 
 These reductions have affected support personnel more than the 
science and engineering (S&E) workforce.  The main reason is that many 
support functions have been contracted out, often in response to 
congressional, DOD, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
initiatives to outsource so-called Commercial Activities.  Commercial 
Activities are functions that fall within the purview of OMB Circular A-
76.20 Other reductions have resulted from streamlining initiatives such as 
business process engineering.  In addition, many of the centers’ 
functions—such as public works, base operations, human resources, and 
finance and accounting—have been turned over to various centrally 
managed organizations either at the Service or DOD level, under the 
assumption that such efforts will achieve cost savings.  Many NLCCG 
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community activities, for example, are now forced to rely on 











































































Figure 2.4: Personnel Reductions for Warfare/Systems Centers and 
NRL (FY 1991 – FY 2009) 
 
 As a result of such pressures, between FY 1991 and FY 2004, the 
overall NLCCG civilian workforce was reduced by 43 percent.  Over this 
same time, the S&E workforce was reduced 20 percent, as shown in 
Figure 2.5. 
 In addition to these substantial personnel reductions, intermittent 
hiring freezes, especially during the 1990s, have exacerbated the 
situation.21 By one count, 13 such freezes were imposed on the NLCCG 
community between September 30, 1990 and March 20, 2002.22 Some 
were the result of budget cutting efforts, while others simply mandated 
an arbitrary workforce reduction, ostensibly to save money.  For 
example, in February 1992 the SECNAV imposed a limited freeze that 
permitted hiring two people for every five lost.  This directive also froze 
all promotions and/or new appointments into certain high-grade levels 
(GS/GM 13, 14, 15) until the DON high grade total was again reduced to 
its September 30, 1991 levels.  As another example, in November 1994 
the Comptroller of the Navy imposed a 4 percent per year reduction in 
the number of administrative support personnel as part of the Clinton 
administration’s National Performance Review.  This reduction remained 
in effect through September 30, 1999. 
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Figure 2.5: NLCCG Community Civilian Workforce Trends  
(Source: NLCCG Database) 
 The Internet bubble hiring boom in the private sector also hampered 
the NLCCG community’s recruitment of high-quality S&Es.  It was 
especially difficult to hire at the Ph.D. level in many of the specialties of 
growing importance, such as nanoscience.  In fact, some of the 
community’s best and brightest S&Es left during this period, enticed by 
higher wages, better benefits, and often by more exciting and challenging 
work.  For example, in a span of just 18 months, DOD lost a key part of 
its 24-year old ability to perform fiber optics research when industry 
hired away 26 of NRL’s best researchers.23 At the time, NRL was the 
Department’s only laboratory with this world-class defense capability. 
 As they have in the past, larger historical events are also driving this 
trend.  Figure 2.6 displays a number of events that produced increased 
hiring at the centers or their predecessor organizations.  Although not 
shown in this figure, the Soviet’s launch of SPUTNIK in 1957 led to a 
jump in hiring as a result of widespread fear that the U.S. was falling 
behind in the space and missile race.  Other hiring spurts occurred during 
the Vietnam War era and during the defense build-up led by President 
Reagan.  The downsizing of the 1990s, on the other hand, was the result 
of the end of the Cold War and the search for a “peace dividend.”  
Recently, President George W. Bush has overseen a major defense build-
up spurred in large part by the events of September 11, 2001.  Since then, 
pressure from the growing Federal budget deficit and GWOT costs are 
again threatening hiring at the centers, as some of the systems commands 
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turn once more to cost-cutting measures, including limited hiring freezes 
aimed at shedding personnel.24 
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Figure 2.6: NLCCG Community S&E Demographic Profile and 
Trends (Source: Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)) 
 These and other factors have markedly affected the demographic 
distribution of S&Es in the NLCCG community and the DON as a 
whole.  This is vividly illustrated in Figure 2.6, which shows 
demographic profiles of the NLCCG S&E populations in FY 1991 and 
FY 2004.  The number of young S&Es has declined dramatically.  Figure 
2.7 depicts the age profile of the entire DON civilian community over the 
period FY 1988 to FY 2000.  Again, the aging trends are evident. 
 Figure 2.8 shows how the various BRACs and mandated reductions 
have increased the average age of S&Es in the NLCCG community, 
contributing to a “bow-wave” effect of a generation of experienced 
technologists moving through the system, without adequate replacements 
behind the wavefront.  The most telling statistic here is that in FY 2004 
there were 57 percent fewer S&Es under the age of 31 than in FY 1991.  
Note also that the average age in FY 1991, 38.2 years, had increased to 
42.7 by FY 2001.  An increase in hiring in 2001 caused this average age 
to decrease slightly, to 42.2 years by FY 2003.  However, NAVSEA’s 
cost-cutting initiatives in early 2005 have again restricted S&E hiring 
and threatened to snuff out the little progress made. As a result, the 
average age is again on the rise. Perhaps one of the most important trends 
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to note is the steady decline in S&Es in the 30 to 40 age group. There 
were 6,920 S&Es in this age group in FY 1991, but by FY 2004 this 
number had dwindled to only 4,801. 
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Figure 2.7: DON Civilian Workforce Demographic Profile and 
Trends (Source: Defense Civilian Personnel Data System                
(DCPDS) Data) 
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Figure 2.8: NLCCG Community S&E Age Trend                     
(Source: DTIC, DMDC, DCPDS data) 
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The Negative Consequences of a Shrinking Workforce 
 
 These sizeable, recurring, multi-layered, multi-year cuts and the 
consequent aging of the S&E population have had serious consequences 
for the defense S&T effort, and threaten more ominous consequences in 
the long-term.  For example, as many analysts are discovering, 
downsizing alone often carries with it a host of negative effects.  These 
include, to name but a few, adverse effects on employee loyalty, the loss 
of invaluable corporate memory, organizational instability, and, 
paradoxically, high costs.25 
 In addition, the S&E aging trends disturbed senior civilian and 
military leaders enough that, in 2000 and 2001 they prompted several 
high-level DON assessments of the problem.  For example, the SECNAV 
chartered a task force to study potential DON human resource 
management systems for the future.  The National Academy of Public 
Administration (NAPA), through its Center for Human Resource 
Management, helped with the study.  The results appeared in “Civilian 
Workforce 2020: Strategies for Modernizing Human Resource 
Management in the Department of the Navy,” released in August 2000.26 
The study recommended a new human resources management system to 
replace an aging CSS unsuitable for 21st century needs.  The Academy 
offered other recommendations to allow the DON to acquire a workforce 
aligned with its future mission requirements, for example: an integrated, 
strategic planning process; modern information systems support; a 
restructured management community; and a new strategy for acquiring 
and retaining talent. 
 Soon after the release of this NAPA report, the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) and Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) initiated 
a study that also discussed the negative effects of downsizing, reduced 
hiring, and outsourcing.  Responding to a briefing on the DON civilian 
workforce, the VCNO chartered a “Civ ilian Manpower and Personnel 
Management Task Force.”  In its June 2001 report, the first problem the 
task force discussed was the effect of workforce aging on demographics 
and the balance of skill mixes in the DON civilian population.  The task 
force described the problem this way: 
 
This is an outcome of the downsizing of the last decade and the 
methods we used to achieve that downsizing.  Years of 
[reductions] have produced a force that relies upon experienced 
workers.  We no longer have the on board strength in the 
younger age groups to naturally replace workers as they retire 
or as they simply leave the Navy for other work.  The civilian 
workforce is not recruited or sustained in a fashion similar to the 
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military.  As the civilian workforce was reduced…fewer young 
workers were hired…. Voluntary reductions were stimulated 
through employee buy-outs and incentives for regular and early 
retirement.  Navy met its civilian workforce reductions – as 
required in BRAC and the past Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR), but we no longer possess the number of younger workers 
to inherently replace older workers….  This is true both in 
government and industry for technical, engineering, 
management and the industrial workforce components.  
Attrition, in addition to retirement, is a significant issue across 
the age groups.  As an example, in FY-00, over 5,200 retired, but 
over 7,700 just left Navy, and we hired less than 7,500 people.  
This net loss in our civilian workforce cannot be permitted to 
continue….  [It] will decimate  our capability….  
 
…we must focus both on attrition as well as retirement, and we 
must adopt an integrated outsourcing strategy.  We need broader 
adoption of methods to increase both our hiring and retention.  
An increasing proportion of our workforce has the opportunity 
to retire in the next decade.  We must prepare for an orderly 
transfer of knowledge.  We must reinvigorate our hiring of both 
new graduate employees as well as more experienced people if 
we are to sustain the civilian workforce at levels necessary to 
meet the requirements set for them.  We must provide 
opportunities for professional growth for our workforce; we 
need to provide for interesting work in order to retain the best 
and brightest. 
 
 Despite the alarms these and other high-level studies sounded, few of 
the recommendations were implemented, and then 9/11 and its aftermath 
diverted the attention of senior civilian and military leaders.  The 
problems have not gone away, however, either for the NLCCG 
community or the DON.  Indeed, current trends suggest they will 
continue to worsen unless significant, sustained steps are taken to reverse 
them. 
 
The Nation’s Shrinking S&E Workforce 
 
 The demographic trends in the warfare/systems centers are in fact 
indicative of a much wider problem.  Comparable troubles are affecting 
all the Services, other Federal departments and agencies that operate 
laboratory systems (such as DOE and NASA), and a growing number of 
defense and aerospace companies in the private sector. 
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 Sean O’Keefe, until recently the NASA Administrator, discussed 
these trends in his testimony before the House Science Committee in 
July 2002.27 Within NASA’s S&E workforce, the over-60 population 
outnumbered the under-30 population by almost 3 to 1.  The age contrast 
was even more dramatic  at some of NASA’s field centers.  For example, 
at the Marshall Space Flight Center only 62 engineers out of a 3,000-
person workforce were younger than 30.  Similar proportions prevailed 
at the Glenn and Langley Research Centers, where the corresponding 
ratios were 5:1 and 7:1 respectively.  O’Keefe noted that by contrast, “in 
1993 the under-30 S&E workforce was nearly double the number of 
over-60 workers.  This is an alarming trend that demands our immediate 
attention with decisive action if we are to preserve NASA’s aeronautics 
and space capabilities.” 
 Figure 2.9, taken from O’Keefe’s testimony, shows how the 
demographic profile for NASA S&Es has changed from 1993 to 2002.  
These data clearly demonstrate that the space agency has significantly 
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Figure 2.9: NASA S&E Demographic Profile and Trends  
 (Source: Congressional Testimony by Sean O’Keefe) 
 Demographic data gleaned from the DOE laboratory community tell 
a similar story, as that Department has begun to experience hiring, 
recruitment, and retention problems within its laboratory system.  This 
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community includes the so-called national laboratories, which have key 
missions in basic science, national security, energy resources, and 
environmental quality.  These laboratories have long been regarded as 
among the most eminent in the world, and have also been a critical factor 
in helping the U.S. maintain its worldwide leadership in generating 
scientific knowledge and discovery. 
 Recently, however, the DOE laboratories, like those in NASA and 
DOD, have experienced critical challenges regarding their S&E 
workforces.  The Department established a task force to recommend 
actions for consideration by management, an effort involving almost all 
of the DOE laboratories.28 Though there are differences among 
individual and among groups of laboratories (for example national 
security versus science laboratories), the task force focused on the high 
degree of commonality across the laboratories on workforce issues. 
 In December 2000, the task force published its findings in a draft 
white paper, highlighting several factors making it more difficult to 
maintain world-class technical staffs and hire new S&Es with skills 
critical to the future.29 For one thing, the paper identified a perception of 
the erosion of exciting scientific and engineering work in the 
laboratories.  For another, it cited funding instability caused by on-going 
fluctuations in the DOE budget as an impediment to strategic workforce 
planning.  In effect, these fluctuations resulted in erratic hiring patterns.  
Moreover, the panel expressed concern over the erosion of flexibility 
resulting from increased restrictions in personnel management 
appendices to the laboratory management contracts. 
 Another overarching problem the task force identified—one hurting 
almost all members of the defense technology base involved with 
classified projects—was the S&E pipeline.  There are simply fewer high 
technology graduates with eligibility (primarily clearances) to work on 
national security problems.  This security clearance impediment is a 
recurring theme throughout this book. 
 Also worrying to the task force was an atmosphere in the laboratories 
that could discourage foreign nationals and even Asian Americans from 
working there.  The task force recommended that, “a cautious and 
rational security policy must be crafted to allow the Labs to tap into the 
outstanding scientific and engineering talent pool in this country, 
including foreign nationals.”  It further bemoaned what it called a 
worsening atmosphere with a drift towards compliance-based 
management.  
 The task force’s demographic analysis also found an S&E population 
aging much like that in the DON.  Even after accounting for differences 
in degree levels, the DOE laboratories had a significantly smaller 
proportion of S&Es under the age of 40 than the U.S. norm (26 percent 
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versus 40 percent), with the largest percentage of its S&Es between 41 
and 50 years old, Figure 2.10. 
 The problems the DOE task force identified have been addressed in 
numerous studies of the DOD laboratories and centers.  One example is a 
recent Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) report, chartered 
by the DDR&E, called “Science and Technology Community in 
Crisis.”30 It notes that a world-class research institution—one with an 
outstanding technical staff, important and challenging work, state of the 
art facilities and equipment, and visionary leadership—cannot exist 
without the ability to attract, retain, and reward high-level talent.  The 
primary culprit preventing the recruitment of such talent is the outdated 
CSS, as it cannot be adapted to specific needs.  The report’s major 
recommendation calls for replacing the personnel system with one 
tailored to a research institution, and points out that Congress has already 
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Figure 2.10: S&E Demographic Profile in DOE Laboratory 
Community (Source: DOE White Paper) 
 The demographic trends that imperil DOD’s laboratories and centers 
also threaten a growing number of private sector defense and aerospace 
companies, and this too has serious implications for U.S. economic and 
national security.  Responding to this problem, the Air Force asked the 
National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies to 
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“provide a report that addresses the effects of U.S. defense industrial 
base shrinkage and the aerospace industry’s ability to continue to attract 
and maintain requisite aerospace engineering talent…to produce 
cutting-edge military products” the DOD needs.32 
 The report emphasizes how current trends threaten the inter-
generational transfer of specialized, crucial technical knowledge and 
skills, a point that also directly applies to the in-house laboratories and 
centers: 
 
The change in the age-experience composition of the work force 
occasioned by the decrease in defense spending raises serious 
questions about mentoring and the generational passing on of 
knowledge in the industry.  One immediate effect is that older 
employees who qualify for early retirement may elect to retire 
because they see fewer opportunities ahead for interesting work.  
Meanwhile, younger engineers may leave for what they perceive 
to be better opportunities…elsewhere.  In addition, the short-
term result would be that the work force is predominantly 
middle-aged.  As time passes with no new significant hiring, the 
work force will become disproportionately composed of older, 
more experienced employees.  This has occurred in the 
aerospace industry and in government over the past 15 years, 
during which time the number of engineers aged 25 to 34 has 
fallen from 27 to 17 percent of the work force.  In the space 
sector, only 7 percent of the engineers are under age 30.  At 
Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Company, for example, new 
hires, which started to decline in the early 1980s, dropped to 
almost zero in the 1990s.  If this trend continues, as experienced 
workers age and retire, their knowledge and expertise will be 
lost….  If the need is there, which seems extremely likely, the gap 
must be filled by young and inexperienced people. 
 
Many companies are now planning formally arranged mentoring 
procedures, as well as more training programs for new workers.  
When new engineers are hired, mentoring and teaming 
arrangements have to be carefully planned to capture the 
experience of those about to retire.  Nevertheless, experience is 
lost, as is efficiency, when work tasks involve significant 
learning curves.” 
 
 Various other reports have discussed these and similar problems in 
the aerospace industry.  One commentary is in the report of the 
congressionally-established Commission on the Future of the United 
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States Aerospace Industry, issued in November 2002.33 Even more 
recently the AIA has proposed steps to address the difficulties, as have 
others.34 
 As noted in the Introduction, the NDIA, an association of defense 
companies, has joined the chorus of those alarmed over the dwindling 
supply of cleared or clearable S&Es who possess critical skills.  In a 
2004 survey of defense companies, they found thousands of unfilled 
S&E positions for U.S. citizens, with the situation getting worse.35 The 
most acute shortages were in engineering disciplines, principally 
aerospace, software, electrical, and mechanical.  However, shortages 
were also identified in mathematics, physics, chemistry, and materials. 
The study does not describe a “shortage environment,” because data 
show many areas where the supply of S&Es exceeds demand.  Rather, 
the “requirement for security clearances [is] greatly restricting the 
supply side for DOD/government.”  The authors worried that the 
conjunction of three trends—the retirement of the post-Sputnik 
generation, the decline in clearance-eligible S&Es, and the diminishing 
U.S. technological dominance due to globalization of R&D—could lead 
to a “perfect storm.”36 
 In sum, the foregoing discussion clearly demonstrates that finding 
qualified technical personnel is a problem of growing concern to the U.S. 
national security enterprise.  Exacerbating the trouble is the shortage of 
people who have required security clearances or are eligible to obtain 
one: eligibility for most national security jobs requires U.S. citizenship.  
What the DOD can do about the situation is a subject reserved for a later 
chapter. 
2.3 Declining Center Science and Technology Resources 
 Unlike the NLCCG community’s civilian workforce, other 
components of the DON enterprise have experienced a more positive 
reversal of fortune over the last few years.  We have already noted that 
the overall business base of the NLCCG declined from FY 1991 to FY 
1996.  Thereafter, it grew markedly, reflecting increases in the overall 
DON budget measured in terms of TOA.  Figure 2.11 illustrates that 
DON TOA also declined significantly from FY 1991 to FY 1997.  It then 
began to increase and by FY 2003 had returned to its inflation-adjusted 
FY 1991 level.  In fact, the latest budget projections suggest TOA in FY 
2010 will be about 2 percent greater than in FY 1991.  Figure 2.11 also 
shows that while workforce levels in the defense industrial sector track 
these budget changes, those in NRL and in the warfare/systems centers 
do not.  This is partly a result of factors already discussed, and partly a 
result of mandated workforce reductions imposed on the centers. 





































Figure 2.11: Civilian and Defense Industry Workforces and DON 
Budget (Source: NLCCG Database; OSD Comptroller Green Book 
of April 2005) 
 Nor have the trends in the centers’ S&T funding—one of their most 
important resources—tracked the overall budget increases.  While S&T 
funding represents only about 6 percent of the centers’ total business 
base, it is essential if they are to carry out their assigned roles and 
missions. That is, it supports breakthrough research and also funds the 
transitioning of that research into next-generation military capabilities.  
Just as important, S&T funding provides the challenging work needed to 
attract and develop new research talent, a point emphasized in the DOE 
white paper mentioned above: “Exciting work and a promising future are 
required to attract and retain employees with critical new skills…. basic 
sciences and exploratory research and development…keep the Labs at 
the forefront of cutting-edge technology and thereby reenergize their 
workforce.” 
 Table 2.1 shows how the DON Basic Research, Applied Research, 
and ATD dollars have changed from FY 1992 to FY 2004.  Overall, S&T 
dollars increased, in significant measure the result of additions by the 
Congress during its mark-up process.  However, as a percentage of TOA, 
S&T still remains well below the overall DOD goal—three percent of 
TOA.  Most of the growth in S&T has occurred in the ATD account, 
which grew by almost 260 percent over the period FY 1992 to FY 2004. 
 Regrettably, center S&T funding has not even come close to keeping 
pace.  For example, in FY 1992 the centers captured 45 percent of the 
DON S&T dollars.  However, by FY 2004, their share had fallen to just 
22 percent. 

















1992 476 593 289 1,359 1.24 
2004 468 678 1,036 2,182 1.79 
Table 2.1: DON S&T Funding Trends in Millions of Constant FY 
2004 Dollars  
 The potentially ominous consequences of such a drop are particularly 
apparent in the funding trends for D&I.  In FY 1992, D&I represented 79 
percent of DON S&T.  However, by FY 2004, it represented only 53 
percent, a decline of some 33 percent.  This means the centers did less 
S&T focused on developing new knowledge related to long-term military 
needs, and more on transitioning already existing technology into 
application.  In sum, D&I represents the “seed corn” for future 
capabilities, and current trends are increasingly nibbling away at it.  
Robert Frosch, a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for research and 
development, described this situation as unsustainable in the long run, 
akin to a farmer who wishes only to harvest and not to sow.37 
 Another feature of the centers’ S&T funding has to do work carried 
out in-house versus that contracted out to the private sector. Of the 
approximately $491 million in DON S&T they received in FY 2004, the 
centers expended some 56 percent on work done in-house and contracted 
out the other 44 percent.  It should be noted that the percentages vary 
across the three S&T budget activities, as shown in Table 2.2. 
  
($ Millions of FY 2004 Dollars) 
 






Basic Research 20.3 4.3 24.6 83 
Applied Research 105.1 62.3 167.4 63 
Advanced Technology 
Development 147.9 150.7 298.6 50 
Total S&T 273.3 217.3 490.6 56 
Table 2.2: Who Performs the Centers’ DON Science and Technology 
Work? 
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2.4 Discretionary S&T Funding: The Quintessential Element 
of Workforce Revitalization 
 Yet another threat to DON’s overall S&T program is the drop in 
discretionary S&T funding.  Discretionary funds are allocations 
laboratory and center directors use, with some constraints, as they see fit.  
These funds give directors more flexibility in pursuing promising 
projects, and therefore more opportunities to attract high-quality 
personnel.  The steady decline in such funding over the last dozen years 
is further eroding capabilities to carry out work that only defense 
laboratories and centers can do, and which is critical to national security. 
 For over 40 years planners and officials have recognized that only 
the defense laboratories and centers can perform certain S&T work 
essential to national defense.  In fact, DOD has been alarmed over the 
deterioration of such capabilities in the past, and acted to rectify the 
problem.  For example, in April 1962, David Bell, director of the Bureau 
of the Budget (now the OMB), submitted a report to President Kennedy 
on contracting by the Federal government for research and 
development.38 The study had been prompted by concerns that excessive 
contracting out had blurred the lines between those technical functions 
that are public and those that are inherently governmental.  Bell argued: 
 
The decisions which seem to us to be essential to be taken by 
government officials, rather than being contracted out to private 
bodies of any kind, are…what work is to be done, what 
objectives are to be set for the work, what time period and what 
costs are to be associated with the work, what results expected 
are to be, and…the responsib ilities for knowing whether the 
work has gone as it was supposed to go, and if it has not, what 
went wrong and why, and how it can be corrected on subsequent 
occasions. 
 
 In essence, Bell was describing what has since been called the “smart 
buyer” or “yardstick” capability.  In the DOD, most of the competence 
needed to perform this role resides in the technical staffs of the 
laboratories and centers the three Services operate.  In this regard, the 
Bell Report stressed that the government should “have on its staff 
exceptionally strong and able executives, scientists, and engineers fully 
qualified to weight the views and advice of technical specialists.”  It 
bemoaned the “serious trend toward eroding the competence of the 
government’s research and development establishment—in part owing to 
the keen competition for scarce talent which has come from 
government’s contractors.”  Bell concluded that it is “highly important to 
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improve this situation by sharply improving the working environment in 
government, in order to attract and hold first-class scientists and 
technicians.”39 
 A later report by the DOD Inspector General characterized the 
concerns that prompted the Bell Study as follows:40 
 
The Bureau of the Budget concluded that the substantial 
increase in contracting out for research had seriously impaired 
the Government’s in -house ability to execute research and 
development work.  The DOD, in particular, had come 
dangerously close to permitting contractor employees to perform 
functions that were the responsibility of Government officials.  In 
addition, the Government’s in -house ability to supervise and 
evaluate research and development efforts that were contracted 
out had been seriously impaired.  [This] was caused by the best 
of the Government’s research scientists, engineers and 
administrators being recruited by private industry as a result of 
higher salaries, significant and challenging work, and better 
working conditions. 
 
The Bureau of the Budget recommended that laboratory 
directors be provided a discretionary allotment of research funds 
to reverse this trend.  The laboratory directors were to use the 
discretionary funds to strengthen the internal competence of 
individual laboratories by assigning research projects that were 
significant and challenging enough to attract and hold 
competent personnel. Laboratory personnel were also to be 
given greater participation in program determination and in 
providing technical advice.  In summary, laboratory directors 
were to be given discretionary funds and the authority to make 
decisions relating to research projects, personnel, funds, and 
other resources.  The [ILIR] Program was initiated Defense-
wide in FY 1963, and the DOD Manual 7110-1-M, “Budget 
Guidance Manual,” provides the guidance on the use of 
Program funds. 
 
There was a general understanding at the time that the laboratory 
directors needed research funds to provide the kind of in-house work that 
would attract and retain high quality staff.  In fact, while the Bell Study 
was in process, the underlying policy for establishing both the 
discretionary In-House Laboratory Independent Research (ILIR) 
program and a complementary BA 2 discretionary Independent 
Exploratory Development (IED) program, was laid out in a 
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memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara.  In this same 
memorandum McNamara also declared, “in-house laboratories shall be 
used as the primary means of carrying out Defense Department Research 
and Development Programs.”41 
As mentioned, direction for applying ILIR and IED program dollars 
was included in the DOD Budget Guidance Manual, which directed that 
funds will be provided:42  
 
…to support, in addition to regularly assigned programs, work 
judged by the Directors of these RDT&E laboratories to be 
important or promising in accomplishment of assigned 
missions…it is intended that Laboratory Directors be given the 
widest latitude…since the purpose is to enable the Director to 
perform innovative, promising work without the procedure of 
formal and prior approval… 
 
Subsequent DOD policy interpreted this budget guidance in more 
detail:43 
• Each DOD Component that operates a research and development 
Laboratory or Center, shall support an ILIR program.  In 
addition, each DOD Component may support an IED program. 
• The technical director and/or commanding officer (TD/CO) of 
each participating laboratory or center shall be provided with 
ILIR and IED funds to initiate and support efforts judged to be 
important or promising in the accomplishment of missions 
assigned to that laboratory and/or center. 
• Each…TD/CO shall be given wide latitude in the use of ILIR 
and IED funds subject to the approval of overall funding levels, 
to enable performance of innovative, timely, and promising work 
without requiring formal and prior approval that might delay 
normal funding authorization. 
• ILIR funds shall be used to support basic research (6.1) efforts 
and IED funds (if available) shall be used to support exploratory 
development (6.2) efforts.  These programs shall have as their 
primary goal the performance of highest quality research and 
exploratory development in support of laboratory missions, and 
enhancement of factors that contribute to recruitment and 
retention of outstanding scientists and engineers. 
For decades, the significance of discretionary funding was widely 
accepted.  For example, a 1983 blue ribbon report of the White House 
Science Council, a study chaired by David Packard, recommended that 
“at least 5 percent, and up to 10 percent, of the annual funding of the 
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Federal laboratories should be devoted to programs of independent 
research and development at the laboratory directors’ discretion.”44 In a 
1987 study on technology base management, the Defense Science Board 
(DSB) asserted that, “a successful laboratory requires discretionary 
basic research funding for its long term viability.”45 The DSB 
recommended that “at least 5 percent, and up to 10 percent, of the 
annual funding of Federal laboratories” should consist of ILIR funds, 
the same percentage recommended in the Packard study. 
The Congress agreed.  Worried that the U.S. might be losing some of 
its technological superiority over the Soviet Union, Congress asked its 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to assess the health of the 
defense technology base.  In April 1989, the OTA issued a 
comprehensive report called Holding the Edge: Maintaining The Defense 
Technology Base that addressed, among other things, technology base 
funding, including that of the ILIR and IED programs.46 The OTA 
observed: 
 
The ILIR programs serve a number of important purposes….  
Because they are a principal main source of discretionary 
research funds, the Service ILIR programs help the laboratories 
maintain an atmosphere of creativity and research excellence, 
enhance their science and technology base, provide seed money 
that can lead to new research efforts, and assist the laboratory 
directors in hiring new PhDs. 
 
 Despite the broad agreement on the importance of discretionary 
funding in general, and ILIR and IED funding in particular, both 
programs suffered erosion in their funding base beginning in the late 
1960s.  From FYs 1967 through 1980, ILIR funding at the Navy’s 
RDT&E centers decreased by 59 percent, while IED funding decreased 
by 74 percent (adjusted for inflation).  Although the DOD budget 
guidance mentioned above specified that ILIR and IED should not 
constitute more than five percent of a laboratory’s funds, only in 1967 
did the two programs even approach five percent.  In fact, ILIR and IED 
expenditures, as a percent of the total budgets of the Navy RDT&E 
centers, declined significantly after that—between 1967 and 1980, these 
programs dropped from 3.8 percent of total funds to just 1.5 percent. 
 The cancellation of the IED program in 1993 had a particularly 
adverse impact on the centers’ discretionary funds.  In part, an overall 
reduction that year of the DON S&T account caused the termination.  
However, it was also the result of a historically demanding defense of the 
program to Congress.  It was always difficult to explain to congressional 
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staff why the IED program involved only after-the-fact review and 
oversight.47 
 The IED program, like ILIR, was a relatively small account, usually 
around $25 million a year for the DON.  Moreover, when this was 
divided among the various center sites, the individual allotments were 
quite modest in proportion to the overall business base of the sites.  An 
example is in Table 2.3, which shows the size of the IED program at 
NSWC’s Dahlgren Division for FY 1989 through the last year of the 
program.48  Note that most projects received about $100,000, enough on 
average to support one scientist or engineer for a year. 
 
 




2600 2412 2880 1437 1219 
Number of 
Projects  





108 110 115 96 94 
Table 2.3: Independent Exploratory Development Funding at 
NSWC’s Dahlgren Division  
Still, the IED program was especially important as a source of 
discretionary funds for development of ideas generated in the ILIR and 
other basic research programs, often scaling up the nature of the basic 
work to a more realistic physical level. 
In sum, despite the relatively modest sizes of both the ILIR and IED 
programs, they have in the past served important functions, including: 
• Providing funding to the centers for basic and applied research in 
areas important to their missions 
• Enabling innovation 
• Developing and maintaining a cadre of S&Es capable of tracking 
and evaluating the rapidly growing global data base of research 
and new knowledge in order to apply it to problems of naval 
interest 
• Promoting the hiring and development of S&Es 
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• Encouraging and supporting cooperation with universities, 
industry, the NRL, and other DON and DOD laboratories. 
Both programs also have proven track records of productivity, 
measured in terms of output metrics such as technical papers published, 
patents applied for or received, and awards and honors. Metrics for the 
ILIR program are shown in Table 2.4.  
 Even more important is the overall impact of these programs over the 
years in transitioning the results of new discoveries and inventions into 
weapons and warfare systems.  
The cancellation of the IED program, and the general decline in S&T 
funds (especially discretionary funds), have been a major blow to the 
technology base of the centers and have contributed to several worrisome 
trends.  One, these changes have contributed to the workforce shortages 
discussed above, pushing many S&Es who worked on IED efforts into 
other paths of work.  Similarly, lack of discretionary resources 
undermines laboratory directors’ ability to provide the challenging 
opportunities that attract and retain expert technical staff.  From 1995 to 
1999, the centers experienced a 15 percent reduction in the number of 
S&Es with advanced degrees (M.S. and Ph.D.). Figure 2.12 illustrates 
the decline in Ph.D.s as a percentage of new S&E hires in both the 
warfare/centers and NRL. For example, among the new hires in FY 
1997, 45 percent at NRL were Ph.D.s while only 5.6 percent of those at 
the centers had doctorates. For the class of FY 2004, these percentages 
had dropped to 39 percent and 3 percent respectively. While the NRL 
data show several ups and downs in Ph.D. hiring patterns, the data for the 
warfare systems centers show a slow but steady decline in the percentage 
of new S&E hires with doctorates. In fact, from FY 1997–FY 2004 that 
percentage declined by about 46 percent. 
In FY 2004, the NLCCG community’s civilian workforce included 
20,795 S&Es, but only 1,702 of them had Ph.D. degrees— slightly more 
than 8 percent. Table 2.5 shows the percent change in the Ph.D. 
populations at the warfare/system centers and at NRL from FY 1997 to 
FY 2004. The community as a whole experienced almost a 15 percent 
decline.  
As a result, the overall intellectual capacity of the centers is 
threatened, a situation reflected in the output of their ILIR programs: 
they produced 225 published papers and 72 patents/patent applications in 
FY 1996, but by FY 2003 the corresponding figures had dropped to 77 





          
 
Output Metric ’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 
No. Transitions -- 38 35 41 33 38 44 49 50 32 68 
No. Projects 181 197 218 214 206 192 183 195 198 181 151 
Published Papers 393 270 259 225 250 261 270 202 203 142 77 
Submitted Papers 110 90 82 74 59 17 19 54 109 56 17 
Books/Chapters 52 7 20 19 6 8 13 16 8 11 3 
Patents/Patent Applications 79 67 69 72 93 98 99 105 94 99 38 
Government Reports 76 62 68 56 38 27 20 8 19 10 8 
Dissertations 37 10 13 5 3 1 6 5 3 2 2 
Presentations 417 259 369 248 248 234 234 229 220 198 76 
Awards/Honors  79 52 68 39 41 39 48 19 14 39 15 
Funding (Millions of dollars) 15.4 16.8 17 15 13.7 13.1 13 14.2 14.4 15.6 14.0 
Table 2.4: ILIR Program Metrics  
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Figure 2.12: Ph.D. Hiring Trends at the Centers and NRL  
(Source: NLCCG Database) 
 
Lab/Center FY 1997 FY 2004 Percent Change 
NAWC 267 216 -19.1 
NSWC 460 404 -12.2 
NUWC 143 125 -12.6 
SSC 201 162 -19.4 
Center Total 1,071 907 -15.3 
NRL 930 795 -14.5 
NLCCG 
Community Total 
2,001 1,702 -14.9 
Table 2.5: S&Es with Ph.D. Degrees at the Centers and NRL 
 
Further, such reductions undercut the centers’ ability to conduct 
fundamental research in militarily important emerging areas, including 
new fields of interdisciplinary research.  Examples of areas that could be 
affected include nanoscience and advanced materials (e.g., biology-based 
materials, miniature systems, new energetics, advanced electronics), 
directed energy (e.g., high-temperature lasers, high-power microwaves, 
pulsed power), and advanced power (e.g., batterie s, energy storage, 
generation and handling of electric power). 
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The loss of staff with advanced degrees, left unchecked, will also 
reduce the centers’ ability to judge the products the DON receives from 
the private sector.  In other words, their yardstick role in emerging areas 
of science, engineering, and mathematics will become more difficult at 
the very time the need for this internal competence is growing.  As has 
been seen, the centers already outsource a large percentage of their S&T 
effort to obtain support for the in-house component.  To assess that work, 
they must be able to interface, peer-to-peer, with their private sector 
colleagues conducting it. 
2.5 A Growing Demand for In-House Science and 
Technology Capability 
Although S&T resources, especially discretionary resources, going to 
the warfare/systems centers are declining, there are several reasons to 
believe the demand for center capability will grow in the future.  These 
reasons are mentioned briefly below, and then each is discussed in detail. 
One reason to believe this demand for S&T effort will increase is 
that the continued growth in outsourcing will eventually require a 
commensurate strengthening of the centers’ yardstick competence.  The 
Federal Government must have objective technical advice about the 
quality, military relevance, and overall worth of the contracted work.  
This can be obtained only through sources insulated from pressures to 
profit.  Otherwise, it cannot be an intelligent consumer of private sector 
products.  Indeed, the absence of such advice could waste precious 
defense resources or, worse yet, undermine national security. 
 A second factor indicating a future increased demand for center S&T 
capability is the growing reluctance of defense companies to invest their 
own resources in long-term, high-risk research.  This is part of a general 
trend that has affected most commercial technology companies, and it 
could mean the DOD will have to look elsewhere, including to its own 
Service laboratories and centers, for many of the innovations needed in 
the global war on terrorism and other conflicts.  A recent article in the 
press addressed this issue, noting, “It is not unusual to hear defense 
officials complain that contractors are too focused on their financial 
bottom lines, rather than on the quality of their new products and the 
needs of the customer.  They also blame the industry’s rapid 
consolidation into a handful of conglomerates for a perceived decline in 
technical innovation.”49 
 A third factor involves the remolding of the industrial base by the 
on-going process of defense transformation Secretary Rumsfeld has 
begun.  The point here is that the effort could result in less DOD 
investment in big-ticket weapon systems and platforms, a development 
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that would jeopardize the funding base of today’s major defense 
contractors.  This could, in turn, pressure these companies to further 
reduce all investments, including those in R&D.  Even more 
dramatically, it could force a number of them out of business. The 
implication in either case is that other sources may have to take up the 
slack, which could shift work back to the laboratories and centers. 
 A fourth factor that could interest defense policy makers in increased 
in-house performance of S&T is an inability, or in some cases reluctance, 
in academia to pursue certain kinds of defense research.  In part, this is 
due to causes stemming from the events of September 11, 2001, such as 
increased scrutiny of foreign students at both the graduate and 
undergraduate levels and reductions in student visas. 
 A final factor that militates in favor of increased in-house 
performance of S&T is the globalization of the technology base.  Most 
likely this will intensify demands on the centers’ capability to track, 
assess, and apply this rapidly growing base of new research and 
knowledge. 
 Each of these factors is discussed in more detail in the following 
sections.  Whether or to what extent any or all of them will have the 
impact suggested is yet to be determined.  Nevertheless, they seem to 
increase the likelihood that the DON warfare/system centers will need 
more, not less, in-house S&T capability in the months and years ahead. 
2.6 Increased Outsourcing Calls for a Bigger Yardstick 
 Over the last 50-plus years, there have been innumerable 
authoritative statements regarding the proper roles of DOD’s in-house 
laboratories and centers; these statements show a high level of consensus 
with respect to several of those roles.  Table 2.6 summarizes a few 
examples, but there are many others, most containing variations of the 
same or similar themes.  For example, almost all studies contend that the 
laboratories and centers exist to: 
• Enable the DOD to be a “smart buyer” in the systems 
acquisition process  
• Provide technological expertise in areas of limited interest to the 
private sector  
• Provide an immediate response in time of crisis (wartime, for 
example)  
• Maintain a corporate research and development memory 
• Maintain and provide specialized equipment and facilities 
impractical for the private sector to provide for itself 
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 Jim Colvard, a prominent former Navy laboratory TD, Deputy Chief 
of Naval Material, and Deputy Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management during the Reagan administration, has written extensively 
about in-house laboratories, often about their smart buyer role.  He notes 
that while many in the DOD today believe you can go directly to 
industry with a problem, it is not that simple—a fact attested to by the 
billions of dollars DOD has poured into contractor claims and get-well 
programs over the years.50 
 Colvard describes the absolute necessity of the smart buyer role in 
these practical terms: “The Navy can never contract out its ability to 
understand military problems in technical terms, know who has the 
potential to solve those problems, and be able to verify a correct solution 
technically when it is presented.”  He also argues that what provides 
these capabilities is the interfacing of the laboratories’ and industry’s 
technical infrastructures.   
 “Without that technical capability, the Navy finds itself in the 
position of having an administrative interface—short on technical 
understanding—dealing with industry.” 
 Another aspect of this relationship Colvard mentions is that military 
preparedness is a continuous function, and the rapid response and 
corporate memory roles of the laboratories are critical adjuncts to their 
smart buyer role.  “The retained intellectual residuals from investment in 
the Navy’s science and technology infrastructure are available on 
demand to the Navy.   Knowledge and experience gained through a 
contract operation may well be lost when the contract ends or goes to 
another contractor.” 
 The DOD’s need for the kind of technical competence Colvard 
describes is growing daily because of the large amount of technical work 
contracted out to the private sector.  As the Department moves to 
outsource even more of its work, it will increasingly need an internal 
yardstick to assess whether the product it is getting is what it is 
advertised to be, and not just a cheaper—not to mention useless—
substitute. 
 Paradoxically, DOD’s increased outsourcing of technical work 
makes it more difficult for the centers to assess technical competence, 
because to do so, they must be knowledgeable performers of hands-on 
technical work themselves.  The more work contracted out, the greater 
the importance of a basic level of in-house technical proficiency.  In the 
increasingly complex world of S&T, this means having S&Es who are 




White House Report 
(1979)51 
Director of Navy Labs 
Report (1980)52 
Federal Advisory Commission 
(1991)53 
White House Report 
(1994)54 
-  Yardstick or smart 
Buyer 
-  Mission-oriented 
studies, tech analyses 
and evaluation 
-  Corporate memory 
-  Independent test & 
evaluation 
-  Rapid/quick response 
capability 
-  Mandated in-house 
performance 
responsibilities 
-  Provide large/unique 
R&D facilities not 
commercially feasible 
-  Yardstick or smart buyer 
-  Advanced capability in 
areas of limited interest to 
private sector 
-  Rapid/quick response 
capability 
-  Provide large/unique 
facilities not  
commercially feasible 
-  Infuse “art of the possible” 
into defense planning 
-  Provide full-spectrum 
capability 
-  Yardstick or  smart buyer 
-  Infuse “art of possible” into 
defense planning 
-  Act as principal agent in 
maintaining tech base 
-  Avoid technological surprise & 
ensure technological innovation 
-  Support the acquisition process 
-  Provide large/unique  R&D 
facilities not commercially feasible 
-  Rapid/quick response capability 
-  Be a constructive advisor for DOD 
directions and programs based on 
technical expertise 
-  Support the user in the application 
of emerging and new technology 
-  Translate user needs into 
technology Requirements for 
industry 
-  Serve as S&T training ground for 
civilian and military acquisition 
personnel 
-  Lowest cost to the Sponsor 
-  Improve planning and 
avoid technological 
Surprise 
-  Rapid/quick Response 
Capability 
-  Flexibility and 
Responsiveness 
-  Inherently governmental 
tasks  
-  Corporate memory 
-  Technology and systems 
integration 
-  Reducing management 
complexity 
-  Continuity of Personnel 
and Facilities Across a 
System’s Lifecycle 
-  Long-term/low pay-off 
essential military R&D 
Table 2.6: Examples of Roles Performed by DOD Laboratories and Centers
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  Conversely, loss of this internal technical competence means loss of 
control over outsourced work, which can have catastrophic consequences 
for any business, public or private.  Colvard cites several examples of 
what can happen when such technical capability is lost or technical 
advice ignored.55 
• ValuJet lost technical control of its fleet and was grounded after 
one of its jets crashed in the Florida Everglades in 1996.  The 
company had contracted out all maintenance and lost the ability 
to recognize its technical troubles.  Further, there are reports 
that the government inspector who monitored ValuJet was not 
technically qualified. 
• NASA decided to go through with the doomed Challenger launch 
in 1986, despite technical advice to delay it because of cold 
weather's effects on the space shuttle's O-rings.  The decision 
was managerial, not technical.  It was reported that the 
contractor's regional manager suggested to the engineer who 
provided the technical advice that the company not appear 
uncooperative, since the contract was coming up for rebid.  
Barbara Romzek and Melvin Dubnick, authors of American 
Public Administration: Politics and the Management of 
Expectations (MacMillan, 1991), say “there has been a shift in 
NASA from a system of professional accountability, which 
emphasizes deference to expertise within the agency, to a 
management system incorporating bureaucratic accountability.”  
• The Navy lost its surface-launched missile engineering 
capability, at least for the short term, in a defense industry 
shakeout that followed the Cold War. General Dynamics Corp. 
operated the Navy Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant in 
Pomona, Calif., for years.  The organization ultimately moved to 
Tucson, Ariz., after being shifted from General Dynamics to 
General Electric to Raytheon.  Many people who had worked for 
years building Navy missiles did not relocate. 
 This incident with General Dynamics demonstrates why the DOD 
must retain the technical capability to assess the products it gets.  Even if 
the company’s move made sense from a shareholder’s perspective, as 
Colvard points out, it left the Navy to rebuild a technical capability that 
had already cost taxpayers billions of dollars.  Further, when an airline 
loses its ability to oversee the technical product it is getting from its 
suppliers—perhaps with devastating consequences—flyers can at least 
turn to another air line.  The DOD, however, may not be able to turn to 
other suppliers because of the recent, extensive consolidation of the 
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defense industrial base, which has left the Department with few 
competitors in many important areas. 
 The second space shuttle disaster also likely occurred, in part, 
because of loss of technical control over an outsourced product.  In this 
case, Boeing shifted space shuttle engineering offices from California to 
Texas.  Unfortunately, some 80 percent of the 500 employees refused to 
move, forcing Boeing to hire new employees, including many engineers.  
The STS-107 shuttle mission was the first one for which the new Texas 
office had primary responsibility.  Engineers who did not move to Texas 
argued after the disaster that they would have reached a different 
conclusion about the damage the foam impact might have caused.  If so, 
the loss of corporate memory resulting from the transition could have 
partly caused this tragedy.56 
 Extensive outsourcing has in fact begun to affect the DOD’s bottom 
line, causing a reaction that underscores the necessity of the laboratories’ 
yardstick role.  As one author puts it, “the trials and tribulations 
experienced in various Pentagon big -ticket programs in recent years 
have prompted a thorough self -examination at the Defense Department.  
At issue is who really is to blame for failures, cost overruns and an 
overall dearth of innovation.”57 The author further points out that the 
DOD is rethinking its management approach, “so it can become a ‘smart 
buyer,’ better equipped to oversee increasingly complex technologies, 
and to determine if a potentially innovative technology is worth the 
financial risk.”  Contractors’ overemphasis on the bottom line may in 
fact help account for problems in such programs as space and 
information technology.  But these problems “can also be attributed to a 
gradual decline in the Defense Department’s in -house expertise to 
manage and oversee highly intricate weapon systems and vast network 
integration efforts.”  
 In “The Case Against Privatizing National Security,” Ann Markusen, 
a university professor and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, 
also discusses how and why many defense officials are beginning to 
reexamine their faith in outsourcing: 
 
[Privatizing] military research and development is especially 
problematic.  Traditionally, the United States has maintained 
strong in -house research and development laboratories to work 
on sensitive and pressing technical issues.  These laboratories 
have contributed to the technological superiority of the 
American military….  They have acted as reservoirs of expertise 
than can be used to oversee, evaluate, and compete with private -
sector research and development efforts, a “yardstick” function 
that economists and defense experts have always considered 
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appropriate for government. Yet in 2000, the Defense Science 
Board recommended that the services hire scientists and 
engineers ‘from universities, industry, and nonprofits for a 
majority of the professional staffs of the defense laboratories.’  
This is considered dangerous by insider critics, because it will 
degrade the ability of the defense laboratories as performers of 
research and as evaluators of for-profit research performance 
[leaving] the military dependent upon advice that is not 
insulated from commercial interests. 58 
 
 A final indication the privatization trend may be winding down is 
that the revivalist fever it engenders is sure to abate as it always has in 
the past, every time the evangelists of outsourcing manage to reap a new 
wave of temporary converts.  This is especially the case once the 
shortcomings and excesses of the new movement become apparent.  In 
fact, an examination of the historical record discloses that today’s faith in 
privatization is just another swing in a recurring historical cycle.59 As has 
been noted, the pendulum may already be once again swinging back in 
favor of rebuilding DOD’s capacity to do more in-house work. 
2.7 Reluctance of Defense Companies to Invest in Long-
Term/High-Risk Research 
 A second major factor that argues in favor of increased in-house 
performance of S&T in certain areas of defense is a growing 
unwillingness in the private sector to engage in technical work that 
involves long-term and/or high-risk investments of their own money.  
Commercial companies, including many in the technology sector, are 
primarily interested in a quick return on investment to boost profits and 
please shareholders.  This is equally true as regards the defense industry, 
where large companies are focusing their dwindling in-house R&D 
efforts on things like risk reduction and cost containment, with little of 
their own money going toward developing innovative technologies.60 
 A report by Booz Allen Hamilton discusses in some detail this trend 
of disinvestment in research by defense companies.61 It points out there 
are basically three sources of R&D funds for the defense industry: 
• The U.S. Government for funded development programs 
(contract research and development) 
• Company-sponsored research and development 
• Independent Research and Development (IR&D) paid for by the 
government, but spent at the discretion of the contractor 
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 With respect to the third funding source—IR&D (also abbreviated as 
IRAD)—the report points out a few problems, including a growing 
national security risk.  First, “discretionary IR&D funds are becoming 
less discretionary; simply put, the ‘I’ in ‘IR&D’ is slipping away.”  
Second, IR&D is increasingly “aligned toward near-term programs or 
used to warrant the development of a specific deliverable rather than 
long-term independent research and development.  While the near-term 
risks to the contractor haven’t increased, the long-term risks to the U.S. 
and its citizens have increased even more.” In 1996 for example, 75 
percent of the IR&D investments by space companies fell in the 
discretionary category, a figure that declined to just 23 percent by 2000.  
Instead, more IR&D was directed toward near-term programs—from 20 
percent in FY 1996 to 45 percent in 2000—and toward developing a 
specific deliverable—from just 5 percent in FY 1996 to 32 percent in FY 
2000.  Long-term independent R&D decreased proportionately. 
 Not only has defense industry R&D investment become less 
discretionary and more devoid of risk, it has also dwindled in overall 
size.  For example, over this same period (1996 through 2000), company-
sponsored R&D investment (the first two categories mentioned above), 
as a percent of several large defense and aerospace companies’ sales, fell 
from 4.1 to 2.9, a decline of almost 30 percent.62 
 Some argue that the fall-off in company IR&D resulted in part from 
changes to the 1971 law that allowed companies to recover their IR&D 
expenses as general and administrative overhead to build their 
technology base.  A recent report by the Potomac Institute for Policy 
Studies argues this point:63 
 
Companies with IR&D programs in excess of $4 million were 
required: (1) to submit a technical plan describing each 
technical project, which the DOD would evaluate for “potential 
military relevance”; (2) to negotiate an agreement with the 
DOD which established an IR&D ceiling for recovery…; (3) to 
present an on-site review of its IR&D program to the DOD at 
least once every three years.  In December 1991, responding to 
pressure from industry to simplify the process and to allow full 
recovery of IR&D expenses, Congress passed PL-102-190, 
which stated that “independent research and development and 
bid and proposal costs of DOD contracts shall be allowable as 
indirect costs on covered contracts to the extent that such costs 
are allocable, reasonable, and not otherwise unallowable by law 
or under the Federal Acquisition [Regulations] (FAR).”  
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 This change allowed companies to fully recover their IR&D 
expenses, but it also negated the requirement for IR&D ceiling 
negotiations with DOD, and for industry reporting and DOD review and 
oversight.  According to the Potomac Institute report, two important but 
unintended consequences resulted: 
 
First, it allowed (thus effectively encouraged) industry to reduce 
overhead rates by reducing IR&D investments.  IR&D budgets 
shrank to less than half their levels before the law change, and 
the character of IR&D work became nearer-term (more like bid 
and proposal funding)….  Second, the DOD and industry lost 
overnight a forcing function to encourage and assure access by 
individual performers to each other’s research and development, 
ending a period of many years of mutually advantageous 
technical communication and leverage between the public and 
private sectors. 
 
 Regardless of the cause, the defense industry is investing less of its 
own money in new, innovative technologies. Unless the trend is 
reversed, defense companies will be less and less able to provide 
solutions the DOD requires, with the result that the Department’s in-
house laboratories and centers may become an increasingly attractive 
alternative. 
2.8 Impact of Defense Transformation on Defense Industrial 
Base 
 A third factor that may well impact in-house versus out-of-house 
performance of defense basic and applied research is DOD’s on-going 
defense transformation effort.  At issue is the following question: how 
will transformation affect the ability of the major defense companies to 
provide new technologies? 
 Some observers are beginning to suggest the shift away from the 
acquiring major weapon systems and toward developing new 
technologies that address terrorist threats may imperil these companies’ 
long-term survival.  For example, some defense officials and analysts 
believe that proposed funding cuts in such major programs as Lockheed 
Martin’s F/A-22 stealth fighter and Northrup Grumman’s shipbuilding 
and repair programs may foreshadow other cuts to big-ticket programs. 
 One defense industry source quoted in a recent story on this subject 
said such changes “raise the question of how large defense contractors 
will stay in the game as the Pentagon puts less emphasis on buying big 
platforms such as aircraft carriers and stealth fighters in quantity and 
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more on technologies designed to meet emerging security threats, 
including countering bioterrorism, developing new non-lethal and kinetic 
energy weapons, and fostering joint service science and technology 
efforts.”64 
 The potential impact of defense transformation is also the subject of 
another recent article that examines how changing defense investments 
may fundamentally reshape the defense industrial base.65 One source 
quoted is Suzanne Patrick, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 
Industrial Policy, who believes “we’ll have a completely different set of 
actors…in terms of corporations that we will draw on….  Of the current 
companies that exist, there may be a modest subset of the primes that still 
will be recognizable.”  Perhaps more ominously, she also predicts that 
two or three of these companies “will go belly up,” while three to five 
“may change quite dramatically, getting into other activities and tasks” 
that suit the soldiers’ needs. 
It remains to be seen whether the small number of major defense and 
aerospace companies we have today will weather the change promised 
both by budget cuts and budget restructuring in response to defense 
transformation.  If, however, they falter, where will the DOD look for the 
technology products it relied on them to produce?  Again, one source 
may well be its own in-house laboratories and centers. 
2.9 Limitations on Academia’s Performance of Defense 
Science and Technology 
 As discussed early in this chapter, historically the DOD has relied on 
academia to perform much of its basic and applied research.  In fact, 
academia performs the largest share of the Department’s overall defense 
basic research program.  According to National Science Foundation 
(NSF) data, U.S. universities and colleges performed 56 percent of all 
federally funded basic research in 2002.66 
 There are, however, reasons to believe it may become more difficult 
to get universities to undertake defense work, at least in certain areas.  If 
so, alternative sources will be required, and these could include DOD’s 
in-house laboratories and centers.  There are several reasons for this 
postulated change, but most can be attributed to the security-conscious 
environment growing out of the events of September 11, 2001. 
 Even before “9/11,” there were several long-standing constraints to 
unfettered performance of defense S&T by academia.  Many of these 
were, and remain, self-imposed.  For one, most colleges and universities 
prefer to focus on fundamental (basic and applied) research, the results of 
which can be published without restriction.  For another, academia 
prefers to eschew classified work, which when done is often confined to 
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off-campus facilities.  The MITRE Corporation is an example of an off-
site organization set up to do classified work related to defense research 
performed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) on behalf 
of the Air Force. Another historical constraint involves the cost of 
facilities and/or equipment which are, in many cases, so large as to 
prohibit private ownership. 
 After 9/11 the constraints on academic performance of research 
became even more restrictive, and significantly so.  These new 
circumstances promise to curb the growth of academic performance of 
defense S&T in some areas by threatening the four principal values 
under with most universities operate.  According to Eugene Skolnikoff, 
emeritus professor of political science at MIT, these values are 
“commitment to openness, resistance to classified research, maintaining 
open relationships between universities and industry (including foreign 
industry) and, of course, relations with foreign students.” 67 Academia 
will likely react to threats to its long-held values by reducing research in 
certain areas, for example biological agents.  Part of the difficulty stems 
from the fact that all technologies are dual-use. That is, any technology, 
regardless of the use for which it was created, can be turned to 
malevolent ends.  Complicating the situation is the fact that many 
technologies are becoming both inexpensive and commercially available.  
This makes it easier for both state and non-state actors to acquire them 
for terrorist purposes.  History demonstrates that almost any kind of 
technological knowledge will eventually leak out and proliferate 
throughout the world.  And today, the rate of diffusion is greatly 
accelerated in a highly interconnected global community.  Further, it is 
practically impossible to predict how a new technology will eventually 
be applied, especially in conjunction with other technologies that may 
enable a completely unforeseen application. 
 Skolnikoff further notes that in the post-9/11 environment, two 
diametrically opposed forces will likely complicate academic 
performance of defense research.  One, most research universities are 
prospering, and in doing so are increasingly engaging in international 
activity.  They educate more foreign students and carry out more 
collaborative efforts that involve foreign researchers, institutions, and 
companies.  In fact, some academic departments would find it difficult or 
even impossible to operate without foreign students.  At the same time, 
however, the U.S. is becoming more concerned over threats from abroad, 
and is seeking to limit some of the very activity universities are engaging 
in now more than ever. 
 The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has examined the 
possible impacts of counter terrorism actions on R&D and higher 
education.68  They note that while there is widespread agreement on the 
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need for such new measures, some could have unintended consequences.  
For example, many new restrictions aim to limit access to scientific and 
technical information.  These include “controlling access to research and 
development laboratories, self -policing, classification and 
reclassification of already released materials, withdrawal of information 
from Federal agency websites, possible additional exemptions from the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and withholding information 
categorized as ‘sensitive but unclassified.”  There is also a growing list 
of new or proposed restrictions dealing with access to biological agents.  
These include “proposals to register users of potentially toxic biological 
and chemical agents; to inventory laboratories that conduct research 
using pathogenic biological agents; to limit access to research and 
development laboratories and biological research agents; and to give tax 
preferences to firms that deal with bioterrorism.”  Some specific 
unintended consequences are the following: “high financial costs, 
especially to academic laboratories, of instituting security and tracking 
measures, the possible deleterious impacts on freedom of scientific 
information exchange and scientific inquiry, and the possible loss to the 
United States of foreign technical workers in areas of short supply 
among U.S. citizens.” 
 The issue of foreign graduate students and national security is 
another factor affecting academia’s ability to do defense-related research.  
This is all the more true because, while American students are rejecting 
graduate study in mathematics, engineering, and the physical sciences, 
the numbers of international graduate students in these areas has 
increased.  Today, for example, in the U.S. more engineering doctorates 
are awarded to international than domestic students.  According to NSF 
data, the number of new U.S. doctorates earned by students on temporary 
visas rose from about 4,300 in 1986 to about 8,000 in 1991, a figure 
around which it has fluctuated for a decade.  Significantly, foreign 
students, both temporary and permanent visa holders, earn a larger 
proportion of doctorates than at any other degree level.69 
 Aside from the question of whether foreign students remain in the 
U.S. and contribute to our S&T resources, there are concerns about 
admitting large numbers of them to American universities and allowing 
many of them to stay after graduation.  Issues surrounding this 
controversy burst into the open in the spring of 2002, when DOD 
proposed a new policy aimed at the handling of unclassified research in 
both DOD and private-sector laboratories.70 According to Science, the 
proposed policy “would have Pentagon program managers decide if 
DOD-funded studies at universities, companies, or military laboratories 
involve critical research technologies, or critical program information.  
If so, the institutions and researchers conducting the work would have to 
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prepare detailed security plans, label documents as protected, obtain 
prior review of publication and travel plans, and decide whether to place 
restrictions on any foreign scientists involved in the project."71 Many of 
the areas that such a policy would affect are precisely those in which 
additional talent is needed. 
 As with the effects of defense transformation on major defense 
companies, the effects of these changes remain to be seen.  They are, 
however, further reasons the DOD should retain a highly trained S&T 
workforce capable of performing work in areas academic  researchers no 
longer pursue. 
2.10 Changes in Center S&T Capability Required by 
Globalization  
Globalization72 is a much talked about subject, especially its impact 
on the ability of the U.S. to remain a world leader in innovation.  
Discussions of globalization and technological innovation often include 
three aspects: technological generation, technological exploitation, and 
technological collaboration.  All of these are important in the context of 
this book, because globalization of sources of new research and 
knowledge will place new demands on the S&Es in the DON 
warfare/systems centers concerning their ability to track, assess, and, 
when appropriate, apply this rapidly growing knowledge to military 
problems.  The challenge of globalization to American technical 
leadership is of growing concern to U.S. policy makers, especially its 
economic and national security implications.73 
 An important point to note regarding collaboration is that today, only 
a handful of firms and other organizations can innovate alone.  More and 
more frequently, innovation requires a network of organizations working 
together.  This is especially true in the case of the most valuable, 
knowledge-intensive, and complex technologies, such as computers, 
semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, aircraft, and 
biotechnology.  Moreover, the ever more rapid dispersion of scientific 
knowledge around the world means an increasing percentage of what 
many refer to as innovation networks involves a mix of global partners.  
This subject is further discussed in Chapter 4, which addresses the need 
to fashion a new DOD S&T enterprise. 
 The rapidly accelerating accumulation of intellectual capital—
including an advanced S&E workforce—in other countries has 
worrisome implications.  Especially noteworthy is Asia’s increasing 
homegrown technical capability, exemplified by the rapid growth in the 
number of students receiving S&E doctorates from Asian institutions.74 
Diana Hicks, chair of the Department of Public Policy at the Georgia 
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Institute of Technology, has compiled extensive data on the 
strengthening of research capability in Asian countries.  She points out 
that the global landscape is changing because, during the past decade, 
“many governments, convinced that their economic futures lay with 
knowledge-based economies, sought to strengthen national research and 
education.”  Further, “Increased foreign scientific competitiveness may 
be little noticed from within the U.S…whose output still dwarfs that of 
any other country.  Nevertheless, in aggregate these shifts are beginning 
to have an impact on U.S. research.”75 In other words, these countries 
are acquiring high-end innovation capabilities by purposefully focusing 
their investments in R&D and technical talent.  Significantly, it is not just 
a matter of other countries building their capabilities; it is the 
development of very broad technical infrastructures that matters in the 
long term. 
 Already, these trends are affecting U.S. research outputs relative to 
the rest of the world. The “Task Force on the Future of American 
Innovation,” which examined this issue in detail, points out that the U.S. 
share of S&E papers published worldwide declined from 38 percent in 
1988 to 31 percent in 2001, with Europe and Asia being responsible for 
the bulk of recent growth in scientific papers.76 In fact, the Task Force 
notes that Western Europe’s output passed the U.S. in the mid-nineties, 
and Asia’s share is rapidly growing.  Moreover, from 1988 to 2001, “the 
U.S. increased its number of published S&E articles by only 13 percent.  
In contrast, Western Europe increased its S&E article output by 59 
percent, Japan increased by 67 percent and countries of East Asia, 
including China, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, increased by 492 
percent.”77 
 The downward trend in U.S.-authored scientific and technical 
articles is evident in most fields, with the greatest decrease occurring in 
engineering and technology articles (down 26 percent between 1992 and 
1999).78 Other declines over this period included articles in mathematics, 
physics, chemistry, and oceanography, all of which are important to the 
DOD.  Figure 2.13, which is taken from a slide in an April 2005 briefing 
by the DDR&E illustrates a striking example of the increase in 
publications in physics from countries other than the U.S, a field of 
critical import to the DOD. 
 Perhaps one of the most important points about the globalization of 
technology is the growing offshore accumulation—“off-shoring”—of 
intellectual capital and industrial capability in many important 
technologies.  If not dealt with soon, such trends may well threaten the 
ability of the DOD to maintain its technological lead over adversaries. 
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Figure 2.13: Trends in the Publications of U.S. Physics Papers 
(Source: April 2005 Briefing by DDR&E Base on American Institute 
of Physics Data) 
  Consider just one example—technological globalization’s threat to 
the electronics sector.  According to an unpublished report by the 
distinguished Pentagon Advisory Group on Electron Devices (AGED), 
the “Department of Defense faces shrinking advantages across all 
technology areas due to the rapid decline of the U.S. electronics 
sector….off-shore movement of intellectual capital and industrial 
capability, particularly in microelectronics, has impacted the ability of 
the U.S. to research and produce the best technologies and products for 
the nation and the warfighter….  DOD is forced to rely on perceived 
system integration advantages to maintain superiority.”79 The group 
argues this could force the DOD to obtain the most advanced 
technologies from overseas, a situation that could assign those nations 
both political and military leverage.  According to the AGED, “In the 
area of battlefield communications and data networks, the global 
availability of wireless communications and high data rate fiber optical 
landlines has greatly reduced this advantage even against the less 
sophisticated terrorist threat.  Use of best commercial chips and 
processors levels the playing field for allies and adversaries.”  
 Off-shoring is accelerating daily.  The manufacturing sector was the 
first to experience it, beginning in the 1980s and 1990s.  However, the 
trend began to impact the service sector soon after with customer service 
centers and other service-oriented functions being handed off to India 
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and other Asian countries.  Engineering and medical services are just two 
areas where this trend has had a major impact. 
 More recently, however, a growing number of U.S. companies are 
farming out their R&D—indeed, their very ability to innovate—to off-
shore entities, ostensibly to cut costs and get their high technology 
products to market faster.  For example, major firms such as Dell, 
Motorola, and Philips are now buying complete designs for many of their 
digital devices from Asian developers, then “tweaking them to their own 
specifications, and slapping on their own brand names.” 80 
 A related consequence is that while many U.S. companies are 
downsizing at home, they are boosting hiring at their laboratories in 
India, China, and even Eastern Europe.  This drains high-tech investment 
capital away from the U.S. and into these countries, a point Battelle 
makes in its most recent R&D funding forecast: “the U.S. industrial 
community will be strained to invest in U.S. R&D as China, India, and 
other Asian economies develop their own technological capabilities and 
draw off investments to support their own burgeoning markets that might 
normally go to U.S. facilities.”81 
 Unquestionably, the line that divides commodity work and R&D is 
sliding year by year. “The implications for the global economy are 
immense.  Countries such as India and China, where wages remain low 
and new engineering graduates are abundant, likely will continue to be 
the biggest gainers in tech employment and become increasingly 
important suppliers of intellectual property.”82  
 As a result, there is a growing consensus among U.S. government 
and many business leaders that off-shoring threatens economic and 
national security.  A recent report by the PCAST voiced concerns that 
“while not in imminent jeopardy, a continuation of current trends could 
result in a breakdown in the web of innovation ecosystems that drive the 
successful U.S. innovation system.”83 That is to say, while a snapshot 
might suggest all is well, the trends tell a different story—there is no 
room for complacency.  The story told by the “slope” of the trend lines 
suggests a currently stable situation may well be heading into one of 
instability.  This is a point developed in detail in Chapter 3. 
2.11 A Call for a New DOD S&T Enterprise 
 Changes in the environment in which its laboratories and centers will 
be operating in the 21st century have begun to undermine the approaches 
the DOD previously used to maintain technological superiority over our 
adversaries.  The rapid spread of capabilities derived from new 
technologies, now widely available on a global basis, raises important 
new questions.  For one, how can the DOD mine and employ these 
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technologies to maintain its technological dominance?  For another, will 
the DOD’s current approaches to the process of technological innovation, 
especially those that appertain to the D&I phases, sustain us in the 21st 
century? 
 Clearly, more in-house S&T capability than we have today will be 
needed.  In fact, it will have to be increasingly sophisticated for the DOD 
to remain a peer-player on the global technology scene.  Regrettably, 
however, just as these demands are growing, the very S&T workforce the 
DOD needs is dwindling and in urgent need of renewal, especially in 
light of its recent deterioration.  Indeed, some policy-makers have 
recognized this need, and proposed new initiatives aimed at bolstering 
the S&T workforces in the in-house laboratories and centers, but these 
are far from sufficient.84 
 It is nearly axiomatic that an organization remains “world-class” by 
hiring and retaining productive, high-quality people, including a few—
the top 10-percent—who have exceptional talent.  This is especially true 
of cutting-edge S&T organizations.  Thus, if the DOD S&T enterprise is 
to remain world-class, it needs the flexibility to do whatever is necessary 
to hire, train, and retain a cadre of the best and brightest scientific and 
engineering talent available—world-class talent. 
 What is needed is a fresh look at the entire innovation process, and in 
particular, the role of the DOD’s in-house laboratories and centers and 
their workforces.  What is really called for is a new DOD S&T 
enterprise, a subject discussed later. 
Chapter 3 
 




 As stated earlier, a principal purpose of this book is to highlight the 
continuing importance of S&T to DOD in ensuring U.S. military forces 
retain their current technological superiority over any and all adversaries. 
Regrettably, the ability of DOD’s laboratories and centers to perform 
their S&T roles is at risk today largely because of what has happened to 
the workforce they employ to carry out that work.  The previous chapter 
mentioned several factors that threaten the continued vitality of this 
workforce such as its dwindling size and rapid aging. 
 Some of the trends that affect the defense S&T enterprise and its in-
house technical workforce are local to the DOD.  Examples include S&T 
funding trends, outsourcing of technical work, and the impact of past 
BRAC actions on the human capital in the laboratories and centers.  
These and other topics are discussed elsewhere in this book.  There are 
also trends that are national in scope, such as the reluctance of young 
Americans, especially women and minorities, to pursue science and 
engineering careers.  There is a large body of literature that has examined 
U.S. education issues as well as those that relate to the quality of primary 
and secondary (K-12) education in the U.S., and readers who are 
interested in such issues should consult those sources. Much has also 
been written about U.S. graduate and post-graduate education challenges. 
In this regard, a later chapter will address several DOD/DON educational 
initiatives aimed at increasing interest among U.S. students in science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM).  
 Besides local and national trends, there are others that are global in 
scope. Some of these have been mentioned previously , and they 
primarily relate to the rapid accumulation of intellectual capital and 
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technical infrastructure in other parts of the world. Especially noteworthy 
in this regard are trends in several Asian countries, with China being of 
particular concern. 
 Global trends too have been widely discussed and debated, 
especially in the context of their impact on U.S. economic world 
leadership.1,2,3,4,5   However, less attention has been paid to what these 
trends have to say about U.S. national security vis-à-vis other countries, 
or how they might impact this country’s future defense posture.  The fact 
is that some of these trends will have a significant influence on the kind 
of S&T enterprise the DOD will need to meet its 21st century 
warfighting needs, and this will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 This chapter will examine a few of the global trends that directly 
impact the size of the talent pool from which the DOD must recruit its 
future S&T workforce, because it is important to understand the factors 
that determine whether this pool will be adequate for future U.S. national 
security needs.  This chapter will look at trends related to U.S. technical 
output, such as the number of scientific articles published in peer-
reviewed technical journals.  This subject was briefly mentioned in the 
previous chapter, where it was noted that much of the decline in numbers 
of publications has occurred in S&E fields of importance to the DOD, 
e.g., mathematics, physics, chemistry, and oceanography. In this chapter, 
the intent is to “look behind the numbers” in two representative areas of 
significant importance to future defense efforts to see what DOD and 
national security implications they might have.  These areas are 
nanotechnology and EMs.  The discussion here will also describe a 
causal model that addresses a number of trends that will be used to 
illustrate the complexity of predicting future S&E production trends and 
needs, and the fact that much of the data needed to populate such a 
model have not been collected, certainly not in a methodical and 
consistent way. 
3.2 Global Trends and the U.S. S&E Labor Market 
 It has already been noted that the issue of whether the U.S. has 
enough, or the right kinds of S&Es to maintain its S&T technological 
leadership in the world is controversial, and that there are proponents on 
both sides of the debate.  To the extent that human capital in the fields of 
S&E is important for economic growth, this issue also has to do with 
U.S. economic leadership in the world and how globalization could 
affect that leadership. 
 One thing is clear: a number of global trends have a direct bearing on 
the U.S. S&E labor market and, ultimately, the supply of S&Es available 
for employment by DOD’s laboratories and centers. Richard Freeman, 
From Global to Local: Looking Behind the Numbers                                                       55 
the Harvard University economist, identifies two of the most important.6 
First, he notes that by 2001-2002, the U.S. share of students worldwide 
enrolled in tertiary education was 14 percent, less than half the 
proportion in 1970, a figure that contrasts sharply with rising numbers in 
Europe and Asia, especially China. In addition, as late as 1975, the U.S. 
granted more S&E Ph.D.s than Europe, and more than three times as 
many as all of Asia. Now the European Union (EU) countries graduate 
about 50 percent more than the U.S. and Asia has edged slightly ahead of 
the U.S. 
 The second trend discussed by Freeman has to do with the 
decreasing attractiveness of S&E to U.S. students. In short, many U.S. 
S&Es are not all that well paid considering their highly-specialized 
skills. This is a fortiori the case as regards those with Ph.D. degrees 
because of the considerable length of time required to obtain that level of 
education. Too often, the result is that many of the brightest U.S. 
students turn instead to other more lucrative fields such as business, law, 
and medicine, which often require less training, and where the payoff is 
often much greater and comes sooner. These labor market trends are 
important because they directly affect the availability of S&Es with 
advanced degrees to work on S&T problems important to the DOD and 
the military services. 
 In the past, American dominance in most fields of S&E was so 
overwhelming that policy changes related to the U.S. technical 
infrastructure could be taken without any great regard for their global 
implications, particularly how they would affect technological 
competition from other countries. However, this situation has changed 
rapidly in the last decade as other countries have begun to build up their 
own technical infrastructures and pools of talented S&Es. As a result, 
many foreign students who once considered American universities as 
their only choice for studying S&E now find they have equally attractive 
options in other countries, including, in a growing number of cases, their 
own. To the extent there is a significant diminution in this pool of foreign 
talent, it will be reflected in the size of the pool of S&E talent available 
to the U.S. and, consequently, to the DOD.  
 Such workforce issues and their national security implications were 
the primary focus of a recent Engineering Dean’s Council Public Policy 
Colloquium held in Washington, D.C. The colloquium, “Engineering’s 
Role in the Nation’s Future,” involved a group of more than 100 deans of 
engineering schools who heard a number of speakers address this 
subject. Congressman Jim Cooper (D-TN), who gave the keynote 
address, expressed growing worry over the future of American 
competitiveness in the world. Among other points, Cooper noted that “In 
today’s business world, a strong foundation in science and engineering is 
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vital to success.” In this regard, he noted that “Enrollment in science and 
engineering graduate programs among American students dropped 10 
percent between 1994 and 2001, while it rose 35 percent among 
international students. We clearly have to do a better job of encouraging 
America’s young men and women to seriously pursue studies in the 
fields if we want them to succeed and we want the American economy to 
continue to lead.” 
 As Cooper and many other individuals and groups have noted, the 
U.S. is still in the lead in most areas that are important to American 
competitiveness.  However, just as a snapshot taken half way through a 
horse race is not a good predictor of which horse will ultimately win the 
race, a snapshot of today’s global trends will not reveal where the U.S. 
may be headed in the future. A better understanding of our future 
direction as a nation can only be glimpsed by collecting and analyzing 
relevant trend data.  There are many sources of such data; however, the 
NSF has one of the most comprehensive and authoritative collections, 
and a look at these data reveal a number of important facts, some of 
which are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs. These data can 
be found in the NSF compilation referred to herein as Indicators 2004.7 
 While the number of college age students in the U.S. has been fairly 
steady over the last 25 years, and is projected to remain steady for the 
next several years, competing countries such as China and India have 
college age populations that are very much larger than that of the U.S. 
(several hundred percent larger). This population advantage alone 
provides a much larger pool of potential students to attend college and 
pursue S&E degrees in these countries. In fact, Freeman suggests that the 
greatest threats to U.S. economic leadership will come from China and 
India in large measure because they are the world’s most populous 
countries. This population advantage means that even if only a small 
proportion of their workforces are dedicated to S&E, the absolute 
numbers of S&E workers will still be large and will feed their R&D 
capabilities. They will also enjoy a significant labor-cost advantage over 
the U.S. in the S&E field for at least the foreseeable future, a factor that 
makes them a highly desirable target location for technology firms 
involved in global trade.  In addition, in several foreign countries the 
number of students in the 20-24 age cohort choosing to attend college 
exceeds that of the U.S. For example, the ratio of degrees granted to 24 
year olds in several Organizations for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries (i.e., Australia, New Zealand, 
Netherlands, Norway, Finland, the United Kingdom, and France) 
exceeds that of the U.S.  Furthermore, in a growing number of countries, 
a larger proportion of college students study S&E than in the U.S. This 
stems in part from the growing unattractiveness of S&E occupations for 
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many American students, a point previously noted. Figure 3.1 compares 
first university S&E degrees in Asia and Europe to those granted in 
North America. It shows that both Asia and Europe produce more 






















SOURCE: NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, INDICATORS 2004
 
Figure 3.1: First University Degrees for Different Regions by Field: 
2000 
 According to the NSF, in the year 2000 some 17 percent of all 
university bachelor-level degrees in the U.S. were in the natural sciences 
and engineering, compared to a world average of 27 percent and to 52 
percent in China. For the past three decades, S&E degrees have made up 
about one-third of U.S. bachelor’s degrees. Corresponding figures were 
higher for China (59 percent in 2001), South Korea (46 percent in 2000), 
and Japan (66 percent in 2001). The contrast is even greater in 
engineering fields where, compared to Asia and Europe, the U.S. has a 
relatively low proportion of S&E bachelor’s degrees in engineering. For 
example, in 2000, students in those two regions earned 40-41 percent of 
their first university S&E degrees in engineering compared to about 15 
percent in the U.S.8 
 In the NSF data, S&E degrees include degrees in Social and 
Behavior Sciences.  In 2000, 1,253,121 first university degrees were 
awarded in US.  Out of these, 398,622 were S&E degrees. Out of the 
398,622 S&E degrees, 188,188 were in the Social and Behavioral 
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Sciences.  Hence, overall 32% (398,622/1,253,121) degrees were 
awarded in S&E fields in US. However, in order to correctly compute the 
influence of these numbers on the US technological leadership, we 
should exclude Social and Behavioral Science numbers from S&E 
numbers.  So, if we exclude Social and Behavior Science degrees from 
S&E, then 17% ((398,622-188,188)/1,253,121) degrees were awarded in 
Natural Sciences and Engineering (these degrees include natural, 
agricultural, and computer sciences, mathematics, and engineering). 
 One conclusion that can be drawn from these data is that students in 
many Asian countries consider an education in S&E as a very desirable 
career path to success.  This is certainly true in China, where engineering 
is highly valued as a career objective.  There, majors in engineering 
account for some 3.7 million students.  Indeed, former President Jiang 
Zemin, current President Hu Jintao, and every member of the nine-man 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China are engineers by 
profession, as are scores of government ministers, governors, chief 
executive officers and entrepreneurs. This situation stands in stark 
contrast to the situation in the U.S., where many, if not most, government 
leaders are trained as lawyers and businessmen. In fact, at present, less 
than 1 percent of the members of the U.S. Congress have a science or 
engineering background. 
 Baccalaureate degree production is important because it feeds the 
graduate level pool of students, and ultimately impacts the number of 
Ph.D. graduates in S&E. These trends in first university degrees strongly 
suggest the number of Ph.D. degrees granted in S&E outside the U.S. 
will rise sharply, whereas the number granted in the U.S. will likely 
remain relatively stable for some years to come. In fact, countries such as 
China that granted few Ph.D. degrees in 1981 increased their number by 
over 61 times (from 125 degrees in 1985 to over 7600 in 2001). Taiwan 
and South Korea have also shown impressive increases in doctoral 
degrees, five-fold and nine-fold respectively, Figure 3.2.  
 As noted, these countries have a large student–aged population that 
is growing, and many will continue to pursue S&E fields. This trend will 
be further stimulated by the rapidly-growing movement on the part of 
U.S. corporations to off-shore technical work to these countries. This 
trend will help fund both the growth of the economies of these countries 
and that of their technical infrastructure. Because of its growing 
importance, the impact of off-shoring on the future S&T enterprise is 
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Figure 3.2: Growth in S&E Doctoral Degrees for Various Countries: 
1985-2001 
 Figure 3.3 compares the growth rate in S&E Ph.D. degrees awarded 
by field and citizenship of recipients. These data show declines in the 
number of doctoral degrees in science, engineering, and mathematics/ 
computer science. The data also show increases in the number of foreign 
citizens earning S&E degrees. The strong growth in S&E doctoral 
degrees awarded by other countries is a further indication of the kind of 
changes that may be expected to occur in the future as other countries’ 
economies and educational systems develop to a level that can more 
equally compete with the U.S. As a result, it can be expected that fewer 
and fewer foreign-born students will feel the need to come to the U.S. in 
order to obtain a Ph.D. degree in many areas of S&E. This trend will also 
affect stay rates and, ultimately, the pool of S&Es available for all kinds 
of work in the U.S., including employment in the defense sector. 
 A closer look at NSF data shows that students from just a few 
foreign countries accounted for nearly 70 percent of all foreign recipients 
of U.S. S&E doctorates from 1985 to 2000. Asian countries sending the 
majority of doctoral students to the U.S. have been China, Taiwan, India, 
and South Korea, in that order. Major European countries of origin have 
been Germany, Greece, the United Kingdom, Italy, and France. 
 
































































Figure 3.3: Growth in U.S. Doctoral Degrees Earned by Field and 
Citizenship: Selected Years, 1977-2001 (Data has been normalized 
using 1977 as the base) 
 In the case of Taiwan, in 1985 their students earned more U.S. S&E 
doctoral degrees than students from India and China combined. The 
Taiwanese number of degrees increased rapidly over the period of 1985 
to 1994 (from 746 in 1985 to 1,300 in 1994). However, as Taiwanese 
universities increased their own capacity for advanced S&E education in 
the 1990s, S&E doctorates earned from U.S. universities by Taiwanese 
students declined to 669 in 2000. Similar trends can be expected in the 
case of other Asian countries.  
 Another interesting trend has to do with the citizenship of the 
majority of S&E post-doctoral students (postdocs) at U.S. universities. 
Here, NSF data show that in the 1970s there was a large difference 
between the number of U.S. postdocs and foreign postdocs at U.S. 
universities: most were U.S. This gap slowly closed over the next 10 to 
12 years and remained small until the late 1990s, when the number of 
foreign postdocs began to increase, while the number of U.S. postdocs 
began to decline. This situation is likely related to the decrease in U.S. 
S&E doctoral degrees and the corresponding increase in foreign S&E 
doctoral degrees shown in Figure 3.3. 
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3.3 U.S. Technical Output Trends 
 The growing scientific and technical infrastructures in Europe and 
Asia have already impacted U.S. leadership in terms of such metrics as 
the numbers of academic papers published in peer-reviewed technical 
journals, citations of those papers, number of patent applications, number 
of patents granted, etc. Citations—the number of times a paper or patent 
is referenced by other researchers or in other patents—are another 
indicator of technical output of a country. In particular, citations provide 
an indication of the paper or patent’s relevance and importance to the 
scientific world. Since it often takes years for some patent applications to 
be approved and the actual patent granted, the number of patent 
applications by a country may be considered a more responsive or 
leading indicator of changes in U.S. technical output than patent awards 
themselves. 
 In terms of output, NSF Indicators 2004 data show that the number 
of U.S. scientific publications has remained essentially flat since 1992, 
while output has grown strongly in Western Europe and several East 
Asian countries. In fact, the number of scientific papers published by 
researchers in the Asia Pacific region could exceed the number from the 
U.S. within six or seven years. According to Science Watch,9 the U.S. 
slide in output has been particularly noticeable in the areas of physics, 
engineering and in materials science. In fact, the “Asia Pacific 
concentration in the physical sciences is even clearer upon examination 
of the detailed subfield covered in National Science Indicators. Between 
2000 and 2004, authors from this region were most heavily represented 
in the subfield designated Materials Science & Engineering, having a 
hand in 54,754 papers, or 42.12% of the 130,004 Thompson10 -indexed 
papers published in that field during the five-year period.” 
 Figure 3.4 depicts the number of S&E articles generated by various 
countries and regions of the world over the period 1988-2001. NSF data 
indicate that in 1998, the production of Western Europe reached the same 
level as that of the whole of North America and has kept pace since that 
time. The number of articles produced by Asian countries has also shown 
rapid growth, with an almost 40 percent increase in article output over 
the period 1988 to 2001.  
 Despite the global trend in publications, the S&E literature of the 
U.S. is most widely cited by non-U.S. scientists. However, the volume 
and world share of citations of U.S. S&E literature have been declining 
as citations of S&E literature from Western Europe and East Asia have 
increased. Trends in citation patterns by region, country, scientific field, 
and institutional sector are indicators of the perceived influence and 
productivity  of   scientific  literature  across   institutional   and  national  
 
 


























SOURCE: NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, INDICATORS 2004  
Figure 3.4: S&E Articles by Region and Country/Economy: 1988-
2001 
boundaries. On the basis of volume, the major producers of scientific 
articles—the U.S., Western Europe, Japan, and other OECD countries—
are those whose S&E literature is most cited. According to NSF 
Indicators 2004 data, “In 2001, the United States’ share of the world’s 
output of cited S&E literature was 44 percent, the largest single share of 
any country. Collectively, the OECD countries accounted for 94 percent 
of the world’s cited scientific literature in 2001 a share that exceeded 
these countries’ share of the world output of S&E articles.” In addition 
to having the most widely cited S&E literature, the U.S. also has the 
largest share of internationally-authored papers and it collaborates with 
the largest number of other countries. But, here again, its lead has 
declined. Other indicators of the technical output of a country include 
patent applications, patent awards, and citations in U.S patents to S&E 
literature. Consider the example of U.S. patents granted by residence of 
the inventor, Figure 3.5. It shows that South Korea and Singapore have 
demonstrated the most rapid growth over the period 1989-2001, with an 
almost 13-fold increase and a 21-fold increase respectively in patent 
applications in the United States. Other impressive increases are 
evidenced by China, Taiwan, and India. Although the U.S. and Japan still 
lead in patent applications, their rates of growth are less impressive. 
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Figure 3.5: U.S. Patents Granted by Residence of Inventor: 1989-
2001 
 Another previously-mentioned indicator of changes in U.S. technical 
output is the number of U.S. patent citations to S&E articles. This is an 
interesting measure because it provides some indication of the linkage 
between research and its practical application. Although existing patents 
are the most often cited  material,  U.S.  patents  increasingly  have  cited  
S&E articles. In fact, according to Indicators 2004 data, the number of 
U.S. patent citations to S&E articles indexed in the Institute for Scientific 
Information’s Science Citation Index11 (SCI) rose more than 10-fold 
between 1987 and 2002. The SCI provides access to current and 
retrospective bibliographic information, author abstracts, and cited 
references found in 3,700 of the world's leading scholarly science and 
technical journals covering more than 100 disciplines. Note particularly 
that most of this growth of article citations in patents was centered in 
huge increases in the life science fields of biomedical research and 
clinical medicine. 
 Figure 3.6 shows how the U.S. has fared over the period 1995-2002 
as compared to other countries and regions in terms of patent citations to 
S&E articles. The rapid increase in citations of S&E research by U.S. 
patents attests to the growing importance of science in practical 
applications of technology. Much of this growth has been driven by 
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increased patenting of research-driven products and processes in the life 
sciences. The U.S. patents most commonly cite articles authored within 
the academic sector, again primarily the life science fields of clinical 
medicine and biomedical research. Industry was the next most widely 
cited sector. The life sciences, particularly biomedical research and 
clinical medicine, dominated nearly every sector, with from 67 to more 
than 90 percent of all citations, including those sectors that had 
prominent citation shares in the physical sciences earlier in the decade 
(industry and FFRDCs). They experienced significant declines in 
citations of articles by these fields, whereas their share of life sciences 
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Figure 3.6: Number of U.S. Patent Citations to S&E Articles: 1995-
2002 
 The small sample of indicators presented above all support the view 
that the U.S. is still highly productive in terms of total scientific output. 
But they also suggest that the current lead the U.S. enjoys in terms of 
world technical and economic leadership may be eroding. There are, 
however, some voices that say this isn’t necessarily a bad thing, at least 
in some areas. For example, Robert Samuelson, who writes frequently on 
economic issues, argues that another country’s gain isn’t necessarily our 
loss. To illustrate his contention, he poin ts out, “if a Swedish or 
Japanese company cured cancer or invented a super-efficient car, 
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Americans would benefit quickly —just as Swedes and Japanese have 
benefited from technologies first developed in the United States.”12  
Samuelson goes on to note that not every new Chinese or Indian scientist 
or engineer poses a threat to the U.S. because, as their economies grow, 
so does their need for technical talent to “design bridges and buildings, 
to maintain communications systems, and to test products.” On the other 
hand, Samuelson notes, “The dangers arise when other countries use 
new technologies to erode America’s advantage in weaponry; that 
obviously is an issue with China. We are also threatened if other 
countries skew their economic policies to attract an unnatural share of 
strategic industries—electronics, biotechnology and aerospace, among 
others. That is an issue with China, some other Asian countries and 
Europe (Airbus).”  
 Despite the words of solace offered by Samuelson and others, the 
rapid rise in the technological might of China is generating considerable 
concern in many quarters. Bruce Stokes has examined many of the pros 
and cons of the debate and provides a good assessment of both in a 
recent article in the National Journal,13 where he had this to say: “Few 
observers here believe that China is an imminent threat to U.S. global 
leadership in science and technology. But few doubt the Chinese 
government’s high-tech aspirations or the trajectory of Chinese 
achievements in recent years. ‘You never want to take a snapshot here,’ 
warned Michael T. Byrnes, president and chief representative in China 
for Tyco international. ‘This is a moving-picture country.’ ”  
 Many of those who dismiss concerns over the growing R&D 
infrastructures and workforces in countries such as China point to the 
fact that the U.S. not only still leads in overall technical output, but also 
leads in terms of its quality. They also maintain that while globalization 
of the S&E workforce may weaken or, in the long-term, even undermine 
American economic leadership, the U.S. as a whole has a strong overall 
innovation system that will help slow this erosion. According to Stokes, 
“The current consensus in Washington is that the best response is to run 
faster than the Chinese: Train more American scientists and engineers, 
spend more on R&D—and innovate, innovate, innovate.” 
 There is no doubt that adding up the numbers of papers and patents 
produced by a country will provide some overall picture of its current 
scientific and technological output. And, as has been seen, such a 
snapshot provides comfort to many here in the U.S. But in truth, such a 
picture does not offer much in the way of insight into how current trends 
may be impacting our future national defense posture. Put simply, if one 
only looks at total numbers of papers in technical journals, the U.S. is 
still in the lead at the moment. However, a closer examination of the U.S. 
portfolio of technical publications provides more interesting insights. For 
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example, it shows that the portfolio is dominated by publications in 
medically-related life sciences (55 percent), while only about a quarter 
(24 percent) are dedicated to the physical sciences, and only eight 
percent to engineering, technology, and mathematics.14  To a significant 
extent, this situation is the result of shifting priorities for Federally-
funded research. Because of its importance, this is a topic considered in 
greater detail in the following paragraphs. 
3.4 Impact of Shifting U.S. Research Funding  
 The growing research focus in the U.S. on the medically-related life 
sciences is largely the result of changing funding priorities of Federal 
departments and agencies. These changing priorities have produced 
significant shifts in the balance of funding among the various fields of 
S&E. A 1999 study15 of research trends commissioned by the National 
Academies' Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy 
(STEP) found that several agencies spent less on research in 1997 than 
they had in 1993. (DOD was down 28 percent). Importantly, these 
agency reductions disproportionately affected most fields in the physical 
sciences (physics, chemistry, and geology), engineering (chemical, civil, 
electrical, and mechanical), environmental (geology, geophysics, 
oceanography, atmospheric sciences, ecological sciences), and 
mathematics, because these fields received most of their support from the 
agencies with reduced funding. The study found that Federal funding 
decreased by 20 percent or more between 1993 and 1997 in four fields: 
mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, and geological 
sciences. The study, however, found growth in several areas, including 
computer sciences and medical sciences. In particular, it noted that most 
recent increases came in research fields supported by the National 
Institutes of Health, largely because Congress doubled that agency's 
budget from FY 1999 to FY 2003. 
 In 2001, the STEP Board published a follow-up16 to its 1999 study of 
Federal research funding trends. It found that funding for the life 
sciences had increased to 46 percent of Federal funding for research in 
1999, compared to 40 percent in 1993, while funding for the physical 
sciences and engineering decreased from 37 percent of the research 
portfolio in 1993 to 31 percent in 1999. Specifically, it found Federal 
funding in 1999 was still below 1993 levels for seven fields of research. 
Five of these fields--physics, geological sciences, and chemical, 
electrical, and mechanical engineering--were down 20 percent or more 
from 1993. The STEP Board concluded that a substantial shift had 
occurred in Federal funding, with significant declines in the physical 
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sciences and certain fields of engineering, and substantial increases in the 
medically-related life sciences. 
 More recently, this issue has been the focus of the previously-
mentioned PCAST, a group established to enable the President to receive 
advice from the business and academic communities on technology, 
scientific research priorities, mathematics, and science education. Its 
members are drawn from industry, education, research institutions, and 
other non-governmental organizations. The PCAST formed a panel on 
"Federal Investment in Science and Technology and Its National 
Benefits" to examine trends in Federal funding for R&D to determine 
their consistency with the nation's present and future needs. As part of its 
effort, the panel commissioned a study by the RAND Corporation to 
examine Federal support for R&D over the past 25 years and compare 
U.S. Federal and private sector R&D investments to those of our global 
competitors. The RAND study17 and other information gathered by the 
panel were then used to develop the final report.18  Its findings and 
recommendations include the following: Federal R&D funding relative 
to GDP continues to decline; private sector R&D investments are 
generally of a different nature than Federal support; and Federal funding 
for the physical sciences and engineering benefits19 all scientific 
disciplines. 
 With regard to our national investment in R&D, the panel notes that 
20 years ago, Federal funding for R&D exceeded that of private industry, 
but today the reverse is true. The panel notes that this is significant, 
because activities emanating from R&D investments that produced new 
growth have never been higher, including increasing numbers of patents 
and discovery disclosures. Indeed, there is strong linkage between 
federally-funded science and innovation. For example, a 1998 CHI 
Research study of the linkage of patent citations to the scientific 
literature found that, of patents granted to U.S. industry, approximately 
73 percent of the science articles cited in the patent resulted from 
publicly-funded science.20  The PCAST panel was not comforted by 
signs of increased private sector funding of R&D, noting: “While strong 
support of R&D by private industry is to be commended, this source of 
funding cycles with business patterns and focuses on short term results 
by emphasizing development of existing technology rather than 
establishing new frontiers. Growing private investments in research do 
not replace the need for Federal support in certain critical areas and for 
long-term basic research, where the benefits cannot be measured in 
short cycles.” 
 PCAST summarizes the funding picture as follows: “As a base point: 
in FY 1970, support for the three major areas of research, namely 
physical and environmental sciences, medically related life sciences and 
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engineering was equally balanced. Today, the medically related life 
sciences receive 48 percent of Federal R&D funding compared to the 
physical sciences’ 11 percent and engineering’s 15 percent. Even if 
physical sciences, environmental sciences, math and computer sciences 
are combined, their total share is 18 percent.21" 
 According to the PCAST, the lack of funding in these disciplines, 
other than those that are medically related, is a cause of concern for a 
number of reasons. First, this has given rise to a situation in which both 
full-time masters and doctoral students in most areas of the physical 
sciences, mathematics, environmental, non-medically-related sciences, 
and engineering are decreasing. Over this same period, the numbers in 
the medically-related life sciences increased. Second, facilities and 
infrastructure in general for S&E are becoming less than adequate for 
meeting the challenges of today’s research problems. Third, it is widely 
understood and acknowledged that the interdependencies of the various 
disciplines require that all advance together.22   In other words, progress 
in such areas as the medically-related life sciences depends on continued 
progress in more fundamental areas, such as physics, chemistry, 
mathematics, and engineering. As an illustration of this latter point, 
PCAST points out that, at IBM, over 95 percent of the Ph.D.s who 
compose its nanotechnology research staff have degrees in the physical 
sciences and electrical engineering, areas in which graduate training is 
largely dependent upon support by the Federal government.23  The 
increasing vitality and exciting discovery-initiating areas of 
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary research and education cannot be 
sustained without investment in the non-medically-related basic sciences. 
Nanotechnology is only one example. The interdisciplinary research 
involving biological, information, nano- and cognitive (neuro-) sciences 
is moving rapidly. To sustain the extraordinary advances being made in 
these interdisciplinary areas, new collaborations in the fundamental, non-
medically-related S&E disciplines must be nurtured now, not in some 
distant future. Indeed, the increasing complexity of advanced technology, 
which integrates multiple disciplines and technologies, depends on 
concurrent advances across many fields. The imbalance in America’s 
scientific portfolio runs a serious risk of adversely affecting the capacity 
for innovation in a range of key sectors and impeding the ability to fulfill 
other critical national missions.24 
 This funding imbalance, with its heavy emphasis on the medically-
related life sciences, has potentially serious implications for national 
defense. This point has been considered by the Council on 
Competitiveness, which suggests three national challenges that face the 
country: improved health care; energy and environmental quality; and 
national defense.25  In each of these areas of national challenge, the 
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Council claims there are both a number of “contributing sciences,” as 
well as a number of “enabling technologies,” providing another 
perspective on the interdisciplinary nature of S&T as it is being done in 
today's world. Therefore, if we are to make headway in meeting national 
challenges in defense, the economy, and social stability, we must also do 
so in the contributing sciences and enabling technologies that underpin 
them, most of which are included among the fields that are, today, 
funded at considerably lower levels than in the past. So, again, we see 
that the physical, environmental, and non-medically-related sciences, 
engineering, and mathematics are pillars on which progress toward 
meeting national challenges stand. 
 The national challenge of defense (including homeland defense) is a 
major concern. The Council cites a number of contributing sciences and 
enabling technologies on which national defense depends. Contributing 
sciences include computer sciences, electromagnetic theory, materials 
sciences, physics, quantum mechanics, robotics, and transport physics. 
Enabling technologies include electronics, computing, the social 
sciences, human-interface technology, manufacturing technology, 
materials technology, nuclear technology, optical technology, and plasma 
technology.26  Because of shifting national funding patterns, many of 
these areas are being reduced in absolute funding levels, with a potential 
negative impact on our ability to meet future national security needs. 
This funding imbalance will also have a negative impact on the 
medically-related sciences because many of the medical devices and 
procedures we benefit from today, e.g., endoscopic surgery, smart 
pacemakers, dialysis machines, imaging technologies (e.g., magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI), Computerized Axial Tomography (CAT) 
scans and Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scans are the result of 
R&D in the physical sciences and engineering.27 
3.5 Global Trends and Implications for DOD: Nano-S&T 
and Energetics Examples 
 As previously discussed, global trends are having a significant 
impact on the position of the U.S. as a leader in S&T output and to the 
extent these trends are not reversed, they will impact the ability of the 
U.S. to compete in a technological and economic sense on a world-wide 
basis. Also, as we have seen, a look behind some of the numbers reveals 
several significant points. First, our current leadership position in terms 
of published papers, patents, etc. is largely due to extensive R&D 
investments by both industry and the Federal government in the 
medically-related life sciences. Second, many areas of importance to the 
DOD are currently under-funded, and this has had an effect on both 
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graduate education and research outputs in these areas. This situation 
raises several questions. For example, while the U.S. is ramping up 
funding for the medically-related life sciences, what are our competitors 
doing in terms of R&D investment strategies? In particular, what are 
those countries that are not only our economic but our military 
competitors as well, for example China and Russia, doing with their 
investments? In the following paragraphs, two areas of S&T will be used 
as examples—nanoscience and energetic materials—to look for answers 
to such questions. 
 Ernest H. Preeg, a Senior Fellow in trade and productivity at the 
Manufacturer’s Alliance/MAPI, has written extensively about China’s 
efforts to become an advanced technology “superstate.” In a recent 
piece28 in The Washington Times, he notes that in April 2005, Premier 
Wen Jiabao summarized the Chinese economic strategy in these stark 
terms:  
 
Science and Technology are the decisive factors in the 
competition of comprehensive economic strength…We must 
introduce and learn from the world’s achievements in advanced 
science and technology, but what is most important is to base 
ourselves on independent innovation… [which] is the national 
strategy.  
 
 Examples cited by Preeg exemplifying China’s advanced technology 
innovation are the planned launch of more than 100 satellites to form a 
global Earth observation system, the Dawning 4,000-A Shanghai 
supercomputer, and the Godson II central processing unit computing chip 
to support the 64-bit Linux operating system. Clearly, the Chinese are 
making strides in several areas of S&T by focusing their R&D 
investments. Stokes says that this year the Chinese hope to spend 1.5 
percent of China’s GDP on R&D, up from just 0.6 percent as recently as 
1996. As a point of reference, in 2003 the U.S. spent 2.6 percent of its 
GDP on R&D.  
 Preeg has also written a recent book called The Emerging Chinese 
Advanced Technology Superstate,29 which examines the rapidly evolving 
technological revolution in China. In it, he estimates that “even if the 
growth rate of Chinese R&D spending slows to only two-thirds of what it 
has been in the past, China will be spending 2.1 percent of its GDP on 
research by 2010. In dollar terms, this would amount to only about half 
of what the United States spends, but it would be 80 percent of the level 
of R&D spending in the European Union, and 40 percent higher than 
such spending in Japan.” Preeg provides an abundance of statistics to 
emphasize the growth of the Chinese pool of scientific and engineering 
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talent. According to his estimates, China has three researchers for every 
five in the U.S.  This year alone, Chinese students will earn nearly 
13,000 doctorates in S&E, about half the number granted in the entire 
U.S., and that gap is narrowing. By 2010, the number of Chinese S&E 
doctorates awarded is expected to exceed those earned in the U.S.  Not 
only that, but the Chinese pipeline of young S&Es is full, unlike ours. In 
fact, S&E account for nearly three in five bachelor’s degrees now 
conferred in China, compared with only one in three in the U.S. Table 
3.1 summarizes a few of the comparisons between the two countries in 












U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China 
1999 - - - - - - 92,349 282 
1999/ 
2000 
- - 1,261 695  -- - - 
2001 - - - - 25,509 7,601 - - 
2002 $277.1 $72.1 - - - - - - 
2005* $330.9 $130.9 1,690 979 24,504 12,838 123,357 2,034 
     *Estimated 
Table 3.1: High-Tech Comparisons Between the U.S. and China  
(Sources: OECD, Projections of Ernest Preeg, Manufacturers 
Alliance Cited in Stokes) 
 While it is certainly true that the quality of Chinese scientific talent 
is not yet up to levels found in the West, it is improving rapidly, and the 
output of that talent is growing rapidly in areas of special interest to their 
government. For example, Stokes observes that “China is currently the 
second-largest producer of technical papers in nanoscience and 
nanotechnology. And more than half of Chinese research papers 
concentrate on chemistry, physics, and mathematics, the seed corn for 
innovation in advanced technology.” These fundamental areas form the 
pillars on which much of the research important to the DOD stands. 
72                                               From Science to Seapower 
Nanotechnology Example 
 It is useful to take a closer look at the field popularly known as 
nanotechnology since it provides a good example of changing global 
trends and how they could impact on our future defense posture. In 
simple terms, nanotechnology involves using single atoms or molecules 
to make electronic circuits and devices, and is a key building block of the 
future. More specifically, it refers to the development and use of 
techniques to study physical phenomena and construct structures in the 
physical size range of 1-100 nanometers, as well as the incorporation of 
these structures into applications.  It has been seen that China is rapidly 
becoming a major center for nanotechnology research. In fact, according 
to Stokes, “China already leads the United States in some key nano 
areas. Chinese scientists can now produce carbon nanotubes 60 times 
faster than their American counterparts can. These tubes—actually 
cylindrical molecules of carbon—can form a substance stronger than 
steel and much, much more conductive than copper.” 
 Chinese technological strides in scientific areas of military 
importance, including nanotechnology, have already caught the attention 
of the DOD. To learn more about the Chinese effort, the ONR recently 
carried out an effort that used text mining techniques to examine the 
research outputs of a number of countries in nanotechnology to gain a 
better understanding of their S&T investment strategies. Text mining 
refers to the extraction of useful information from large volumes of text. 
In the ONR effort, Kostoff and other researchers performed an analysis30 
of the global open nanotechnology literature. The effort analyzed SCI 
records in order to provide the infrastructure of the global 
nanotechnology literature, e.g., the most prolific and most cited authors, 
journals, institutions, and countries, as well as the thematic (taxonomy) 
of the global nanotechnology literature from a science perspective. It also 
examined records from the Engineering Compendex31 to provide a 
taxonomy from a technology perspective. Among their general findings 
were the following: 
• Countries in the Far East have expanded nanotechnology 
publication output dramatically in the past decade.  
• China ranks second to the USA (2004 results) in nanotechnology 
papers published in the SCI, and has increased its 
nanotechnology publication output by a factor of 21 in a decade.  
• Of the six most prolific (measured by numbers of publications) 
countries in nanotechnology, the three from the Western group 
(U.S., Germany, France) have about eight percent more 
publications (for 2004) than the three from the Far Eastern group 
(China, Japan, South Korea).   
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• While most of the high nanotechnology publication-producing 
countries are also high nanotechnology patent producers of U.S. 
patents (as of 2003), China is a major exception, ranking 20th 
after the U.S. among the countries considered.  
 Table 3.2 shows the Kostoff et al. results in terms of the most prolific 
paper-producing countries for the year 2004.  It can be seen that three 
countries dominate in terms of overall output of technical papers: U.S., 
China, and Japan. In terms of U.S. patents, the top three performers were 
U.S., Japan, and Germany. Note that China ranks last in the list of 
countries shown in terms of U.S. patents. Stokes suggests that one reason 
that China has not produced more U.S. patents is that they do a lot of 
research aimed at “reverse-engineering,” so a lot of what they do is not 
patentable. There is also the possibility that some areas could be highly 
classified for military or commercial reasons. 
 Although detailed findings will not be presented here, a more 
thorough understanding of China’s S&T investment in nanotechnology 
can also be gleaned from Kostoff’s text mining efforts. It shows that the 
Chinese are focusing on several specific areas in the physical sciences. 
For example, its investment in scanning electron microscopy research is 
about twelve times that of the U.S. China is also heavily invested in 
research on nanorods and in Fourier-transform infrared spectroscopy.  
 The significant point that emerges from this kind of analysis is that 
the Chinese have carefully decided where to spend money in order to get 
the best return on investment, not only in terms of furthering their 
economic interests, but their national security interests as well. 
  
Energetic Materials Example 
 Another area that can be used to analyze global trends in terms of 
their potential impact on DOD’s efforts is the field of EMs. It is 
especially useful in that it provides a case study of several other points 
raised in this book, for example the dwindling size of the EMs S&E 
workforce and its technical output. Therefore, it offers a glimpse of 
where this field could be headed from a global perspective.  The field of 
EMs is certainly one of major and enduring importance to the DOD, 
since they are a key component of many armament systems of crucial 
importance to maintaining U.S. military preeminence.  Finally, it is one 
of the areas where most observers agree the DOD should be 
concentrating the efforts of its in-house laboratories and centers. 
 EMs is a term widely used to describe explosives, propellants, and 
pyrotechnics. In essence, they are mixtures of chemicals that undergo 
highly exothermic chemical reactions while converting condensed phase 
(solid or liquid) materials into rapidly expanding gases. The rate of this 
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phase change is so rapid, and the volume of gas produced per unit mass 
of condensed phase material so large, as to be capable of producing 
destructive force. If the rate of reaction is supersonic (greater than the 
speed of sound), it is called an explosive.  If the rate of reaction is 
subsonic, it is called a propellant. A pyrotechnic is a mixture of 
chemicals which when ignited is capable of reacting exothermically to 
produce light, heat, smoke, sound or gas. 
  
Country Number  
of Papers 
Country Number  
of Patents 
USA 7512 USA 5228 
Japan 4431 Japan 926 
China 4417 Germany 684 
Germany 3099 Canada 244 
France 1900 France 183 
South Korea 1592 South Korea 84 
United Kingdom 1520 Netherlands 81 
Russia 1293 United Kingdom 78 
Italy 1015 Taiwan 77 
India 830 Israel 68 
Spain 727 Switzerland 56 
Taiwan 706 Australia 53 
Canada 690 Sweden 39 
Poland 515 Italy 31 
Switzerland 498 Belgium 28 
Netherlands 492 Denmark 23 
Brazil 455 Singapore 20 
Sweden 435 Finland 17 
Australia 434 Ireland 10 
Singapore 372 Austria 8 
Israel 347 China 8 
Table 3.2: Most Prolific Countries (2004) in Terms of SCI Papers 
and U.S.P.O. Patents 
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 The field of EMs is very old. In fact, it is believed they were first 
made by the Chinese more than one thousand years ago, when they 
discovered that mixtures of saltpeter and sulfur reacted rapidly, 
producing a highly-destructive force. Perhaps the earliest unequivocal 
reference to what would be today called gunpowder occurs in 1242 in the 
writings 32 of Roger Bacon, an English alchemist and monk. However, it 
was the Swedish chemist Alfred Nobel who gave much of the modern 
impetus to the field of EMs when he patented a composition called 
dynamite in 1867. It was one thousand times more powerful than black 
powder, and expedited the building of roads, tunnels, canals, and other 
projects worldwide. Because of the damage it could do, Nobel thought its 
invention would end all wars. However, as history has since shown, 
instead of ending war it ignited a global race to find newer, even more 
powerful explosives for military use. 
 Figure 3.7 depicts in greatly simplified form a few generations in the 
historical evolution of EMs, moving from the era of black powder to the 
very powerful plastic bonded explosives (PBXs) that came into use in 
many military applications following the Second World War. PBXs have 
since become the preferred choice for nearly all new naval and airborne 
weapons such as missile warheads. Despite past successes in the field of 
EMs, this area of scientific inquiry has not become static. Indeed, new 
areas of research continue to evolve, and the outlines of what might be 
called a 6th generation of EMs are already emerging. Examples include 
reactive materials (RMs) and nuclear isomers. RMs denotes a class of 
materials that typically combine two or more non-explosive solids which, 
upon ignition, react to release chemical energy in addition to the kinetic 
energy resulting when the high-speed projectile containing the reactive 
materials collide with the target. Nuclear isomers of the element hafnium 
are of interest as potential high-density storage media. Even more exotic 
is the idea of using antimatter for storing energy at extremely high 
densities. 
 The generations of EMs shown in Figure 3.7 resulted from years of 
sustained R&D carried out by a global workforce of researchers. The 
S&Es who carry out such work typically fall into three technical areas: 
synthesis chemistry, formulation and processing, and detonation science.  
 As the name suggests, synthesis chemistry focuses on the creation of 
new energetic molecules, and it is largely responsible for new 
breakthroughs in energetic materials. Formulation and processing 
involves making EMs in large amounts for use in test and evaluation 
experiments, and typically involves large-scale synthesis, formulation, 
pressing and casting. Finally, detonation science includes development 
of fundamental detonation and shockwave physics models; modeling of 
both detonation initiation and growth phenomena, and deflagration to 
76                                               From Science to Seapower 
detonation transition reactions in explosives and propellants; 
understanding mechanical and thermal initiation of explosives and 
pyrotechnics; design and development of initiation system components; 
and evaluating explosive and propellant sensitivity and hazard analysis. 
S&Es who work in detonation science are keenly interested in the 
behavior of energetic materials under all environments, and have 
contributed greatly to the weaponization of new materials, including 




Figure 3.7: Historical Evolution of the Field of Energetics  
  Historically, the number of S&Es in the U.S. engaged in EMs R&D 
has been relatively small compared to the numbers in many other 
scientific fields. However, recent trends show that this already small 
number is shrinking further, a concern noted in several recent studies of 
the EMs field. Two of these studies,33,34 provide a cogent summary of the 
current U.S. posture in EMs and are reviewed here in brief. The first is 
entitled Advanced Energetic Materials. It was carried out by the NRC 
through the Board on Manufacturing and Engineering Design, in 
response to concerns voiced by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense for S&T and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency over the 
prioritization of scarce resources and issues related to maintaining and 
improving DOD’s knowledge base in this critical defense technology 
area. The second study is called National Security Assessment of the 
High Performance Explosives and Explosive Component Industries. It 
was requested by NSWC’s Indian Head Division to help address growing 
concerns over the ability of U.S. suppliers of high performance 
explosives (HPEs) and high performance explosive components 
(HPECs) to produce their products in the future. A HPEC is a weapon or 
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subassembly of a weapon that utilizes HPEs as its source of destructive 
power, e.g., artillery shells, warheads for missiles, bombs, fuzes, 
detonators, etc. This study also considered the dwindling national 
investment in R&D which historically has led to the development of 
explosive materials for new applications. Because of falling DOD 
spending on munitions, much of the industry has faced reduced 
production orders and lower revenues bringing into question its very 
survival. 
 The study Advanced Energetic Materials found that, although all 
modern defense systems and weaponry rely heavily on EMs, the U.S. 
R&D effort has become small, fragmented and suboptimal, leaving this 
critical national technology area at risk. This suboptimal effort is 
characterized by severe resource limitations across the entire spectrum of 
EMs R&D. Significantly this situation arises just at a time when the 
current focus of the DOD is on limited theater actions that emphasize 
deployment of precision strike smart weapons that are smaller, cheaper, 
and at the same time more lethal against all target classes. All of these 
are demands that advanced EMs can and should address. And while the 
U.S. effort is shrinking, the study found strong indications that former 
Soviet states such as Russia are investing heavily in EMs R&D, and may 
well be exploiting technological breakthroughs that could have the 
potential to place U.S. armed forces at a substantial technological 
disadvantage in the future. 
 The study also called attention to the fact that funding for the 
nation’s EMs technology effort is shrinking largely as the result of 
reduced defense spending on munitions R&D in recent years. 
Importantly, the study warned that “Without the opportunity for the 
current workforce to train the next generation of expert scientists and 
engineers, much corporate knowledge may be lost. This knowledge is key 
to maintaining the current weapon stockpiles safely, to ensuring their 
performance, and to developing the next generation of energetic 
materials.”  
 As an indication of just how fragile the U.S. R&D effort in EMs has 
become, the authors noted:  
 
The U.S. effort in the synthesis of energetic materials at present 
involves approximately 24 chemists, several of whom are 
approaching retirement. Few chemists are being trained to 
replace them. The committee considers these scientists to be a 
national resource whose productivity in terms of new energetic 
compounds has been very high. If the level of effort that these 
scientists have contributed is not fostered and maintained, the 
United States will lose the technological edge that it has gained 
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as a result of their work. Attracting top synthetic chemistry talent 
to energetic materials research is possible only if the field is 
perceived to be scientifically exciting and financially stable . 
 
 The second study—National Security Assessment of the High 
Performance Explosives and Explosive Component Industries—was 
carried out by the Department of Commerce’s Office of Strategic 
Industries and Economic Security, and reached similar conclusions. For 
example, it pointed out that the U.S. supplier base for HPEs has been 
operating under increasing stress since the late 1980s because of reduced 
production orders and lower revenues. It also called attention to the 
decline in spending on EMs R&D, noting that “since its 20-year high in 
1989, DOD spending on munitions research, development, testing, and 
evaluation (RDT&E) has fallen nearly 45 percent…[and that] according 
to current projections, RDT&E spending on munitions will plunge 
another 50 percent to about $820 million by 2005.” The study found this 
issue to be even more serious in light of the fact that munitions RDT&E 
is also falling as a percentage of DOD’s overall RDT&E budget.  It was 
between 4 and 6 percent of the overall DOD RDT&E budget from 1986 
to 2000, but then plunged to about 2.4 percent, a reduction that seemed 
likely to slow innovation and hinder the ability of the U.S. to field 
cutting-edge munitions technologies. 
 Finally, the study addressed the impact of these funding declines on 
workforce issues. Here its authors opined that “Reduced RDT&E 
spending will almost certainly degrade the ability of firms and 
government organizations to hire and retain scientific and technical 
staff. Drastic budget cuts will send a loud signal to the chemistry and 
physics communities that there are few opportunities in the field of high 
performance explosives. Scientists and engineers will simply vote with 
their feet—opting to “follow the money” to financially healthier areas of 
research.”  
 The impact of aging on the EMs S&E workforce will also take its 
toll, and replacing that workforce will not be quick or easy. According to 
NSWC Indian Head officials quoted in the study, it can take five years or 
longer to fully train a college graduate with a science or engineering 
degree to work with EMs. As the study notes, the long lead-time to train 
S&Es to work in this field, coupled with the anticipated retirements in 
the next 10 to 15 years, “portends the development of a knowledge gap,” 
in this critical defense technology area. It also raises important issues as 
regards the inter-generational transfer of corporate knowledge in this key 
area. The need for the DOD to address the issue of how it will preserve 
its existing corporate memory for use by future generations of defense 
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S&Es is a subject of great importance and is discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter. 
 Left unchecked, current workforce trends will likely result in serious 
employment issues with S&Es engaged in EMs as the current generation 
of workers retires over the next several years. As just one example, 
consider what has happened at the Weapon Division of the NAWC 
which is located in China Lake, California, once one of the DON’s 
premier weapons laboratories. In 1985, it had a workforce of 10 to 12 
employees engaged in active R&D of new energetic compounds. 
However, by 2003 that effort had dwindled to only two to three people 
carrying out applied development on a single material according to 
Robin Nissan, Head of the NAWC Chemistry and Materials Division.35 
Indeed, the number of synthesis chemists working in the entire Western 
world is quite small--fewer than 75 people by some estimates—and this 
entire effort is funded at the paltry rate of only about $10 million 
dollars/year.36  While there are no comparable estimates for the numbers 
of S&Es working in formulation and processing and in the detonation 
sciences, it is likely they too are quite small and declining. 
 If the U.S. S&E workforce engaged in EMs R&D is shrinking in 
size, has this had an impact on its technical output? There is some 
evidence that it has. It can be found in the number of research papers 
published in technical journals. Kostoff and his colleagues have also 
investigated this technical area, again using text mining techniques. In 
this case they examined papers referenced in the following three data 
bases: the SCI, the Engineering Compendex, and the DTIC. As before, 
the focus in this investigation was on assessing the most prolific authors, 
journals, countries, etc. They utilized technical experts drawn from the 
various communities that comprise EMs R&D to compile a list of key 
words and phrases for use in querying the various data bases. Figure 3.8 
displays results based on querying all technical papers in the SCI data 
base. It shows a significant decline in U.S. technical output in the field of 
EMs relative to that of the rest of the world. 
 The data also show that while China accounted for only 2 percent of 
total SCI-referenced papers in 1993-1996, its share more than tripled to 7 
percent by 2001-2004. In terms of EMs publications only, China’s share 
rose from 3 percent to 9 percent over this same period. It can be seen that 
Russia and Germany are also prolific  in EMs publications. 
 Figure 3.9 shows the declining percentage of U.S. technical papers 
over time, both in terms of overall papers and those in the EMs field 
only, as compared to other countries. These results are based on citations 
in the SCI data base. It can be seen that in 1991, the U.S. accounted for 
about half of all SCI-referenced papers, a figure that dropped to just over 
40 percent by 2004. The fall-off is more dramatic in the EMs  field. Here  




Figure 3.8: Changes in U.S. Technical Output in EMs Relative to the 








































Figure 3.9: Publication Trends Showing Changes in Percentage of 
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the U.S. had nearly 55 percent of the SCI-referenced papers in 1991, but 
only about 36 percent in 2004. The slow but steady growth of Chinese 
papers over this same timeframe is also evident, both overall and in the 
field of EMs. 
 The Kostoff results do seem to indicate that the shrinking size of the 
U.S. S&E workforce engaged in EMs R&D has also resulted in a 
diminished technical output measured in terms of the number of papers 
published in SCI-referenced journals. These data do not, however, allow 
judgments to be drawn about the quality of this output or its impact in the 
field. These results do provide some insight into what two of our military 
rivals—China and Russia—are doing in the field of EMs. They 
demonstrate that Russia has maintained a vibrant effort in this important 
technical area since the early 1990s. In addition, they indicate that China 
is probably increasing its investment in EMs R&D aimed at developing 
new and very likely more powerful explosives for military applications. 
 The shrinking size of the U.S. S&E workforce engaged in various 
aspects of EMs R&D raises an important question: what can be done to 
preserve this critically important defense technology area? As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, one approach is to leverage DOD’s in-
house R&D expertise by collaborating with outside educational 
organizations. In fact, one such example involves an alliance called the 
Center for Energetic Concepts Development (CECD). Its purpose is to 
foster continued advancements in EMs S&T and manufacturing. 
Additionally, it will also help train the next generation of S&Es working 
in energetics through its graduate education and research programs. The 
CECD came about when NSWC’s Indian Head division initiated a 
program to expand cooperation with universities and in turn increase the 
number of graduates with experience in EMs.The effort commenced in 
September 1998 with the signing of a contract between NSWC Indian 
Head and the University of Maryland. The agreement calls for the two 
organizations to work together to: 
• Develop an internationally recognized energetics capability 
• Develop the next generation of DON energetics experts 
• Support DOD and non-military research priorities 
• Access world-class experts in energetics and related disciplines 
• Share experts and facilities. 
 Among other things, the agreement that established the CECD called 
for the University of Maryland to cost-share faculty time and to provide 
free graduate courses for NSWC Indian Head S&Es. More recently, the 
CECD has broadened its scope to include the energetics manufacturing 
S&T as well as modeling and simulation of energetic systems. It has also 
been funded to help train technicians at Maryland community colleges 
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and through distance learning techniques. It is hoped that this alliance 
will eventually be expanded to include additional universities, national 
laboratories, and even private firms. Importantly, this kind of innovative 
arrangement could also serve as a repository of knowledge, helping to 
preserve for future generations vital scientific and engineering expertise 
that is currently dispersed around the country. This new organizational 
construct could also offer a model for other innovative arrangements 
involving both public and private sector partners that would help the 
DOD leverage its shrinking in-house S&T resources. 
3.6 Trends, Data, and Modeling 
 In the introductory chapter of this book, reference was made to a 
joint Industry-Academia-Government workshop held in December 2004 
just outside Washington, D.C.  Called “National Security Workforce: 
Challenges and Solutions,” it brought together key stakeholders in the 
U.S. national security enterprise to address pressing S&E workforce 
problems. At the workshop, attendees identified an urgent need for good 
models and the necessary data to feed them that could be used to provide 
accurate long-term forecasts of S&E workforce supplies and demand. 
They agreed that macro level data are probably sufficient for 
characterizing the current state of the national S&E workforce, but noted 
that these data currently lack specificity as regards needs attendant to the 
national security enterprise. To help rectify this situation, the attendees 
recommended several steps be taken including the following: 
• Identify the kind of data needed to feed forecast models that 
affect workforce supply and demand (local, national, global). 
• Assess its current quality and availability in order to determine 
gaps in the data, and institute steps to close them. 
• Routinely collect data related to both supply and demand, 
including both global and national S&E supply estimates in the 
disciplines and sub-disciplines important to national security.  
 The workshop made one thing abundantly clear: there are currently 
no workforce forecasting models that incorporate the myriad variables 
that impact S&E workforce supply and demand. Moreover, even if there 
were good models, there are major gaps in the data that would be needed 
to populate them. Much of it is not collected today. Indeed, the rapid off-
shore accumulation of technical talent makes it nearly impossible to 
develop accurate quantitative models of U.S. S&E supply and demand. 
Much of the data that would be needed is not and probably cannot be 
obtained, in part because of the dynamic nature of the global S&E 
enterprise and its growing interconnectedness. This enterprise has many 
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loops and branches, and their effect is to introduce time-delayed effects 
and amplifications that are difficult to model in terms of their impact on 
our domestic supply of S&Es.  
 Because of this complex behavior, modeling this S&E enterprise can 
be considered as somewhat analogous to modeling and solving a non-
linear control systems problem. Consider, for example, the possible 
effects that could result from reducing R&D funding available to U.S. 
universities by 5 percent in terms of impact on our global 
competitiveness. This reduction might well prompt a foreign-born 
student who would have otherwise come to the U.S. for graduate studies 
to join an educational institution in another country instead. There, he 
will add to their intellectual capital and the global competitiveness of that 
country. Concomitantly, his not coming to the U.S. represents a loss in so 
far as our ability to be more competitive on the world stage. Moreover, 
over time such a funding reduction might have a negative impact on the 
reputation of U.S. universities, making it more difficult for them to 
attract the best and brightest students. For example, post-9/11 visa and 
travel restrictions might send a signal to foreign students that the U.S. no 
longer welcomes them. This situation would then have another negative 
impact on our talent base and its technical output and impact and, 
ultimately, on our global competitiveness.  
 This very simple example illustrates that the decision branches 
introduced by the competing forces in the S&E enterprises can lead to 
time-delayed non-linear effects. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain a 
quantitative assessment of the exact degree of non-linearity introduced 
by such time-delayed loops. Nevertheless, it is possible to create 
conceptual models that are useful in thinking about the various factors 
that affect S&E supply and demand in the global enterprise, and how 
they could be impacted by time-delayed non-linear phenomena. By way 
of illustration, a few examples of such conceptual models are presented 
in the following sections. It should be emphasized, however, that these 
models are not unique—they are not data-driven. Other individuals 
attempting such models would doubtless pick and choose their own set 
of variables and relationships they consider most important, and would 
doubtless “wire” them together in ways different from those shown in the 
examples here. 
 As a first example, consider a so-called “base” model that follows 
the decision points that a U.S. born student encounters in deciding to 
enter into a S&E career in the U.S. This model also follows the path that 
a foreign-born student takes, either to enter into a S&E career in the U.S. 
or in another country. The education/career path of the U.S. student and 
the foreign-born student are essentially parallel processes that are 
nevertheless highly linked to each other.  
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 The U.S. side of the model begins with a U.S. citizen of college age 
making the decision to attend a U.S. university. There are several factors 
that control this decision such as degree of high school preparation, 
perception of the worth of a college education, cost of attending, 
perception of the future job market, etc. The foreign-born student weighs 
similar considerations, including whether to attend in the U.S. or in 
another country. The decision process for the foreign-born student is, 
however, more complicated than for his U.S. counterpart. For example, 
the decision also involves uncertainties associated with living in a 
foreign country, potential language problems, less clearly defined 
opportunities upon graduation and, more recently, potential 
complications due to post-9/11 visa and travel restrictions. 
 At this point, there are two different pools of applicants: U.S. 
students who have decided to attend a university, and those foreign-born 
students who have also decided to study in the U.S. Now, these students 
must decide whether or not to pursue an S&E education path. Factors 
that influence this decision might include the perception of opportunities 
in S&E, the health of the U.S. economy, opportunities in other fields 
such as law, business or medicine, level of federal support of S&E, etc. 
The foreign-born student ponders similar factors and in addition, those 
related to being foreign-born, such as opportunities for remaining in the 
U.S. after graduation. 
 The next step involves the process of admittance into their desired 
educational program. Both sets of students must go through a 
competitive admissions process. The decision of what discipline/field to 
pursue also involves a decision tree. The foreign-born student has also to 
weigh the additional factor of being statistically less likely to be admitted 
than a U.S. applicant. Moreover, the issue of financial aid may well be 
more important to the foreign-born student than the one born in the U.S. 
 Following admission to a university of their choice and completion 
of all required studies, the students, both U.S. and foreign-born, become 
members of a pool of highly-trained S&E graduates who are now 
available to join the workforce. At this point, the two groups of graduates 
(U.S. and foreign-born) must decide whether or not to join the U.S. S&E 
enterprise. The foreign-born graduates also have to decide whether to try 
and remain in the U.S. or to take a position in the S&E workforce of 
another country, a very important decision for them. In fact, it is not only 
important to their future, but to the future strength of the U.S. S&E 
enterprise. As previously alluded to, this decision is one that is closely 
related to the issue of whether or not the U.S. will maintain its current 
preeminence in S&E. 
 Following the base model further shows that if the foreign-born 
graduate decides to remain in the U.S. and join its S&E workforce, then 
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the two parallel tracks merge into one path that leads to the production of 
measurable technical outputs such as journal articles, patent applications, 
etc. Conversely, if the foreign-born graduate decides to leave the U.S. 
and join the S&E workforce of some other country, the base model paths 
remain divergent. In that case, the U.S. trained but foreign-born graduate 
will now be adding to the intellectual capital and technical output of that 
country as an economic competitor of the U.S. In fact, data trends 
discussed previously show that this is a growing trend that will continue 
to erode the current position of the U.S. as a global leader in S&E. As 
seen, many other countries, especially in Asia, are rapidly improving 
their educational systems and their production of S&E graduates and thus 
their technical output, and this is happening at what appears to be an 
accelerating rate as directly measured by numbers of papers, citation 
rates, patent counts, etc. Simply put, the stronger foreign competitors 
become, the more likely they are to attract and retain their own 
intellectual capital as well as that from other countries. 
 The base model captures a number of causes and effects, and 
therefore it can also be used as a perturbation model, making it useful as 
a tool for analyzing some of the principal concerns that face the U.S. 
S&E enterprise. In principle, such a model could be populated with 
representative data useful for relating input and output at each decision 
point, thus providing some level of quantitative estimates similar to those 
that can be obtained with some econometric models. The point here is 
neither to develop such a model nor to produce quantitative results, but 
rather to provide the reader with some suggestions as to how one might 
produce a model useful for making forecasts about the U.S. S&E 
workforce and the kinds of considerations such a model would have to 
address to give it credibility. It is also intended to highlight just how 
difficult it would be to construct an accurate model given the highly-
dynamic nature of the global S&T enterprise and its S&E workforce. 
 Turning to the idea of the perturbation model, consider as an 
example the situation with regard to U.S. visa regulations, Figure 3.10. 
The effect of visa regulations and restrictions, including travel 
requirements, on the supply of foreign-born students applying to U.S. 
universities has been a highly discussed topic ever since the events of 
9/11.37 Many are concerned that intensified monitoring of foreign 
students will result in fewer students, especially graduate students, 
coming to study scientific and technical subjects in American colleges 
and universities and ultimately will reduce the supply of scientific and 
technical personnel available for employment in the U.S. Indeed, 
although these new restrictions were only intended to improve our 
homeland security posture, they can nevertheless have negative impacts. 
This very point was the focus of a recent piece38 by William Wulf, who is 
                                                                                             From Science to Seapower 
 
86 
president of the National Academy of Engineering. It suggests the U.S. 
may be trading the long-term health of its research and education for 
what he calls “the appearance of short-term security.” More 
specifically, he has this comment about new U.S. visa restrictions:  
 
Much has been written about the impact of new visa policies on 
students. Although the situation has improved somewhat in the 
last several months (as of this writing, the average time for 
processing visas for students is less than two weeks), I am still 
concerned because the distribution has a “long tail.” Some 
students must still wait a year or more for visas, and some senior 
scholars, including a Nobel laureate, are still being subjected to 
lengthy, demeaning treatment. These cases, not the shorter 
processing time, are being reported in the international press, 
and as a result, instead of the United States being seen as a 
welcoming “land of opportunity,”  it is now seen as exactly the 
opposite. When coupled with new, demeaning procedures for 
photographing and fingerprinting visitors, we are not just 
discouraging students, international conferences in the United 
States, and collaboration with our international colleagues. We 
are dramatically altering the image of our country in the eyes of 
the rest of the world.  
 
 As Wulf notes, since many of these new rules and restrictions have 
only been in effect for a relatively short time, it is not clear how the 
impacts will play out, especially since there are many other factors, as 
already discussed, that affect the ultimate decisions of such students. 
 In addition to following the paths that either an American-born 
student or a foreign-born student takes in attaining a career in S&E, 
Figure 3.10 provides a conceptualization of how an increase in visa 
restrictions might ultimately impact the technical output of the U.S. S&E 
workforce. It can be seen that a reduction in the number of foreign-born 
students causes a concomitant reduction in the number of foreign-born 
graduates of U.S. universities, and consequently a diminution of the 
number of highly trained foreign-born S&Es available to join the U.S. 
workforce. This has two results. First, it produces a further reduction in 
U.S. technical output (e.g., patent and paper citation count). At the same 
time, it adds to the output of the country where the students decides to 
go—a net loss for the U.S. and a net gain for a potential U.S. economic 
competitor. Again, if a model such as this could be populated with 
appropriate data, it would show that a 5 percent reduction in the supply 
of foreign-born students for U.S. universities might have an even greater 
impact on the number of papers published by the faculty of those 
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universities given the very productive nature of most foreign students. 
Such a causal model could also be utilized to study the effects of other 
influencing factors such as S&E workforce retirement rates, changes in 
the U.S. investment rate in R&D and so on. 
 Another significant consideration as regards the supply of American-
born university students who want to study S&E fields has to do with the 
early education infrastructure in this country, K-12 for example. In this 
regard, consider the causal model depicted in Figure 3.11. It too shows 
the cyclical (feedback) effects that may occur if this infrastructure isn’t 
improved in a way that produces more high school graduates who are 
interested and qualified to pursue S&E degrees at the college or 
university level.  
 It is worth noting that the timeframe covered in this model may be as 
much as twenty years: the time it takes a child entering kindergarten to 
ultimately obtain a Ph.D. degree in S&E and be ready to enter upon a 
research or teaching career. Unless the number of U.S. students that go 
on to careers in S&E can be increased, the effect will be to further 
decrease U.S. technical output. This, in turn, can cause additional high-
tech American firms to off-shore their R&D to those countries that do 
have the requisite technical talent. Indeed, many prominent American 
corporate leaders—past and present—have commented on the 
connection between the state of America’s early education infrastructure 
and its impact on U.S. innovation and productivity. Consider for example 
the recent congressional testimony39 of Norm Augustine, former 
chairman and chief executive officer of Lockheed Martin Corporation, 
before the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, 
Subcommittee on 21st Century Competitiveness:  
 
…with regard to seeking to recover from any ill-advised attempt 
to under-invest in research and education, it takes a very long 
time to produce additional productive research scientists.  A 
youth wishing to become a mathematician, scientist or engineer 
must decide in ninth grade to take courses which preserve the 
option to pursue a career in any of these fields.  This is a 
consequence of the hierarchical and interdependent character of 
a science or technology education.  Further, the “leakage” rate 
in the process of producing credentialed researchers is very high 
indeed.  In the field of mathematics, for example, based on 
current trends one must begin with 3,500 ninth -graders in 2005 
to produce 300 freshmen qualified to pursue a degree in 
mathematics.  Of these, about 10 will actually receive a 
bachelor’s degree in the field.  Finally, one PhD in mathematics 
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Figure 3.10: Causal Model – Effects of Visa Regulations  
(See www.cecd.umd.edu for larger scale) 
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Figure 3.11: Causal Model – Effects of Early Education Structure  
(See www.cecd.umd.edu for larger scale) 
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 Returning to the subject of modeling U.S. S&E workforce trends, it 
can be seen that many of local, national, and global trends are 
interrelated so that a negative result in one can produce negative impacts 
in several others. It can also been seen that reversing some of the 
trends—like those characterizing the current U.S. K-12 educational 
infrastructure—is a very long term proposition, as previously noted. The 
value of models, even causal ones such as the examples presented here, 
is that they help us understand the trends and their implications for the 
future. It is very important to gain this understanding soon because of the 
long delays involved in building a workforce with the required skills to 
replace the S&Es of the Baby Boom generation, who are retiring just as 
the needs of national defense and homeland security are increasing. 
The S&E workforce problem has many dimensions, and potential 
fixes vary from short-term to very long-term (many years). Only a few of 
the problems can and should be addressed by the DOD and by elements 
of the national security/homeland security enterprise. Indeed, some 
mention has already been made of efforts currently being undertaken by 
the DOD such as the SMART scholarship problem. The DOD and the 
Services also have many other efforts on-going or in the planning stage. 
Some of these are focused on getting more women and minorities 
interested in careers in STEM fields. As will be seen later in this book, 
the DON has been especially aggressive and innovative in its efforts to 
increase the pool of U.S. citizens qualified for S&E careers, including 
some aimed at the middle -school level. This is imperative, because the 
DOD and DON laboratory/center S&T workforces need revitalization 
now, not later. Moreover, because there is a direct causal connection 
between federal spending on S&T and its impact on research fields and 
their technical output, and on graduate training in those fields, it is 
essential for the DOD and DON to also reinvigorate their investment in 
S&T, especially that small portion that builds and supports the S&T 
workforces at the in-house laboratories and centers. This is in fact a 
major focus of the DON’s N-STAR initiative (Naval Research—Science 
& Technology for America’s Readiness). Because of its promise as a 
model for other similar initiatives, a detailed discussion of N-STAR and 










 A sweeping reform effort aimed at transforming the way the 
Department equips, trains, and supports its military forces is underway in 
the DOD.  RDT&E management processes are a part of this review, and 
a major aim of defense transformation is to foster the development and 
employment of joint military capabilities. The recent Joint Defense 
Capabilities Study,1 chaired by Pete Aldridge, former Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)), 
described the problem this way: 
 
The Department’s RDT&E resources and infrastructure are 
decentralized across the Components.  In fast-moving technology 
areas, this decentralized approach to planning, programming, 
and execution results in inefficiencies, duplications, missed 
opportunities, and the inability to mass critical expertise in 
emerging areas. 
 
 Sustaining the dominance of military technology in the face of 
relentless change will not be easy.  The rapid spread of new technologies 
now available worldwide raises the question of how the DOD can best 
identify and use them to create new military capability.  The fact that 
these same capabilities are now readily accessible to our friends and foes 
alike makes it all the more important that we use them first. 
 Various change factors reveal that the DOD’s current approach to 
managing its S&T enterprise will not produce the results its military 
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must have for the 21st century.  A recent white paper,2 by the Institute for 
Defense Analyses calls for a “fundamental re-examination and 
alteration” of innovation practices, as global technological and 
economic changes have “invalidated the very basis by which the DOD 
has achieved technological superiority.  The global diffusion of 
capabilities in emerging technologies raises serious issues as to how 
those technologies with implications for advanced military capabilities 
can be identified, supported, accessed, and employed by the DOD to 
maintain DOD’s position of technological superiority.  Today’s DOD 
S&T practices are largely unresponsive to this emergent environment.”  
 General John Jumper, who was until recently the Air Force Chief of 
Staff, characterized the need for technological advantage as follows: “We 
are not interested in a fair fight….  We want to put overwhelming 
technology into the hands of our warriors.”3 But as the IDA paper 
suggests, giving General Jumper the advantage he called for will require 
a fresh approach to the way DOD manages innovation.  Finding the best 
approach must include examining the role of the laboratories and centers 
and the S&T workers they employ. This fresh approach must include 
global collaborations, a highly educated S&T workforce and its 
supporting structure, intergenerational transfer of knowledge, visionary 
leadership, and fully engaging military officers in S&T. 
4.2 Collaboration and Networking 
 S&T breakthroughs today are increasingly the product of the 
collective efforts of networks of collaborators.  These innovation 
networks are often global in nature, frequently draw on cross- and multi-
disciplinary branches of science and engineering, and include players 
from both the public and private sectors.4 
 The growing need to network has inspired an upsurge of cooperative 
innovation agreements.  These involve a diversity of participants, 
including commercial firms, universities, and research institutes to name 
only a few.  Also, there are a growing number of government efforts in 
the U.S. to bring together public sector laboratories and centers with their 
private sector counterparts.  The now familiar Cooperative Research and 
Development Agreement, is one example.  In fact, a mix of university-
government-industry linkages now characterizes many if not most 
technological sectors.  Consequently, they are of increasing importance 
to the new DOD S&T enterprise. 
 Strategic alliances, joint ventures, and intimate supplier-producer 
relationships are proliferating across the globe.  Agreements encompass a 
wide range of activities, such as “joint ventures, research corporations 
(e.g., research pacts, joint development agreements), technology 
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exchange agreements (e.g., technology sharing, cross-licensing, mutual 
second-sourcing), direct investment, minority/cross-holding, customer-
supplier and customer-user relationships, R&D contracts, one-
directional technology flow agreements (e.g., licensing, second-
sourcing), manufacturing agreements, marketing agreements, or services 
agreements.”5 Some groups, often referred to as generation networks, 
focus on generating new technology.  Their activities include “licensing 
and cross-licensing agreements, technology exchanges, visitation and 
research participation, personnel exchanges, joint development, and 
research consortia .6 ” 
 Technological globalization is of mounting concern to defense policy 
makers, and has prompted a DSB study called Technology Capabilities 
of Non-DOD Providers.7 The task force that conducted the study argued 
that, as a globalized technology base has come to dominate development 
of capabilities in a number of critical areas, it has grown much faster than 
DOD’s own funded research efforts.  As a result, the Department 
increasingly depends on it.  The task force recommended that DOD 
concentrate the efforts of its limited laboratory and center resources on 
those unique military technologies and systems which are of crucial 
importance to maintaining US military preeminence.  Examples cited 
include armament systems, undersea warfare, surveillance, identification, 
targeting systems, and nuclear systems. 
 It should be noted that the study occurred during the still heady days 
of the “Dot-com” bubble, when it appeared private sector R&D 
investments were increasing almost exponentially.  Those days are past, 
and, as noted in Chapter 2, commercial investments in basic research  are  
 
Sources for DOD Technology Innovation 
 DOD Sources  Non-DOD Sources  
Non-DOD Unique 
S&T 
DOD should not fund (use 
non-DOD sources) 
DOD should use 
commercially 
developed S&T 
DOD Unique S&T DOD should fund  (but no 
longer attracts “best 
and brightest”) 
DOD should utilize, but 
must change its 
procurement 
 
Table 4.1: Sources for DOD Technology Innovation 
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dwindling in many, if not most, areas.  Even so, it is true that DOD’s 
laboratories and centers cannot be the technological leaders in all the 
fields of importance to national defense.  Therefore, they must have a 
sufficient number of qualified S&Es who can perform as peers, in all 
areas of potential interest to national security, in the worldwide networks 
that generate new knowledge. Otherwise, DOD risks falling behind in the 
global race for knowledge. The DSB task force recommended the 
paradigm for DOD innovation depicted in Table 4.1. 
 Collaborating and networking now more frequently than ever draw 
on cross- and multi-disciplinary branches of science and engineering for 
scientific breakthroughs.  A good discussion of this trend is in a recent 
report by the Council on Competitiveness, which notes: 
 
Historically, advances in knowledge came through the efforts of 
individual investigators with specific disciplinary specialties….  
Today, however, innovation tends to occur more frequently at 
the intersection of disciplines and, indeed, sometimes drives the 
creation of entirely new ones, such as nanobiology, network 
science or bioinformatics. 
 
Advances in medical technologies integrate biology with physics, 
mathematics, materials sciences and software engineering.  
Innovation in the IT sector is built on research that spans a 
range of sciences…and increasingly, social sciences and the 
unique dynamics of particular industries, as IT planning 
becomes integral with business and organizational strategy. 
 
At issue is not a choice between a single discipline specialization 
and multi-disciplinary research.  The ability to innovate at the 
intersection of disciplines, by definition, implies the need for 
strong disciplinary expertise.  But, knowledge silos simply won’t 
drive innovation in a much more interconnected world.  Indeed, 
they will inhibit it. 
 
The changing nature of innovation demands new knowledge and 
learning networks that can facilitate communications and 
collaboration at frontiers of many disciplines and that can cross 
organizational boundaries between academia, industry and 
government. 
 
While academia has been exploring interdisciplinary approaches 
for decades…such efforts at universities remain insufficient – 
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and have yet to emerge as a core focus of the national research 
enterprise.8 
 
 Similarly, advances in areas such as medical technologies are 
underpinned by biology, physics, mathematics, and materials sciences.  
This is equally true of the fields important to the DOD.  Clearly, 
“working in the seams” between various disciplines is becoming 
progressively more important not only to U.S. innovation generally, but 
also to DOD’s effort to maintain its technological lead over its 
adversaries. 
 Since at least the advent of the GWOT, it has also become clear that 
other, non-technical fields of study are also important to national 
security.  Examples include foreign languages, cultural and religious 
studies, and history.  John Holzrichter, an assistant to the director of the 
DOE’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and president of the 
Fannie and John Hertz Foundation, addressed this point in a paper for 
Physics Today on attracting and retaining R&D talent for defense.9 
 
Whatever the future brings, national security requires more 
highly talented and motivated experts…not only in the 
traditional S&T disciplines, but also in biology, computer 
science, and other fields.  Equally important are technical 
experts who can work…with nontechnical experts in social 
sciences such as diplomacy, policy-making, political science, 
behavior, economics, and international law, to name a few.  
Talented people, trained to deal with new knowledge and 
unknown conditions, are needed to respond to large numbers of 
unexpected—and sometimes “should have been expected”—
situations. 
4.3 A Highly Educated S&T Workforce 
 As discussed above, the unprecedented nature and extent of 
technological change today is often the result of interdisciplinary 
research.  Such research “integrates information, data, techniques, tools, 
perspectives, concepts, and/or theories from two or more scientific 
disciplines or bodies of specialized knowledge to advance fundamental 
understanding or to solve problems whose solutions are beyond the 
scope of a single discipline or area of research practice.”10 Indeed, 
interdisciplinary thinking is now an integral feature of most scientific 
inquiry as the result of four powerful drivers: 11 
                                                                                              From Science to Seapower 96 
• The inherent complexity of nature and society 
• The desire to explore problems and questions not confined to a 
single discipline 
• The need to solve social problems 
• The power of new technologies 
 This new context means that those planning S&T careers will have to 
be more highly trained, and their education will have to be much more 
broadly-based and multidisciplinary. 
 Educators and professional societies are already seeking new 
teaching methods and curricula that can produce S&Es who can thrive in 
such a dynamic and globalized environment.  This is especially true for 
engineering, with its rapid off-shoring of many types of jobs previously 
done here at home.  Such changes have raised many questions about the 
future of professional engineering in the U.S., including whether it will 
even have a future. 
These concerns prompted a major study at the National Academy of 
Engineering (NAE) to assess the next generation of engineering in the 
U.S.12 Because of the near impossibility of predicting the future, the 
study participants helped bound the analysis by using a scenario-based 
approach that utilized alternative visions. 
 In a Phase I report, the Academy concluded that if the engineering 
profession is to define its own future, it must: 
• Agree on an exciting vision. 
• Transform engineering education to help achieve the vision. 
• Build a clear image of the new roles for engineers, including that 
of broad-based technology leaders who in the mind of the public 
and prospective students can replenish and improve the talent 
base of an aging workforce. 
• Find ways to focus the energies of the different disciplines of 
engineering toward common goals. 
 Importantly, “if the United States is to maintain its economic 
leadership and be able to sustain its share of high-technology jobs, it 
must prepare for a new wave of change.”  To do this, the engineering 
profession must “educate the next generation of students so as to arm 
them with the tools needed for the world as it will be, not as it is today.” 
 A Phase II NAE assessment focused on the education appropriate to 
the engineer of 2020:  “The economy in which we will work will be 
strongly influenced by the global marketplace for engineering services, 
evidenced by the outsourcing of engineering jobs, a growing need for 
interdisciplinary and systems-based approaches, demands for new 
paradigms of customization, and an increasingly international talent 
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pool.”  Therefore, undergraduate education “needs to be reshaped to 
attract students to the profession, prepare them to compete in a global 
marketplace, and ensure that America’s pre-eminence in engineering is 
not lost.13 ”  
 Recognition of these new needs has led engineering organizations to 
recommend changes in degree programs.  As the NAE states, “it is 
evident that the exploding body of science and engineering knowledge 
can not be accommodated within the context of the traditional four year 
baccalaureate degree.”  For one, academic institutions should 
“introduce interdisciplinary learning—today typically reserved for 
graduate programs—into the undergraduate engineering curriculum.”  
Further, those with bachelor’s degrees should be viewed as “engineers in 
training,” and the master’s should be considered the engineering 
“professional degree.”  Similarly, the Board of the American Society of 
Civil Engineers has adopted a policy that “supports the concept of the 
Master’s degree or equivalent as a prerequisite for licensure and the 
practice of civil engineering at the professional level.14” 
 In sum, the NAE studies and other reports point out a number of 
implications for engineering and related fields.  One, the M.S. degree 
will likely become a minimum requirement for entering most fields of 
engineering as a professional.  Two, and perhaps more important, both 
undergraduate and graduate training will have to be much more diverse 
in content than it is today, involving not only fields such as mathematics 
and science, but also exposure to the humanities and training in 
analytical, communication, and foreign-language skills.  In addition, 
because “the half -life of cutting-edge technical knowledge today is of the 
order of a few years,” colleges and universities will have to offer 
advanced technical training to working engineers, who will need this 
continuing education to maintain their technical relevance.15 The same 
factors changing the engineering professions are also affecting the 
sciences and mathematics.  There too, success will require more 
advanced education, exposure to various disciplines, and continuous 
training. 
 
Ph.D.-Level Education or Equivalent 
 These evolving requirements have important implications for the 
DOD laboratories’ and centers’ S&T workforce.  A Ph.D. or equivalent 
should be the goal for each journeymen member, especially any who 
aspire to cutting-edge work.  Further, because many of the evolving 
fields of D&I will likely involve knowledge and skills not typically 
acquired through purely academic training, significant job experience 
and training that come through working with others who know the field 
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will become crucial.  While the goal should be a S&T workforce 
comprised wholly of S&Es with an education to the Ph.D. level, 
including post-doctoral work in many instances, the reality is that this 
will not be possible for all new hires.  In those cases, a vigorous effort 
must be made to help ensure that those workers hired with B.S. or M.S. 
degrees receive the equivalent of a Ph.D. level educational experience.
 Continuing educational opportunities that provide sufficient credits 
for a Ph.D. or its training equivalent are therefore increasingly necessary.  
Opportunities could be provided via on-site training or through distance 
learning methods.  The subject of post-baccalaureate certificate programs 
has been widely discussed in the literature, and the Council of Graduate 
Schools has assembled a number of best practices in this area.16 
 One example is a certificate-based graduate engineering program 
that partners Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia 
Tech) with NSWC’s Dahlgren Division.  This program supports 
retention and professional development of technical personnel.  It is 
considered unique in that it centers on graduate certificates that represent 
a concentration of expertise in a technical or scientific skill area.  By 
linking coursework with practical research problems at NSWC, the 
program fosters focused skill building and improved workplace problem-
solving capabilities.  If they desire, participants can combine certain 
certificates with a dissertation or thesis to obtain a Virginia Tech 
graduate engineering degree. 
 The University of Maryland’s CECD, which has already been 
discussed in Chapter 3, is another example of how cooperative efforts 
between universities and DON laboratories and centers can provide 
continuing educational opportunities for in-house S&Es.17As noted, this 
alliance partners the university with the NSWC’s Indian Head, Maryland 
Division to foster advancements in energetics manufacturing, science, 
and research, while also helping to train the next generation of energetics 
S&Es through its graduate programs on campus and via  distance 
learning. 
 Efforts such as these should be more widely exploited for a number 
of reasons.  Distance education, for example, would allow universities to 
partner with others in the DON to build scientific and technical 
competence at globally distributed naval installations, while also 
furthering their own academic missions.  Also, cooperative efforts offer 
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DOD S&T Academy 
 As mentioned above, several DSB reports used membership in the 
National Academies of Science and Engineering as a metric of the 
quality of research organizations.  Since universities dominate academy 
membership, the DSB concluded they are the prime performers of both 
basic research and engineering.  It further judged profit-making 
companies, also well represented on the membership rolls, as strong 
players in engineering and technology development, along with various 
FFRDCs, national laboratories, UARCs, and non-DOD government 
laboratories.  Importantly, because the DOD laboratories and centers are 
not well represented in academy membership, the DSB rated them to be 
of lower quality, and therefore unable to attract the best S&Es. 
 Their many scientific breakthroughs and engineering feats, plus the 
demographics of the academies’ members and criteria for membership, 
suggest that Academy membership is an inappropriate quality metric for 
the DOD laboratories and centers. For example, only members can 
nominate other members, so who you know can be as important as what 
you know or even what you have done.  Membership may also be 
awarded for other than technical achievement.  For example, several 
members are retired Navy flag officers selected primarily because of 
their leadership and management skills.  Consider the following: RADM 
Albert R. Marschall, elected in 1990 “for outstanding management, 
stressing highly professional leadership in all phases of vital large-scale 
worldwide facilities programs”; RADM Millard S. Firebaugh, elected in 
2000 “for innovation and U.S. Navy leadership in submarine design, 
propulsion, and construction”; and RADM Robert Wertheim, elected in 
1977 for “contributions to national strategic programs, particularly 
engineering leadership of ballistic missile systems.”18 
 Academy membership is highly esteemed regardless of its 
inadequacies as a measure of quality, and yet the DOD laboratories and 
centers will most likely never have significant numbers of S&Es on the 
rolls.  For one, membership is relatively small compared to the total 
population of eligible S&Es (both academies have just over 2,000 
members each).  Much more important is that a great deal of the work 
done for DOD is classified and often not even publicly attributable to the 
individuals who carry it out.  Therefore, gaining public recognition for 
such work—an important academy consideration—is often impossible. 
 Given these circumstances, there is a real need for some institutional 
mechanism within the DOD that can provide the recognition its top 
S&Es deserve for their work, including classified work.  One possibility 
is some kind of S&T academy, perhaps analogous to the national 
academies, membership in which would be reserved for those whose 
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achievements on behalf of national defense are outstanding.  Our 
national leadership would acknowledge election to membership, and 
would award prizes and/or privileges accordingly.  For example, 
members might be awarded a stipend to work on a project of their own 
choosing, or to support something like a sabbatical for work with 
colleagues in the private sector. 
 Recognizing the contributions of the DOD S&T personnel to 
national security is not only appropriate—it can also attract technical 
talent.  Acknowledgment, especially from peers, of the importance of 
contributions to national defense could provide a magnet for attracting 
some of the nation’s best talent to work at the in-house laboratories and 
centers.  In a major study of the Department’s human resources, the DSB 
commented “National leaders, at every level, need to speak to the 
American public, on an on-going basis, about the value of public 
service—both civilian and military.”  Therefore, the Secretary of 
Defense “should charge the Service Secretaries as a group with the 
responsibility to develop, execute, and fund an outreach strategy.”  Such 
efforts “should be a critical component of the Department’s human 
resources responsibilities.”19 An S&T academy would be a productive 
way for the DOD leadership to verify the value it places on research and 
engineering and on the men and women who carry it out. 
 
Hiring, Retention, and Motivation 
 Human resource management systems must be tailored to enhance 
not only personnel recruitment, retention, and motivation.  The current 
longevity-based CSS clearly will not suffice, and the jury is out as to 
whether the follow-on NSPS will prove up to the task.  In fact, Congress 
recently exempted most DOD laboratory and center personnel from its 
operation until 2008, when the NSPS must prove it is up to the task.  A 
letter from several members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld explains that the new system will 
actually provide less flexibility for the laboratories and centers.  The 
Congress therefore wants assurances that this will not happen: 
 
 Section 1101 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004, chapter 99, section 9902(c) …allows for the 
inclusion of the laboratories in NSPS after October 1, 2008, but 
only if the Secretary determines that the flexibilities provided by 
NSPS are greater than those already provided.20 
 
 Whether the one-size-fits-all NSPS will in fact have both the 
flexibility and agility to serve changing personnel needs will not be 
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known until the implementation details are finally decided, which could 
take several years.  In the meantime, the DOD has in essence frozen 
further flexibilities for the current demonstration personnel systems.  
This threatens to hamstring the laboratories and centers at a critical 
juncture—just when they are trying to adapt to the new requirements of 
the on-going process of defense transformation. 
 Today, the DOD laboratories and centers confront a classic Catch-
22: consistently doing first-rate work requires the ability to hire top 
scientific and engineering talent, yet they have difficulty hiring such 
talent because of the widespread—and unfounded—perception that they 
no longer do first-rate work. 
 A growing chorus of negative assertions has amplified this 
perception.  Consider the following examples from recent DSB studies.  
In March 2000, the DSB declared the laboratories and centers “are not 
competitive with leading industrial and university laboratories in terms 
of innovation and technical leadership.”21 Another study from June of 
the same year asserted “DOD laboratory directors are unable to obtain 
or retain the services of not only the ‘best and brightest’ scientists and 
engineers but even those of average capability.”22 Both studies use little 
evidence to support those claims, for which there is little quantitative 
basis.  Rather, these are like ly the views of the authors, who are 
principally drawn from the private sector, which often considers itself a 
competitor with the in-house laboratories and centers. 
 Also, corporate marketeers and various interest groups, incentivized 
to lobby for the commercial sector, often promote such statements.  A 
good example is the pro-defense industry lobby called Business 
Executives for National Security (BENS), which aims, among other 
things, to privatize as much defense work as possible.23 Such groups 
often proclaim without reservation—and also without substantiation—
that the private sector can do the work not only better, but also cheaper 
and faster as well.  Further, many officials of various kinds, including 
elected officials, are interested in shifting government work to the private 
sector.  They denigrate Federal employees and employment with blanket 
declarations—again unsubstantiated—that the private sector can perform 
the work more efficiently than civil servants. 
 A recent study by a tri-Service NRAC panel expressed concern over 
how these negative views damage DOD recruitment and retention 
efforts.  The panel observed that indeed “Perceptions are hurting the 
ability of the labs to attract and retain required talent.”24 The authors 
called on the DDR&E, who oversees the DOD’s S&T enterprise, to 
secure a commitment from the Secretary of Defense and the Service 
Secretaries to reaffirm the need for, and importance and value of, their 
laboratories. 
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 John Holzrichter, mentioned above, also addressed the impact of this 
perception on hiring and retention at the DOE national laboratories.  In 
his experienced view: 
 
There are many ways to fix the twin problems of recruiting and 
retaining bright, talented, creative people for defense-related 
R&D. One of the most effective ways is for our national 
leadership to more clearly acknowledge the importance of 
workers’ contributions in the defense sector, and in particular 
the importance of R&D.  National security R&D is one of the 
best collective investments our nation has made.25 
 
 Holzrichter is saying is that yes, there are perception problems, but 
the nation’s leaders can and should neutralize these by compellingly 
addressing the importance of government service to the country’s 
security.  Although he does not specifically call for a DOD S&T 
academy, his research lends support for creating one. 
 In addition to perceptions, the laboratories’ and centers’ declining 
capacity to offer appealing incentives to prospective talent is hurting 
hiring and retention.  Incentives include not only tangible items, such as 
compensation and benefits, but also intangible ones, such as important 
and challenging work, access to state of the art facilities and equipment, 
adequate and stable funding to pursue important ideas, high-quality 
professional colleagues, and pride in the employing institution. 
 The problem is that one-size-fits-all personnel systems, such as the 
CSS, designed for the entire defense workforce, cannot offer these kinds 
of incentives.  In fact, for the laboratories and centers currently operating 
under congressionally authorized personnel demonstration systems, the 
challenge for NSPS is to offer flexibility. Regardless, as discussed later 
in this chapter, attracting and retaining top-level talent requires human 
capital management systems tailored to scientific and engineering career 
paths.  These systems must also permit the selective and appropriate 
rewarding of a few key individuals—the top performers. 
 Other factors have shackled hiring and retention at the laboratories 
and centers in recent years (most of these were discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 2).  Five cycles of BRAC, arbitrary personnel cuts, 
intermittent hiring freezes, high-grade controls, forced contracting out of 
work, and budget cuts have curtailed investments in research facilities, 
state of the art equipment, and employee development and training.  The 
authority of laboratory directors has been eroded, as services once under 
their local control have been turned over to various centrally or 
regionally managed and often geographically remote organizations, 
supposedly to save money.  Such services include public works, base 
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operations and support, finance and accounting, and human resources.  
As just one illustration, employees at the NAWC aircraft division in 
Patuxent River, Maryland now depend on a human resources office in 
Philadelphia to process their personnel transactions. 
 Although an unintended consequence, this centralization has in 
particular impaired hiring and retention efforts.  Not surprisingly, it has 
diminished system responsiveness and slowed the delivery of services to 
laboratory and center employees.  As just one example, regionalization 
of personnel services in the DON has significantly increased the time it 
takes to fill jobs, which all too often means high-quality S&Es accept 
other employment offers in the interim.26  It has also impeded the timely 
processing of financial transactions—it often takes weeks to pay new 
hires.  Finally, regionalization of base operations and support in the DON 
under a newly-established centralized command threatens to curtail 
investment in new facilities and high-technology equipment even more 
than before, a point elaborated on below. 
 In sum, the growing inability of the laboratories and centers to offer 
prospective S&Es—especially the best and brightest—sufficient 
incentives to hire and retain them is a serious impediment to the DOD’s 
S&T effort.  A shrinking pipeline of available new talent exacerbates the 
problem.  This shortage is especially acute in certain areas of engineering 
and the physical sciences of particular importance to the DOD.  The 
graying of the overall workforce, accelerating as the Baby Boom 
generation retires, aggravates the problem even further, and adds an 
additional element discussed later in this chapter: what should be done 
about inter-generational transfer of knowledge. 
 
Important and Challenging Work 
 In the past, the DOD laboratories and centers have sought to offset 
pay disadvantages relative to the private sector by offering benefits such 
as the opportunity to do important and challenging technical work.  Such 
work has long been recognized as a major attraction to high-quality 
employees.  As the 1962 Bell report (see Chapter 2) noted, “Having 
significant and challenging work to do is the most important element in 
establishing a successful research and development organization.”  One 
reaction to the concern Bell expressed was the creation of the 
discretionary ILIR program. 
 The 1991 Adolph Commission report also noted the importance of 
interesting work for morale among laboratory staff,27 while a more recent 
DON report put it this way:  
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One of the strongest attractions offered by the Naval in -house 
S&T enterprise is the wide variety of interesting, challenging 
and important work assignments, free from the pressure to 
introduce a new product every year, which is a pervasive 
pressure in most industrial laboratories today.  This is important 
because fundamental research often does not produce a mature 
product or process for 20 years or more.28 
 
 Once again, the laboratories and centers are being stripped of the 
ability to perform a role just as that role is becoming increasingly 
important.  In other words, at a time when challenging work is 
particularly vital to attract a new generation of the best technical talent, it 
is becoming more difficult to provide it.  Two reasons for this, as noted, 
are the significant decline in discretionary money available to laboratory 
and center directors, and the long-term trend toward outsourcing of work 
to the private sector. 
 The impact of this outsourcing on internal technical competence has 
been discussed, but there is another, perhaps even more important, 
impact: outsourcing also means the remaining S&Es are increasingly 
saddled with overseeing the work of contractors.  Monitoring contracts 
does not provide the same satisfaction as actual technical work, and 
therefore acts as a disincentive to remain in the Government.  It also 
makes the higher pay in the private sector even more attractive than it 
might otherwise be. 
4.4 S&T Support Structure  
 In early 2000 the SECNAV enlisted the National Academy of Public 
Administration (NAPA) to study potential DON human resource 
management systems.  The results appeared in Civilian Workforce 2020: 
Strategies for Modernizing Human Resource Management in the 
Department of the Navy.29  It described the current CSS as “ponderous, 
bureaucratic, slow, and unresponsive,” and noted that “it is not a great 
leap of logic to predict that organizations with people -management 
systems that are controlled by over 2000 pages of law and regulations, 
with literally years required to make change, will not be among the 
winners in the war for talent.”  Indeed, the current system presents “an 
almost insurmountable barrier to achieving flexibility and agility in 
responding to new requirements.  Change requires years of persistent 
effort with uncertain or negligible results.”  Consequently, the “flexibility 
to succeed in the 2020 environment is not possible within the constraints 
of the current federal civil service system.  The inherent Title 5 concept 
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of ‘one size fits all’ will not serve the needs of the Navy nor the needs of 
the diverse technical and support communities upon which it depends.” 
 As the NAPA makes clear, the one-size-fits-all approach to human 
capital management codified in Title 5 of the United States Code will 
soon be totally ineffective.  One key element to the burdensome 
regulations is the CSS compensation system, which has the following 
problems: narrow pay ranges with cumbersome processes for moving to 
another range; little relationship to the realities of labor market dynamics 
for key scientific and technical occupations; and limited ability to reward 
excellence. 
 The Academy recommended a new human capital management 
system tailored to today’s scientific and engineering career paths.  This 
system should maintain pay comparability at the 50th percentile for key 
occupations, with the ability to pay more for highly qualified personnel.  
Other basic features of a system should include a process for market-
based pay within the parameters of a general schedule or pay bands, 
authority to pay a limited number of senior scientific and technical 
employees above pay caps, and elimination of civil service job 
protections for poor performers. 
 Other study groups have reached similar conclusions, and in fact 
encouraged the Secretary of Defense simply to utilize an existing 
authority to create a personnel system specifically for the laboratories 
and centers.  The NRAC, for example, in its tri-Service study of DOD’s 
corporate research laboratories, argued as follows: 
 
 The Panel recommends that the Secretary of Defense fully 
utilize the authority granted him by Section 1114 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act of FY 01, and any other authoritie s 
granted by Congress, to establish a separate personnel system 
for the scientists and engineers in the Services’ corporate 
research laboratories.30 
 
 The Section 1114 authority granted by Congress is indeed powerful, 
because it took away from the Office of Personnel Management the 
authority to manage DOD’s S&T laboratory personnel demonstration 
projects and vested it in the Secretary of Defense.  This authority in 
essence gives the Secretary the tools to set up tailored personnel systems.   
 Studies of the Air Force laboratories have also focused on Section 
1114.  One example is the NRC’s Effectiveness of Air Force Science and 
Technology Program Changes.  After examining in great detail the 
problems the Air Force faces in hiring and retaining top-notch scientific 
and engineering talent, the authors commented: 
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A key step toward alleviating this situation would be for Section 
1114 of the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act (Public 
Law [P.L.] 106-398) (U.S. Congress, 2000) to be implemented.  
Because this issue transcends the Air Force, such direction 
would have to apply to all of the service laboratories and would 
therefore be effective only if directed by the Secretary of the 
Defense. 
 
 Therefore, the authors recommended: “The Secretary of Defense 
should immediately direct the implementation of the provisions of 
Section 1114…so that Department of Defense laboratory directors have 
the ability to shape their workforces.” 
 
Competitive Compensation: The Essential Element of a Quality 
Organization 
 Although not the only major factor, compensation is often 
determinative in employee job decisions, and the field of compensation 
is moving in new directions.31 Howard Risher, who has served as a 
Senior Fellow in the Wharton School’s Center for Human Resources, has 
studied compensation extensively, including its use in government 
organizations.  In a review of the best thinking in 41 major companies 
with large R&D centers, he discussed compensation models that foster 
improvements in both organizational and individual performance.,32  
Basic features of this concept include: 
• Broad-banding to replace the traditional salary structure 
• Competency-based pay to shift the focus from the job to the 
individual 
• Increased emphasis on market alignment rather than internal 
equity 
• Expanded role of variable pay linked to group/team performance 
• Increased emphasis on recognizing and rewarding individual 
achievement 
 Salary decisions based on the individual’s value to the organization, 
rather than on defined job duties or relative job value, encourage the kind 
of employee development particularly important in fast moving, dynamic 
areas of science and technology. 
 An essential ingredient for an effective compensation structure is pay 
bands.  “One of the key changes” Risher identifies among the companies 
he studied is “the shift from the tightly structured ranges and centralized 
control of traditional programs to salary or career bands.  The bands 
increase flexibility to respond to labor market trends and to recognize 
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individual growth and contribution.”  Further, “salary increases within 
the band are then linked to assessed competence, with the larger 
increases granted to the individuals who demonstrate new or enhanced 
competence.”  Career bands involve separate broadband structures for 
defined job families.  They typically “float” with the market for the job 
family.  Risher also notes the expanded role of cash incentives, including 
group incentives.  In sum, salaries are aligned with individual 
competence, while cash incentives are used to reward results. 
 Another aspect of the new compensation model involves “market 
alignment.”  Recognizing they have to offer whatever it takes to attract 
and retain the best talent, the most competitive organizations have shifted 
away from the traditional goal of internal equity, so familiar in 
Government organizations, to external competitiveness.  Many high-
technology companies now set pay levels for primary job families solely 
on the basis of market data.  As noted in the Introduction, many defense 
and aerospace companies are now having to pay significantly higher 
levels of compensation to hire cleared or clearable S&Es in fields such as 
aeronautical and electrical engineering, where salaries are soaring by 10 
to 15 percent annually. 
 The differences between the new compensation models of successful 
R&D companies and those of the Federal government are telling.  
Companies pay valuable individuals much more than others if the market 
dictates.  Conversely, Federal pay approaches, including those 
incorporated in the S&T personnel demonstrations used at a number of 
DOD’s laboratories and centers, lump all S&Es into a single career path.  
Further, they pay roughly the same salaries to those situated at the same 
place along this path.  Most importantly, salaries are not based on true 
pay comparability dictated by market alignment, a bias that leads to 
egalitarian compensation approaches not conducive to rewarding 
particularly valuable individuals.  This focus on the “average” misses a 
lesson competitive organizations have learned.  As Peter Drucker states, 
“The averages serve the purposes of the insurance company, but they are 
meaningless, indeed misleading, for personnel management decisions.”33 
 The point is that highly competitive organizations understand that 
success depends on having a lot of good people and a few extraordinarily 
good people.  How many of the latter an organization needs is subject to 
debate, and depends on a number of factors.  For an organization 
primarily engaged in S&T, the figure is probably around 10 percent of 
the S&E workforce.  Dr. Hans Mark, former DDR&E, once remarked, 
“The presence of a few individuals of exceptional talent has, to a very 
large degree, been responsible for the success (and even the existence) of 
outstanding research and technology development organizations.”34 
Similarly, a former president of the National Academy of Sciences put it 
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this way: “In the advancement of science, the best is vastly more 
important than the next best.”35 
 In fact, plenty of evidence indicates that just a few highly talented 
individuals in a research workforce produce much of its output.  One 
study for example observed that “scientific output is concentrated 
amongst relatively few scientists,”36 while another concluded that the top 
10 to 15 percent of scientists contribute about half the papers published, 
and that this is consistent across a range of fields.37 Work comparing the 
distribution of citations to the distribution of publications,38 also shows 
that the inequality in the former is much greater than in the latter.  This 
suggests that fewer than 10 percent of scientists are responsible for about 
half of citations in a field. 
 Whatever the exact number, it is clear that for any scientific 
organization to be world class, it must have a small cadre of outstanding 
employees.  It must therefore have the flexibility to offer whatever it 
takes to attract and retain them.  Needless to say, such individuals are in 
increasing demand around the world, and will only work for 
organizations that provide them the benefits—tangible and intangible—
they desire. 
4.5 Career Management of the S&T Workforce 
 Tailoring human resource management systems means simply 
recognizing that different communities of employees have different 
career path needs, and that there are different ways among those paths to 
measure success.  For example, a scientific and engineering career path 
follows a certain set of core competencies, common knowledge, skills, 
and experience, which differ in many ways from those of a lawyer, 
contracts specia list, or accountant.  Career management in each of these 
communities should consider things like a common core training 
curriculum, common culture and professional identity, identifiable career 
paths, and links to community related professional associations. 
 In fact, community management is quite familiar within military 
circles, and its benefits have long been understood.  Within the DON, for 
example, Surface Warfare Officers and Engineering Duty Officers (and 
various others) chart and control the career paths and other aspects of 
these communities.  The assumption is that utilizing some aspects of 
community management for the civilian population would, as it does for 
the military, provide for a national and unified understanding of the 
health of the community and the needs of its members.  It would also 
provide the refreshment and retention strategies that will work best for 
each specific workforce. 
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In this regard, measuring health is one of the most important aspects of 
the overall career management approach.  Here, the health of the 
community’s workforce is defined by reference to a set of metrics 
considered important to the workforce.  Examples of such metrics might 
include education levels, age, diversity, experience, and hiring/attrition 
rates.  They could also include measures of the size and qualifications of 
the potential applicant pool. 
 The DON has in fact attempted to implement some form of 
community management.  As noted in the Introduction, in response to 
the NAPA report, Civilian Workforce 2020: Strategies for Modernizing 
Human Resource Management in the Department of the Navy, the 
VCNO chartered a task force to examine civilian personnel issues.  The 
resulting study recommended that the DON utilize community 
management.  It identified 20 potential communities: science and 
engineering, facilities, information technology/management, 
environment, logistics, contracts, human resources, legal, financial, 
education and training, administration, analysts, medical, security and 
law enforcement, intelligence, media and public relations, community 
support, acquisition program management, manufacturing and 
production, and wage grade (included as a distinct community).  It also 
envisioned that a leader for each community would help coordinate such 
efforts as: 
• Promoting the needs of the workforce to top DON leadership 
• Providing a forum for Navy S&Es to discuss issues of 
importance, including their relationship with S&Es in the 
private sector 
• Fostering professional development by understanding and 
sharing best practices and advocating for training and 
development budgets 
• Providing professional recognition for community members 
• Developing templates for various career tracks 
 The DON S&E community, with almost 21,000 members, was 
considered diverse enough that it would need various career tracks from 
which workforce members might choose.  Examples included systems 
engineering, R&D, R&D technical expert, and engineering management.  
Moreover, DON planners also deemed S&T a distinct subset of the S&E 
community, because of its own unique characteristics.  This would 
include both S&T performers and managers at the NRL, ONR 
headquarters, and within the warfare/systems centers. 
 Despite initial efforts to implement this approach—including an 
overall plan for a Civilian Community Management Division (CCMD) 
within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower 
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and Personnel (N1)—little has come of the effort.  This issue should be 
revisited and strongly supported. The point is not to provide a status 
report on the DON CCMD effort, but to demonstrate the value in 
championing S&E careers within a community context.  This would 
recognize the special needs of that workforce and allow for tracking its 
overall health with an eye to rapidly developing and deploying new 
strategies to address emerging requirements. 
4.6 Stable Funding 
 As long as analysts have been studying the Federal laboratory 
system, they have emphasized the connection between effectiveness and 
stable, adequate funding.  In 1945 Vannevar Bush, in his now classic 
book, Science: The Endless Frontier, helped establish the Federal 
Government’s approach to its laboratories and centers.  He argued, as the 
title suggests, for the need for continued, intensive support for scientific 
research.39 In 1983 the highly influential Packard Commission 
recommended multiyear funding of R&D, noting, “the direction and 
performance of Federal laboratories is less than optimal because of 
serious problems with the continuity of research funding.  Supporting 
high quality research requires stability and a long-range view.”40 One 
year later, a White House Science Council study addressing the Packard 
panel’s recommendations argued that funding instabilities impede the 
planning and operation of research programs.  It also suggested that 
Congress adopt a biennial budget for Federal laboratories.41 
 Stable funding is especially important in S&T, where basic research 
projects can extend for several years before being terminated or 
transitioned.  One report observed that “the extraordinary historical 
productivity of several of America’s most innovative and important 
research laboratories (Bell Telephone, DuPont, Xerox, IBM) is often 
traced to their commitment to a long-term, stable support to researchers 
and programs with productive pasts and promising futures.”42 The DOE 
white paper discussed in Chapter 2 also identified funding instability 
caused by budget fluctuations as a barrier to strategic workforce planning 
in the national laboratories.  In effect, these fluctuations resulted in 
erratic hiring patterns and contribute to the difficulty in hiring the 
technical staff needed to meet mission requirements. 
 
System Agility 
 Today, system agility may be one of the biggest impediments to 
hiring and retention in the DOD laboratories and centers.  The Quiet 
Crisis,43 a report prepared for the CNR, introduces this subject with an 
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insightful quote from an acknowledged expert in corporate management, 
Peter Drucker: 
What people mean by bureaucracy, and rightly condemn, is a 
management that has come to misconceive of itself as an end and 
the institution as a means….  The hospital does not exist for the 
sake of the doctors and nurses, but for the patients….  The 
school does not exist for the sake of the teachers, but for the 
students.44 
 
 Indeed, some analysts have estimated that navigating administrative 
mazes consumes as much as half of the working time of S&Es.45 As 
officials in the DOD and Services increasingly sought to monitor and 
control in-house work, they constructed increasingly complex 
administrative structures of review.  The Task Force 97 report, in a 
statement echoed countless times since, lamented that S&Es in the DOD 
laboratories were “buried within a wearisome administrative 
structure.”46 The Bell Committee report recommended eliminating layers 
of management;47 a 1962 DSB study chartered by Dr. Harold Brown, a 
former DDR&E, bemoaned inappropriate bureaucratic regulations;48 in 
1970, a blue ribbon panel appointed by Secretary of Defense Melvin 
Laird reported that excessive centralization in the OSD had impaired 
effective civilian control of the laboratories and centers, and that overly 
large staffs caused unwarranted paperwork, delay, duplication, and 
expense;49 a study by Booz, Allen & Hamilton of the DON R&D process 
found that increased centralization directly increased reviewing 
authorities and their staffs, which in turn stifled initiative, stultified 
progress, and diluted resources.50 
 Ironically, centralization wrested many crucial support functions 
from the laboratories and centers just as Vice President Gore’s highly 
touted National Performance Review advertised decentralization as a 
means to increase government competence.  Although centralization’s 
advocates promised increased efficiency at lower cost, to date, the results 
contradic t the claims, largely because efforts were designed to optimize 
the efficiency of the service-providing organizations, not the customers.  
Indeed, these new support organizations are just the kind of 
bureaucracies Drucker describes, because they operate for the most part 
as an end to themselves. 
 The bottom line is that flexibility—not rigid central control—is 
essential to an effective RDT&E organization.  This is especially true in 
regard to financial resources and other forms of necessary support. 
Centralization of operation and support functions, and the erosion of the 
laboratory director authority resulting from the centralization of various 
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services, operate counter to these needs. The Adolph Commission 
worried about such trends, noting “an effective laboratory has sufficient 
local operating authority to execute [its] responsibilities in a rational, 
effective manner.  Laboratory management must have authority to plan, 
organize, staff, and direct its technical program as well as all necessary 
support services to ensure that the technical program is not impeded by 
inadequate support.  The support services should be organic to the 
laboratory.” 
 Similarly, as the Quiet Crisis points out, “the effects of this excessive 
control can be delays in facility and equipment procurement that, in turn, 
delay R&D projects, some of which are critical to national security 
requirements, or lengthen the time it takes to process personnel actions, 
thereby exacerbating the difficulties in recruiting high-quality S&Es.  
These bureaucratic constraints can threaten work quality and employee 
morale to the point where a talented researcher concludes that the 
system is unworkable, and he or she departs for employment in industry 
or academe.” 
 Bureaucratic regulations have always presented difficulties, but 
recent changes are crippling the capacity for dealing with them.  In the 
past, most of the laboratories and centers found work-arounds.  However, 
as their overhead and discretionary resources continue to decline, their 
ability to “make the system work” in the face of growing bureaucratic 
constraints is rapidly decreasing.  As the system fails to deliver quality 
services to the employees when needed, frustration will increase, and 
more and more will seek employment elsewhere. 
 In sum, many DOD and Service centralization initiatives have been 
driven almost completely by the desire to cut costs, or to run things as 
cheaply as possible.  Almost no attention has been given to the impact on 
the delivery of services, which in turn affects the direct missions of the 
laboratories and centers.  Nor has any attention been paid to the impact 
on their recruitment and retention efforts. 
 
Facilities and Scientific Equipment 
 Various studies have demonstrated the necessity of up to date 
facilities for effective laboratories.  The Adolph Commission’s report to 
Congress noted that state of the art equipment and specialized laboratory 
facilities “appropriate to advancing the leading edge of relevant 
technologies are necessary to fully exploit the creative potential of 
scientists and engineers.”  Further, “new technical facilities must become 
available at the rate for which technology advancement is desired; there 
is a direct cause-and-effect relationship.”  Similarly, a 1987 DSB task 
force commented, “R&D depends upon the use of state-of-the-art 
Characteristics of the New Science and Technology Enterprise 113 
equipment and facilities.  Providing [these] is made difficult by rapidly 
changing technology which results in equipment becoming quickly 
outmoded and by the increasing cost of renewing such equipment and 
facilities.”51 This task force also argued, “without very good facilities and 
equipment, in some areas, even an excellent researcher cannot compete 
with a mediocre researcher who does have the facilities.” 
 Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, it is becoming almost 
impossible for many DOD laboratories and centers to invest as required 
to do cutting-edge technical work.  For one thing, they must have the 
authority to do so when and where needed. However, construction of 
most new facilities is subject to the idiosyncrasies of the MILCON 
process. Politics, competing priorities, and other factors can delay 
construction projects for years.  Indeed, few facilities—especially those 
needed for general-purpose RDT&E—make it through the process these 
days.  Without MILCON funding, many laboratories and centers are left 
with the unattractive alternative of upgrading old facilities, even though 
renovation is often less efficient and much more expensive than new 
construction.  The simple fact is that MILCON is often the most cost 
effective approach. 
 Getting approval for general-purpose research buildings has always 
been difficult because, in the decision-making process for construction 
dollars, RDT&E does not compete well with readiness-related activities.  
In the DON, decisions for RDT&E MILCON priorities are largely under 
the control of the operational side of the Navy via the Deputy Chief of 
Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4).  On October 1, 
2003, the CNO stood up a new organization within N4 called 
Commander, Naval Installations (CNI) to centrally manage all 
installations, including laboratories and centers.52  However, the principal 
mission for CNI—indeed, its raison d’etre—is to enhance fleet 
readiness, a goal that therefore receives much higher priority than long-
term RDT&E facility needs. It is therefore important that a clear path be 
established to ensure the availability of adequate funding for scientific 
equipment and related infrastructure.  
4.7 Inter-Generational Transfer of Knowledge 
 The evidence clearly indicates that the DOD can expect a critical 
problem in the near future, how to transfer the corporate memory 
inherent in their workforces to the next generation of S&Es. 
 What is corporate memory?  Most individuals in an organization, 
especially high performers, are storehouses of specialized knowledge.  
This includes not only subject matter expertise, but also familiarity with 
less tangible matters like organizational folklore, culture, and oral 
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tradition, all of which facilitate smooth and efficient performance.  Such 
collective wisdom further consists of experience in specific projects, 
networks with clients and contacts, and awareness of an organization’s 
informal relationships and decision-making processes.  All together, this 
learning represents corporate memory.  It needs to be identified, 
safeguarded, shared, and passed to the next generation of workers, as it is 
one of an organization’s most valuable—yet often unrecognized and 
under appreciated—assets.  Corporate memory is especially important to 
high technology enterprises involved with R&D. 
 Any time employees leave, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, they 
take with them some of this knowledge and lore.  When the separation is 
voluntary, there may be an opportunity to pass along some knowledge to 
a successor. However, even this opportunity is dwindling today in many 
in-house fields of expertise because they are already one-deep, and this 
has a real impact on the apprentice programs that have served the defense 
laboratories and centers so well in the past. When, however, the 
separation is involuntary—as has frequently been the case with the 
forced downsizing in the DOD laboratories and centers for the past 15 
years—there is a loss of corporate memory.53 
Innovation in R&D organizations has been widely studied, and the 
results state unambiguously that much of it depends on informal 
networks that enable vital collaboration.  One study identifies three 
critical variables that underpin the value-added creation process: skilled 
human assets, skilled senior leadership, and adequate resources. If any 
one of the three is absent, value-added creation is unlikely. Competitive 
organizations use a strong culture to bond these three variables in ways 
that cultivate core competencies and capabilities.54 The important point 
here is that loss of employees, in particular key individuals, disrupts 
informal networks and collaboration processes, destroying the corporate 
memory needed to prosper. 
 The impending retirements, along with the dwindling pool of 
available new workers, will have a tremendous impact on corporate 
memory. The Center for Innovation Management Studies (CIMS), which 
has examined inter-generational knowledge transfer in the corporate 
context, notes that in the short term the “Xers and the upcoming mini-
boomers are not going to feed the innovation engine that the U.S. 
industry needs to stay competitive.”  The problem is even worse 
“because we haven’t been educating them in science and technology.” 
As a result, “the crisis looms as those boomer-aged professionals, 
especially technical professionals, begin to retire.”55 A few companies 
are already addressing the knowledge loss that goes with retirement.  
Some, for example, are rethinking their policies on mandatory 
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retirement, looking at such alternatives as phased retirement, rehiring 
retirees as consultants, and creating mentor programs. 
 The crucial point about mentoring programs is that the need must be 
recognized and the process formally structured to accomplish their goals.  
Such programs involve experienced employees teaching newer ones 
things that make up the company’s corporate knowledge.  This function 
could be full-time or simply one task of the employee’s job.  The “final 
reality,” according to CIMS, is that “organizations must prepare for this 
predicted decline in the number of technically competent workers.” 
 In his book Lost Knowledge, David DeLong has offered a number of 
prescriptions for dealing with this pending loss of corporate memory.56 
One of the examples he documents in some detail is that of NASA.  By 
2006, at least 50 percent of the administration’s employees will be 
eligible for retirement.  According to DeLong, NASA still hasn’t come 
up with a complete replacement program.  Moreover, even if NASA 
could find enough younger S&Es to replace the ones retiring (or the ones 
lost already), it cannot replace or even substitute for the experience and 
knowledge they will take with them.  Indeed, DeLong observes that the 
problem is so severe NASA no longer knows how to send a manned 
spacecraft to the moon.  The S&Es who performed so well at that in the 
1960s and 1970s have already left.  The important knowledge they have 
taken with them includes not just that of the technical and engineering 
requirements, but of the procedures and processes involved in preparing 
an organization for such an undertaking.  Regrettably, this tacit 
knowledge was not well documented, and that part of NASA’s corporate 
memory is gone forever.  Reconstituting it, if it can be done at all, will be 
expensive and time consuming.  In essence, taxpayers will be paying 
again for something they already paid dearly for years ago. 
 Importantly, the Commission highlighted the significance of 
corporate memory and mentoring in training.  “Over the last half 
century,” it observed, “the nuclear weapons complex has successfully 
managed the training of such individuals primarily through mentoring 
and on-the-job training.  In some critical skill areas this training takes 
about five or more years to gain sufficient experience to make design 
decisions.”  The Commission noted Sandia’s new intern program to 
supplement on the job training, and Los Alamos’ effort called 
“TITANS,” or Theoretical Institute for Thermonuclear and Nuclear 
Studies.”  This is a course, primarily focused on nuclear weapons design 
for new personnel, “to facilitate knowledge transfer of archived data and 
cross training.” 
 The need to invest in inter-generational transfer of knowledge is also 
underscored in an article in the Harvard Business Review.  The piece 
focuses on both the explicit and tacit knowledge an organization’s best 
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employees have stored in their heads.  This knowledge—Deep Smarts—
cannot be transferred on a “series of PowerPoint slides or downloaded 
into a data repository.”  Instead, it can only “be passed on in person—
slowly, patiently, and systematically .”  Further, these Deep Smarts are 
experience based, and “can’t be produced overnight or imported readily, 
as many companies pursuing a new strategy have discovered to their 
dismay.  But with the right techniques, this sort of knowledge can be 
taught—if a company is willing to invest.”  This is precisely the kind of 
acumen NASA relied on to put a man on the moon and the DOE used to 
provide the U.S. with state of the art nuclear weapons throughout the 
Cold War.57 
 The demographic trends threatening the ability of the DOD 
laboratories and centers to preserve their Deep Smarts in areas vital to 
national security also imperil a growing number of private defense and 
aerospace companies.  The NRC has noted how these trends jeopardize 
the inter-generational transfer of specialized technical knowledge and 
skills: “The change in the age-experience composition of the work force 
occasioned by the decrease in defense spending raises serious questions 
about mentoring and the generational passing on of knowledge in the 
industry.”  As a result, “Many companies are now planning formally 
arranged mentoring procedures, as well as more training programs for 
new workers.  When new engineers are hired, mentoring and teaming 
arrangements have to be carefully planned to capture the experience of 
those about to retire.  Nevertheless, experience is lost, as is efficiency, 
when work tasks involve significant learning curves.” 58 
 In sum, the imminent retirement of large numbers of S&Es in the 
DOD, the resulting loss of corporate memory, and the lack of programs 
designed specifically to ensure the inter-generational transfer of this 
memory all have potentially dismal consequences.  The DOD faces the 
prospect of having to reconstitute a number of its important research 
areas unless steps are taken soon, and in many of these areas there is too 
little private sector interest to allow a commercial alternative.  An 
example is EMs research, or studies of the basic science associated with 
reactive materials such as explosives and propellants.  At present, there 
are still enough potential S&E mentors in the overall population to 
facilitate inter-generational transfer of knowledge, but their numbers are 
dwindling every year. 
4.8 Civilian Leadership  
 Since the publication of the Bell report in 1962, there have been 
some 100 major studies on improving the ability of the DOD laboratories 
and centers to execute their missions.  Remarkably, little progress has 
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occurred with many of the issues those reports have often raised. There 
are many reasons for this inaction.  However, one important reason has 
received little attention: the lack of consistent, unqualified, high-level 
support and advocacy for reform efforts from both the military and 
civilian leadership. 
 The NRAC wrote one of the few studies to call attention to this 
problem.59 Its look at the corporate laboratories the Services operate 
considered among other things why reform efforts had so often 
foundered in the past.  Among reasons they identified were several so-
called “practical impediments.” 
 
For example, because of the bureaucratic tendency to resist 
change, senior leadership at all levels must make an unequivocal 
commitment to endorse exceptional reforms, and insist 
subordinates implement them.  That is, for efforts to succeed 
decision-makers at all levels must make reform a high-priority 
issue, and take the time to understand the issues and the 
solutions proposed.  And they must demonstrate a continuing 
commitment to implement their decisions. 
 
 For some time, analysts have been concerned over such growing 
problems with the S&T leadership in the Federal Government.  For 
example, in 1992 a major report from the National Academies noted, “As 
scientific and technological knowledge continues to expand at a rapid 
rate, the government needs ever greater capacity to formulate, carry out, 
and monitor S&T policies and programs and their effects.  The need for 
highly competent and dedicated scientists, engineers, and other experts 
in top policy and program management positions in the federal 
government has never been greater.”60 The authors worried that the 
Federal Government was facing increasing difficulty in recruiting 
talented and qualified individuals.  Causes for this difficulty included: 
• Stringent and confusing post-government employment 
restrictions 
• Long, burdensome, and intrusive nomination and Senate 
confirmation processes 
• Strict and costly conflict of interest provisions 
• Overly detailed requirements for public financial disclosure 
• Pay uncompetitive with comparable positions in the private and 
nonprofit sectors 
• The high cost of living in Washington, D.C. 
• Increased public scrutiny of private life 
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• Decreased capacity of government to execute effective 
programs 
• Lower public esteem for and prestige of public service 
 The report notes that these factors apply to all PAS positions 
government-wide, but can “have a differential impact on the 
government’s ability to attract researchers from academia and industry 
and managers with technical backgrounds from industry,” because 
“Government service does not usually further the careers of practicing 
scientists and engineers.”  It also points out that it took the first Bush 
administration an average of nine months to fill key S&T positions, up 
from six months in the Reagan administration.  “This lag in filling 
positions,” the authors assert, “has a significant and harmful effect on the 
government’s ability to manage ongoing programs and to undertake 
S&T-based initiatives.” 
 A good example of how such factors can hamstring qualified 
candidates with bi-partisan Senate support is that of Gordon England, the 
former Secretary of the Navy whom President George W. Bush 
nominated for the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense.  His 
confirmation was delayed for several months while members of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee struggled to overcome a rule 
“requiring the Pentagon’s top officials with pensions from private 
companies to buy an insurance policy that locks the value of their 
benefits while in office.”61 It seems MetLife, the only company that has 
provided such insurance, was no longer willing to do so. Although this 
impediment was eventually overcome, it prevented England from 
quickly taking over a critical position within the DOD. 
 RAND’s National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) carried out a 
more recent study of this problem.  Requested by a DSB Task Force on 
Human Resources Strategy chartered in 1998 by the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the NDRI report, Department 
of Defense Political Appointees: Positions and Processes, was published 
in 2001.62 The DSB task force incorporated some of the findings into its 
report released in February 2000.63 The NDRI’s detailed analysis found 
that since the creation of the DOD in 1947, the number of PAS positions 
(including the Military departments) grew from just 12 to 45, as of May 
1999.  As the number grew, the percentage of available time those 
positions were filled declined.  For example, during the Truman 
administration, PAS positions were filled an average of 98 percent of the 
available time.  During the Clinton administration, the average was 80 
percent, and in fact, since the Carter administration, seldom have all 
positions been filled. 
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 A study published earlier this year reached similar conclusions about 
how tenure issues related to PAS positions suffocate reform.  Called 
High-Performance Government: Structures, Leadership, Incentives, it 
noted that in the late nineties the executive branch experienced vacancy 
rates in appointed positions that frequently exceeded 25 percent.  As a 
consequence, “If it takes the better part of a year to complete a 
presidential-appointment, it follows that many departments and agencies 
will need to limp along.  ‘Acting officials are disinclined to initiate 
anything, they shy away from difficult administration problems, they 
avoid congressional testimony and public representation for most of 
their decisions.’”  And so we have a growth of inaction.64 
 As briefly mentioned just above, one difficulty in sustaining any 
reform initiative stems from the organizational placement of the Office 
of the DDR&E a placement that hampers its power to provide centralized 
leadership and advocacy for the S&T enterprise.  Recently, the Congress 
has become concerned about this matter.  In its report on the fiscal year 
2005 National Defense Authorization Act, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee included a section (911) entitled Study of roles and 
authorities of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering.  This 
called for a DSB study on the requirements “to enable the DDRE to 
effectively perform the required mission.”65 
 The Committee expressed concern about the strength of the 
DDR&E, but did little other than direct a study of the situation by the 
DSB, a step unlikely to do much to alter the status quo. If so, the 
ingredients needed to provide stable leadership and top-level advocacy 
for the DOD’s S&T enterprise will remain largely unavailable just as the 
GWOT and other factors require strong, hands-on leadership.  
 
Visionary Leadership 
 Studies have also accentuated the importance of leadership, and 
identified the salient characteristics of effective laboratory and center 
managers.  The Packard Report noted, “The quality of management is 
crucial to a laboratory’s performance.  Federal agencies must insist on 
highly competent laboratory directors.”66 The Adolph Commission also 
identified “an inspired, empowered, highly qualified leadership 
committed to technical excellence through support for excellence, 
creativity, and high-risk/high-payoff initiatives,” as an essential element 
of a world-class laboratory.  The Commission specified several attributes 
of a good technical director: 
• High standards of qualification in technical background and 
technology management experience 
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• Commitment to a creative work environment where individual 
initiative is encouraged and nurtured 
• A long-term management perspective of planning, 
accomplishment, and resource commitment 
• Willingness to undertake developments recognized as being high 
risk, and having high payoff potential 
 In other words, successful RDT&E organizations have leaders with 
vision who balance long-range challenges against immediate technology 
needs and risk against payoff.  Moreover, such leaders are adept at 
choosing the areas in which to work, divesting work that has become 
more appropriate for other performers (transition), judging scientific and 
technical merit, and orchestrating the conditions that foster innovation. 
 Because of the long-term horizon for much scientific and technical 
effort, leadership continuity is also important (not only at the field level, 
but at the headquarters level as well, a point addressed in more depth 
below).  Again, many study groups have acknowledged this need, such 
as the Task Force 97 report: 
 
In virtually all the Defense Laboratories authority and 
responsibility are divided between a commander and a technical 
director.  Often, the commander is not technically qualified for 
the position [director of technical programs].  Even in the cases 
in which the commander is technically qualified, he falls victim 
of a military career management policy which requires his rapid 
rotation without regard for research program requirements.67  
 
 Rotation of commanding officers has a ripple effect, affecting both 
continuity and corporate memory.  A 1976 review of Navy R&D 
management commented: 
 
To some extent, rotation of line officers into RDT&E activities 
was considered desirable.  First, it was necessitated by the 
career requirements of naval officers.  Second, it brought in -fleet 
operating experience and understanding of new weapons and 
systems developments back to the laboratories.  Nevertheless, 
some technical directors felt strongly that rotation compromised 
the stability and continuity of the technical program and 
inhibited the internal management and control of the activity.68 
 
 Related to the matter of management continuity is the larger issue of 
military versus civilian management of the laboratories and centers.  The 
DSB has commented: 
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In previous examinations of the in -house laboratories, the 
problem of military versus civilian leadership has been 
considered critical.  
 
It is generally conceded that competent management…requires a 
sound knowledge of the military problems encountered in actual 
field and combat situations.  This has been the leading argument 
for maintaining military management control of the Defense 
Laboratories. 
 
Nevertheless, in a carefully planned program, it is not out of the 
question to have civilian personnel who are thoroughly versed in 
military affairs from a quite practical viewpoint.  It is as possible 
for civilians to understand the military environment as it is for 
military personnel to be trained in technical areas.69 
 
 The DON sought to balance this joint relationship through the dual 
executive—having both a Commander and TD.  It codified the approach 
in a Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST 3900.13A of 
November 1, 1963).  This instruction clarified that the military officer 
commanding the laboratory was responsible for overall management and 
the usual functions of commanding, such as ensuring compliance with 
legal and regulatory requirements, serving as a liaison with other military 
activities, and generally supervising the quality, timeliness, and 
effectiveness of the technical work and support services.  On the other 
hand, he was to delegate line authority and assign responsibility to the 
TD for the technical program, including directing its planning, conduct, 
and staffing; evaluating the competence of personnel; serving as a liaison 
with the scientific community; selecting subordinate technical personnel; 
exchanging technical information; and also ensuring the effectiveness of 
the program. 
 Dual executive management helped minimize the problems of 
discontinuity associated with officer rotation, and generally worked well 
for over 30 years until the Navy Secretariat cancelled it in 1995.70 Since 
then, the position of director of the warfare center field divisions has 
continued to weaken.  In fact, it has been abolished in the NSWC and 
NUWC.  Another blow has been the creation of the CNI, which also has 
eaten away at the authority of the laboratory/center commander by 
turning control of most base operations support functions over to CNI 
regional commanders. 
 All this adds yet another element to the major recent changes in the 
DON warfare/systems centers, and intensifies the challenge of providing 
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the visionary leadership they need in this new century.  Certainly the 
DOE national laboratories have acknowledged the growing necessity for 
world-class leadership, appointing only internationally recognized S&Es 
to their laboratory director positions. 
4.9 Military Technology Officers  
 In the past, the DOD laboratories and centers have benefited from 
staffing young military officers with technical backgrounds alongside 
civilian scientists and engineers.  The civilians learned something of war 
operations while the officers gained appreciation of how S&T develops 
future military capability.  The eminent scientist and engineer Theodore 
Von Karman, the first head of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at the 
California Institute of Technology and a man with close connections to 
the Air Force throughout his career, described the benefits of the synergy 
this way: “Scientific results cannot be used effectively by soldiers who 
have no understanding of them, and scientists cannot produce results 
useful for warfare without an understanding of the operations.”71 
 Of the three military Services, the Air Force has utilized this 
principle to the greatest extent.  In fact, staffs at Air Force laboratories 
and centers have, in the past, included significant numbers of officers 
with technical backgrounds. Von Karman himself argued that 20 percent 
of the scientists and engineers in its S&T organizations should be 
military officers. 
 Recently, the technical staffs of the laboratories and centers in all 
three Services have experienced dwindling numbers of military officers 
with technical degrees.  This trend was noted with concern in the recent 
NRAC tri-Service study cited earlier.72 The panel unanimously agreed on 
the importance of uniformed S&Es and worried that the Services were 
not fully exploiting that capability.  Although this issue was only briefly 
investigated because it was not part of the formal study charter, the panel 
did find the following: 
• The number of officers with advanced degrees in S&E is 
declining, especially in the Army and Navy. 
• In the past, such officers usually spent one or two tours in 
Service laboratories/centers. 
• Tours provided an understanding of the RDT&E process and 
problems. 
• This helped link the laboratories/centers and the operating 
forces. 
• The need for officers may become even more important, given 
the emphasis on providing our military with overwhelming 
technological superiority. 
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 The panel asserted that the Services could, to their considerable long-
range benefit, improve development, support, and promotion of 
uniformed S&E personnel.  More specifically, they argued that a tour in 
a laboratory or center should be considered as one of several possible 
career-enhancing (rather than the opposite) assignments available to a 
junior officer, no matter what his or her background and specialty.  The 
rationale is that it is as important to understand the development of war-
fighting technologies as it is to understand the intricacies of DOD’s 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System process, which is 
commonly taught to officers as part of their acquisition training. 
 A comprehensive study of the Air Force’s S&T workforce for the 
21st century cogently articulated the benefits of officer tours in 
laboratories and centers: 
 
[The ideal military lab] has military officers flowing from the 
operational and acquisition communities into the lab for one or 
more tours and then back into those communities.  This constant 
leavening serves to ingrain the lab with the military thinking 
and…the military communities with the best of the innovation 
from the laboratories.  This…explicitly recognizes that the best 
technology transition occurs through the transfer of ideas and 
minds rather than reports and devices.  A further benefit… is the 
presence of a number of general officers who are cognizant of 
the capabilities of the S&T laboratory.  Since [they] serve as the 
senior leadership base for a military organization, the 
recognition of value in the S&T laboratory depends in part on 
the ability of the general officers to understand the contributions 
and culture of the laboratory.73 
 
 This report reaffirmed the 20 percent figure Von Karman argued for, 
noting such a strong military presence benefits a “high tech” Service.  It 
further observed that this percentage had fallen to 11 percent, and 
recommended it be increased to 15 percent as an interim step.  Moreover, 
it argued this increase should “occur in the context of a career 
management plan for military S&E officers that has them serving in the 
lab as well as in the operational commands and the acquisition 
community ,” because one goal “should be to have more General Officers 
cognizant of this critical part of the Air Force.” 
 A more recent study of the Air Force by its Scientific Advisory 
Board (SAB) expressed even greater alarm over the military S&E 
presence in their laboratories, calling the situation a “graveyard spiral.”74 
The SAB found worsening trends in accession and retention as well as in 
development and management.  1999 data showing the inventory of 
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military S&Es, the current authorization, and the numbers needed for 
self-sustainment suggest: 
 
After the first 4 years… the inventory roughly matches the 
sustainment or authorized curves.  However… a crisis in military 
engineers will soon occur, if it has not occurred already.  The 
Air Force has been accessing during those 4 years at slightly 
over half the rate necessary to sustain the force.  When one 
projects that 4-year period into the later periods (say, 8- to 12- 
years middle management period), with normal retention there 
may be fewer than 50 military engineers in any 1-year group. 
 
 The SAB further pointed out that “at the same point in time (11 years 
of commissioned service), the retention of military S&Es (39 percent) is 
even worse than that of pilots (41 percent).” 
  
AFIT S&E Quotas M.S.  
Quota 
M.S. Fills Ph.D. 
Quota 
Ph.D. Fills 
Aero/Astro/Mech 32 10 10 0 
Acq Mgt 21 20 0 0 
Comp Sci/Engr 22 9 3 0 
Elect Engr 43 21 8 2 
Electro Optics  9 2 1 0 
Eng Phys/Nuclear 17 6 8 3 
Environmental 12 12 0 0 
Logistics Mgmt  21 7 0 0 
Meteorology 22 12 2 0 
Ops Anal/Rsch 20 13 3 0 
Sys Eng/Space Ops 11 2 0 0 
TOTAL 230 128 35 5 
Table 4.2: Fills of Advanced Academic Degrees versus Quotas for 
Air Force S&Es for FY 2000 
 Of even more serious concern to the SAB was the deficit with 
respect to the advanced academic degrees of S&E military officers.  The 
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Board recommended that at least half of the S&E officers have technical 
master’s degrees and that 15 percent have technical Ph.D.s, a level of 
education it deemed “necessary to provide the technical leadership 
needed for high-technology acquisitions occurring within the Air Force.”  
The study provided data showing advanced degree quotas versus fills for  
several Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) engineering degree 
programs in fiscal year 2000, Table 4.2. 
 As can be seen, the total fills do not come close to the quotas—128 
of 230 for M.S. degrees and 5 of 35 for Ph.D. degrees.  These data show 
 
 … there are serious deficiencies of the programs with respect to 
Air Force needs.  For example, electro-optics is critical in 
directed-energy applications and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance such as Space-Based Infrared System, the 
Airborne Laser, and the Space-Based Laser.  Yet there are no 
Ph.D. fills and only two master fills.  Similarly, in computer 
science and computer engineering, which are key to command 
and control and information operation application, there are no 
Ph.D. fills and less than half the masters needed….  Not only are 
officers not necessarily being educated in the right fields, but 
AFIT cannot be expected to operate efficiently with such low and 
unstable input.  As a result, the Air Force will be in serious 
trouble technically if this situation is allowed to continue. 
 
 A follow-up inquiry by the NRC similarly drew attention to this 
issue, arguing that the military component of the S&E workforce should 
be given priority attention.75 In addition, it found that the mix of civilian 
and military S&Es conveyed at least three distinct advantages: 
• Young officers entering the service bring with them fresh 
degrees, new perspectives, and unbridled enthusiasm that infuse 
‘new blood’ into the enterprise.  Even if these officers decide to 
leave the Air Force after a 3- to 4- year tour, they have served 
an important purpose because of the innovative element that 
only ‘outsiders’ can bring.  The key is to replace these…with 
other newly commissioned technical officers so that the latest 
knowledge and the freshest thinking is a hallmark of the 
laboratory infrastructure. 
• Mid-level officers who have served elsewhere in the Air Force 
bring a broader perspective in areas such as acquisition, 
logistics, and operations….  This…complements the specialized 
and often narrower technical perspective of the government 
civilian workforce. 
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• Historically, a subset of technical officers that have had 
laboratory experience rise to the ranks of Air Force senior 
leadership (e.g., general officers) and thus provide an ‘S&T’ 
perspective to the corporate decision-making process in various 
senior forums.  Perhaps the epitome was General Lew Allen, 
who served in an Air Force laboratory and ultimately was 
selected to be the Air Force Chief of Staff.  Others such as 
Lieutenant General Tom Ferguson and Major Generals Jasper 
Welch, Don Lamberson, and Fred Dropplet served in the 
laboratory system as junior officers, and went on to play major 
roles in policy, acquisition, and R&D decision-making.  These 
officers were consciously nurtured, mentored, and promoted in 
an Air Force culture that recognized the value and contributions 
of talented young military scientists and engineers. 
 “In short,” wrote the NRC, “an appropriate mix of military and 
government civilian S&Es, properly led and motivated, has proven its 
merit throughout the history of the Air Force.” 
 Despite the widely acknowledged value of having military officers 
with technical degrees in the laboratories and centers, their numbers are 
likely to remain relatively small until senior military leadership 
encourages them through promotion.  At the present, having technical 
degrees and serving tours in the laboratories and centers are not 
considered “career enhancing,” certainly not to the same degree as 
serving in an operational command.  This is unfortunate because, at just 
the time when military-civilian partnership could bring so much to the 
S&T enterprise, the hard facts of career advancement discourage it. 
Chapter 5 
 




 Today, many consider the Department’s S&T budget an unnecessary 
cost, a drain on resources better spent on things such as new weapons, 
logistics and supply functions, military personnel, and maintenance and 
repair of ships, aircraft, and facilities. Many who hold this view, 
however, focus only on the costs and not on the benefits, when in fact 
there is abundant proof that defense S&T offers a cost-effective approach 
to national security. Indeed, even a cursory look at this evidence reveals 
that even the most modest S&T investment has a very large BtC ratio. 
 Especially cost effective is that fraction of DOD’s S&T budget 
expended in-house, both to carry out its portfolio of technical work and 
to support a small but highly trained, experienced, and readily available 
team of experts in a wide range of militarily important scientific and 
engineering disciplines. Defense dollars spent on this critical reservoir 
are repaid many-fold, in increased military effectiveness, avoidance of 
costly acquisition errors, and rapid response to threats. This in-house 
S&T talent is a significant source of new and future capabilities, and also 
provides the agility needed by today’s military to act quickly and 
decisively. This has proved especially important in the fight against 
global terror, where the threat has shown itself capable of rapid evolution 
in response to U.S. weapons and tactics. 
 There are many other ways DOD investment in S&T provides 
significant va lue for money. These include innovative ideas to create 
budget savings that can be diverted to other high-priority areas. Often, 
S&T produces both near- and long-term returns on investment, not only 
in dollars saved, but also in lives spared. S&T produces new materials 
and processes that increase the reliability and safety of weapons and 
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warfare systems such as aircraft, submarines, missiles, and torpedoes. It 
also creates efficiencies in operations, manufacturing processes, and 
maintenance—the very things critics of S&T investment want 
emphasized. 
 As discussed at length in this book, S&T investment also yields a 
large payback by providing the “yardstick” capability needed to avoid 
high cost acquisition problems. Without objective technical advice about 
the quality, relevance, and overall worth of work it contracts out to the 
private sector, the DOD cannot be a smart buyer of the products it 
receives. In turn, S&T spent in-house helps attract and retain the top 
quality S&Es who provide much of this expertise. 
 Regrettably, erosion of this capability has contributed to costly 
problems that plague an increasing number of major defense acquisition 
programs. Examples—in addition to the ones mentioned in Chapter 
Two—include the Navy’s DD(X) program and the Air Force’s F/A-22 
Raptor. The DD(X), originally considered a $700 million cure to the 
rising costs of surface warships, is now projected to cost more than $3 
billion each, and some estimate each Raptor could cost a quarter-billion 
dollars.1 Clearly, DOD’s small investment in maintaining an in-house 
workforce of S&Es produces positive BtC ratios when measured in such 
dimensions. 
 In other words, low investment in S&T is expensive. Ultimately, 
S&T innovation can not only help deter war and terrorism, but also help 
mitigate the high costs when they do occur. Indeed, in light of global 
terrorism, the cost of not investing in S&T could be terrible indeed, not 
only for our military forces, but for our nation. 
5.2 Getting Value: It is the Positive BtC Ratios 
 One of the most remarkable aspects of S&T investment is its multi-
dimensional payoff. S&T effort by its very nature focuses on long-term 
development of new technology, yet it also produces large near-term 
paybacks—measured in dollars and lives. In-house expertise provides a 
capacity to rapidly deliver solutions to battlefield problems. 
 The thermobaric bomb, widely credited with sparing U.S. troops the 
bloody prospect of tunnel-to-tunnel combat in Afghanistan, is a good 
example. Sustained ONR investments in high performance yet extremely 
survivable “internal blast” explosive formulations began in the 1980s and 
were brought to bear by NSWC’s Indian Head Division in the mid-1990s 
to remedy deficiencies seen with in-service penetrator weapons used in 
Operation Desert Storm. Indian Head’s effort produced an explosive that 
could survive a severe hyper-velocity penetration environment while 
retaining lethality in hardened deeply buried targets (in essence, the 
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thermobaric explosives create sustained overpressures in confined spaces 
such as caves, tunnels and hardened structures). Because of the technical 
know-how resident in the DON S&T community as a result of its prior 
work, it could respond to a request by the USD (AT&L) and produce this 
capability within 60 days. How does one measure a return on investment 
(ROI) that saves hundreds of lives? 
 In fact, in the ongoing war in Iraq, there are many such quick 
reaction stories whose success derives from ONR’s sustained investment 
in a reservoir of in-house S&T talent. They include improved personal 
armor capable of protecting the torso, face, and extremities; new 
detection and neutralization technology for use against IEDs; new forms 
of unmanned aerial vehicles to provide persistent surveillance capability; 
unmanned ground vehicles fitted with a variety of sensors for search and 
surveillance in urban terrain; and new types of vehicle armor to minimize 
damage radii inflicted by IEDs and other weapons. The following 
examples illustrate just how rapidly DON in-house capability can help 
U.S. forces. 
• In less than four months, NSWC Indian Head produced the 
warhead for a new shoulder-mounted weapon needed by the 
Marines. The effort included a new design and fuzing system, 
explosive selection, initial testing, and manufacture of some 
1,200 warheads for qualification and field-testing.  The total 
effort, including deliverables, was performed within 6 months. 
• In two weeks, NSWC Dahlgren produced “Dragonshield,” a 
polymer coating that protects the Marines’ High-Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle s. In early 2004, the Marines 
could not locate enough 3/8” protective armor, so they requested 
that NSWC find a way to enhance the performance of the 3/16” 
armor they had available. An in-house team studied performance 
of different polymer coatings and then performed ballistic testing 
to demonstrate that the new material selected did not delaminate. 
In fact, it enhanced the armor’s performance by 50 percent. 
Dragonshield could be sprayed on in field with a drying time of 
7 seconds, and cost only $13 per square foot. In addition, 
spraying a thin layer on the inside of the door reduced the 
thermal conductivity, preventing Marines from burning their skin 
on the hot armored doors. 
• In response to an urgent need to supply the Marines with a heavy 
anti-armor capability for attack helicopters for use in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, NAWC China Lake mobilized its resident know-
how to develop a new metal-augmented-charge thermobaric 
warhead for use in the Hellfire missile. The effort, which 
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involved total design, development, assembly, explosive loading, 
integration into the missile armament section, and testing, took 
just 13 months from funding to fielding.  Secretary Rumsfeld 
himself commented on this new capability, noting that this new 
missile “can take out the first flo or of a building without 
damaging floors above, and is capable of reaching around 
corners, striking enemy forces that hide in caves or bunkers and 
hardened multi-room complexes.”2 
 In addition to providing rapid solutions to pressing battlefield 
problems, the DOD’s in-house S&T investment also pays for itself many 
times over by improving the reliability, operational safety, and 
manufacturability of U.S. weapons and warfare systems. These 
innovations, just as those mentioned above, not only save lives, but also 
save money in such areas as operations and maintenance. In other words, 
their payoffs produce very large BtC ratios that forcefully argue the 
value of this small investment. Again, this point becomes clear with a 
few diverse examples from the DON laboratory/center community: 
 
• A Voice Communication Processing System developed by NRL 
created a one-time savings of nearly $600 million to the DOD, 
including about $375 million to the DON.  The system enhances 
speech intelligibility on secure telephones and provides 
interoperability between old and new speech parameters, 
allowing new and legacy phones to work together. This means 
40,000 legacy units do not have to be retired prematurely, and 
during the potentially long transition period, secure phone 
service will remain uninterrupted. 
• With seed money from ONR, NSWC Carderock saved the Navy 
$120 million in construction costs by developing and supporting 
certification of weldable High Strength Low Alloy (HSLA) 80 
and 100 steels for ship and submarine construction. This major 
innovation not only reduced the acquisition cost of steel plate, 
but also significantly increased welding productivity by 
eliminating the costly process of weld preheating. In addition to 
using HSLA 80 in constructing the TICONDEROGA (CG 47) 
Class, ARLEIGH BURKE (DDG 51) Class, and NIMITZ (CVN 
68) Class of ships, HSLA 100 is being used for flight deck, 
island, and ballistic protection structures of the UNITED 
STATES (CVN 75) and REAGAN (CVN 76) carriers.  Savings 
per ship are on the order of $30 million. 
• Efforts by NSWC Indian Head promise to reduce labor costs by 
50 percent, increase manufacturing throughput, and improve the 
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quality of Cartridge-Actuated Devices and Propellant Actuated 
Devices.  These enable pilots to eject from an aircraft in an 
emergency. Utilizing lean manufacturing technology, the 
division reduced production cycle time and unit cost while 
improving output. 
• A single innovation at NRL saved the Navy over $100 million in 
replacement fuel, filtering, and cleanup costs, and increased 
operational safety and combat readiness of Navy vessels.  In-
house S&T personnel invented a method for assessing distillate 
fuel stability, an innovation that has reduced the number of 
incidents in which vessels have shut down or failed to achieve 
full power because of contaminants, which result from chemical 
reactions in fuels stored for extended periods of time. This 
method has also been adopted as an American Society for the 
Testing of Materials Standard. 
 Although it is sometimes possible to estimate the dollar savings an 
innovation yields, as these examples illustrate, more often this is not the 
case. In fact, there has been no systematic effort to quantify such benefits 
because there is no methodology for generating comprehensive BtC 
ratios.3 It should be emphasized that BtC is more comprehensive than 
traditional ROI approaches, typically employed by industry and 
measured only in dollar savings. As demonstrated above, defense S&T 
innovations often produce an array of benefits, many of which are not 
captured in a simple financial ROI. 
 To help remedy this deficiency, ONR’s N-STAR office 
commissioned a study4 to develop a more comprehensive BtC 
methodology.  Using the Navy’s ILIR (discretionary 6.1) program as a 
test case, the idea is to use the results to ascertain the total benefits 
derived compared to the total funds invested.  NUWC Newport Division 
was selected for the pilot study. The division has operated a modestly 
sized ILIR program for more than 30 years, and has a detailed database 
on projects funded along with their history of transition into follow-on 
torpedo development efforts. The study, overseen by the ILIR program 
manager along with NUWC S&Es and other Navy principals, has 
already examined several projects. One involves using ILIR-generated 
technology to increase the MK-14 ADCAP (Mod 5) torpedo’s stealth. 
The knowledge base used in this upgrade is largely the result of a 20-
year investment in some 33 ILIR projects totaling $4.7 million (in 
inflation adjusted FY 2005 dollars), and has produced a substantial 
corporate memory at NUWC that helps the center transition S&T into 
development programs.  
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 The results of this case study impressed even those who fully 
expected impressive results. The Mod 6 upgrade version reduced 
radiated noise by more than two orders of magnitude. Importantly, it was 
ILIR-funded research that enabled this reduction without a replacement 
of both the energy and propulsion sections of the torpedo. Of the total 
estimated savings to the Navy of $1.558 billion, about 80 percent or 
$1.247 billion is attributable to the ILIR effort alone. Comparing this to 
the $4.7 million investment produces a BtC ratio of 264:1. Even 
comparing the $1.247 billion to the entire $114 million (in inflation 
adjusted FY 2005 dollars) ILIR investment (not just the portion focused 
on torpedo stealth) at NUWC from 1971 to 2005 produces a BtC ratio of 
10:1. ILIR technology in this effort also produced several other benefits, 
such as accelerated Fleet deployment of the Mod 6 torpedo. Over 70 
percent of the total ADCAP inventory has been converted to Mod 6 to 
date. 
 Three additional ILIR efforts at NUWC are now being studied, 
including submarine towed arrays and a fuel cell project aimed at future 
unmanned undersea vehicles. A comprehensive draft report on this new 
BtC methodology has been delivered to the N-STAR office for review. If 
this pilot effort continues to show promise as a means of accurately and 
comprehensively estimating the overall BtC of ILIR-funded programs, it 
will be extended to other DON warfare/system centers that receive such 
funds. 
5.3 The High Cost of Not Acting 
 Just as there are substantial benefits derived from DOD’s S&T 
investment, there are costs incurred as the result of investing too little. It 
is useful to consider just how high these costs can be, measured in lives 
lost, injuries incurred, and depletion of our national resources. 
 To help put the DON’s annual S&T investment (currently at some 
$1.8 billion) in some perspective, it is useful to examine the enormous 
costs of military conflicts and terrorist acts. Some of these costs are 
direct, for example the impact on the budgets of the countries involved, 
while others are indirect, for example the overall effect on the world 
economy. Of course there is a multitude of situational factors. To give 
just one example, costs generally depend on the size of the conflict and 
its duration, although a short conflict can certainly involve very high 
costs, as the case of a nuclear exchange makes obvious.  Because of the 
compounding effects produced by an almost countless number of 
situational factors, estimating the costs associated with war is replete 
with difficulty and involves tremendous uncertainty.  Even so, some 
analysts, such as William Nordhaus of Yale University, have tried. In 
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one such example, he analyzed the likely costs of the Iraq war. As part of 
this effort, he also estimated the direct military costs of past American 
wars, from the Revolution up to the first Gulf War, Table 5.1.5 While 
these estimates do not include veterans’ benefits and health costs,  which  
 
Total Direct Costs of Wars  















0.1 2.2 447 63 
War of 1812 
(1812-1815) 
0.09 1.1 120 13 
Mexican War 
(1846-1848) 
0.07 1.6 68 3 
Civil War (1861-
1865) 
    
Union 3.2 38.1 1,357 84 
Confederate 2.0 23.8 2,749 169 




0.4 9.6 110 3 
World War I 
(1917-1918) 
16.8 190.6 2,489 24 
World War II 
(1941-1945) 
285.4 2,896.3 20,388 130 
Korean War 
(1950-1953) 
54.0 335.9 2,266 15 
Vietnam War 
(1964-1972) 
111.0 494.3 2,204 12 
First Persian Gulf 
War (1990-1991) 
61.0 76.1 306 1 
Table 5.1: Costs of Major American Wars                                
(Source: Nordhaus, Table 2) 
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are very large indeed for more recent wars (a point developed below), 
they certainly indicate that major wars have cost a lot in comparison to 
GDP estimates at the time of the conflict. The costs of any war are high, 
and the costs of losing are even higher. John Holzrichter, an assistant to 
the director of the DOE’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 
states, “In my opinion, nothing can be worse than losing a conflict of the 
magnitude of a world war. Even the so-called winners of past conflicts 
faced innumerable negative consequences, especially our European 
allies.  6 ”  
 Obviously then, avoiding a war offers enormous savings. Holzrichter 
continues, “Of course, in more recent history, a nuclear exchange would 
have been a worldwide catastrophe. I firmly believe that the prevention 
of such conflicts over the past 55 years, using military deterrence, 
information dominance, and diplomacy, has been the greatest success in 
America's national security history.7 The deterrence Holzrichter 
mentions was made possible by maintaining a technological superiority 
over would-be adversaries. Today, as throughout the Cold war, U.S. 
technological superiority depends on a vibrant national S&T effort, 
including a healthy and productive in-house S&T component.  
Calculating cost of the Global War on Terror is even more difficult.  The 
elements that contribute to the overall costs of terrorism are more varied 
than with a traditional war. In addition to the costs from the immediate 
aftermath of the terrorist act, there is a continuing economic impact, such 
as the added cost to protect citizens from further attacks. This “terrorism 
tax” is high, and imposed on every citizen.  
 Regardless of the difficulties, many are attempting to determine the 
costs of terrorism. Consider Table 5.2, taken from a study by the Milken 
Institute.8 Simply the sheer number of cost elements shows that 
estimations are fraught with complexity and uncertainty. Many have 
attempted to assess the overall costs associa ted with 9/11. By one 
estimate, the real and human capital costs ranged from $25 billion to $60 
billion.9 Another put the human capital loss at $40 billion, and the 
property loss between $10 and $13 billion.10 Still another claimed a total 
direct loss of about $21.4 billion.11 While such estimates are imprecise, 
they certainly hammer home the point that even a small shadowy 
network of individuals can inflict tremendous costs on a nation, and for 
very little money. 
  As mentioned, another high price of war is the veterans’ benefits 
and associated health costs, which are particularly large for recent 
conflicts. One reason is that, even though the firepower today has 
increased, the lethality of wounds has decreased, as the result of 
improvements in the military medical system. This has especially been 
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the case since the end of the Persian Gulf War, and includes changes in 
strategies and systems of battle care.  As reported by Gawade, “In World 
War II, 30 percent of the Americans injured in combat died. In Vietnam, 
the proportion dropped to 24 percent. In the war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, about 10 percent of those injured have died. At least as 
many U.S. soldiers have been injured in combat in this wa r as in the 
Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, or the first five years of the 
Vietnam conflict, from 1961 to 1965.”12 These numbers and others in  
Table 5.3 illustrate how the lethality of war wounds has changed over 
time. 
 
War No. Wounded or 






Revolutionary War 10,623 4,435 42 
War of 1812 6,765 2,260 33 
Mexican War 5,885 1,733 29 
Civil War (Union Forces) 422,295 140,414 33 
Spanish-American War 2,047 385 19 
World War I 257,404 53,402 21 
World War II 963,403 291,557 30 
Korean War 137,025 33,741 25 
Vietnam War 200,727 47,424 24 
Persian Gulf War 614 147 24 
War in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2001-Dec 
2004 
10,369 1,004 10 
Table 5.3: Lethality of War Wounds among U.S. Soldiers          
(Source: Gawande based on DOD data) 
 Aside from the personal tragedy involved here, these numbers also 
translate into very large health costs.  The number of killed or wounded 
in action shown in this table has of course increased, and as of 4 
November 2005 stood at 17,067, an increase of almost 65 percent.13 Of 
the wounded, just under half return to action within 72 hours. But over 
half do not return to duty quickly, and many are permanently disfigured 
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and disabled. One recent story reported that the U.S. Senate had 
approved $1.5 billion in emergency funds for veterans’ health care to pay 
for the rising cost of Iraq war injuries.14 In June 2005 testimony before 
the House Veterans Affairs Committee, James Nicholson, Secretary of 
the Department of Veterans Affairs, noted that 2002 projections 
estimated that 23,553 veterans from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars would 
need health care, but this figure has been revised to 103,000. As a result, 
Nicholson said, health care costs were rising at a pace of 5.2 percent, far 
beyond the 2.3 percent annual growth originally projected.15 
 Whatever the exact numbers, the costs of war-related wounds are 
very large and at the moment growing rapidly. The IEDs causing so 
much damage to U.S. troops in Iraq have created an urgent demand for 
new technological breakthroughs to counter them or mitigate their 
impact. Such breakthroughs are precisely the role of in-house S&T 
efforts carried out by S&Es working in the DON laboratories and 
centers. The BtC ratio of finding a technological solution to the IED 
threat alone would be enormous. The point here is not to determine the 
costs associated with the war or terrorism, but to further underline the 
great value of maintaining a strong defense S&T effort, and especially to 
affirm the necessity of revitalizing a DON in-house S&T enterprise 
teetering on the brink of becoming inadequate for the tasks placed before 
it. In terms of the overall defense budget, the investment in S&T is 
relatively modest, but one that produces large payoffs. 
 
   
Chapter 6 
 




 The U.S. is today the sole world superpower. It enjoys a position of 
unparalleled military strength and uses that strength to defend itself and 
its allies. Indeed, providing for the national defense is the first and 
fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. But the task of 
national defense is rapidly changing as it must in order to counter 
evolving threats such as global terrorism. As it has since the end of 
World War II, the country must equip the men and women who comprise 
its armed forces with superior technology that enables the best possible 
warfighting capability. Leveraging the products of S&T to provide this 
technological edge is still a valid strategy for a new century. It is in fact 
an absolutely essential strategy, as our forces face an ever-growing array 
of threats from a determined enemy. The U.S. must sustain a vigorous 
national defense S&T effort not only in the private sector, but in the 
DOD’s own in-house laboratories and centers as well. 
 Despite the growing indications that the DOD will need it, this in-
house S&T workforce has been allowed to atrophy both in size and 
technical quality. And the vigorous in-house S&T stabilization and 
rebuilding now required faces significant challenges. Local, national, and 
global trends all indicate that staffing with the right kinds of S&Es will 
not be easy, especially in light of the rapid build-up of scientific talent 
and infrastructure outside the U.S. Many of the trends previously 
discussed have already constricted the flow of talent in the pipeline that 
feeds DOD’s hiring pool. Further, global trends have changed the very 
manner in which innovation occurs, all of which means the DOD must 
reshape its S&T enterprise into one suited to 21st century needs. 
Realizing this new vision requires achieving four overarching goals: 
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• First, there must be a sufficiently large community of S&T 
“prospectors” who can participate as peers with colleagues 
throughout the global community, thereby ensuring that the 
fruits of the worldwide enterprise can also be applied. 
• Second, the DON must develop and implement a human capital 
strategy for its in-house S&T community that will work on 
today’s most important problems. The strategy should result in 
4,000 new Ph.D.s by 2015. 
• Third, S&T funding should be increased to 3 percent of overall 
DON total obligation authority, and it should be maintained at 
that level in constant, inflation-adjusted dollars through 2015 to 
ensure revitalization of the workforce and provide the 
intellectual capital base for the Navy-After-Next. 
• Fourth, the DON must support and emphasize technical 
excellence, and appoint visionary civilian leaders who have 
authority and responsibility for the technical output of their 
organizations. 
 
 To realize these overarching goals, the following sections will 
provide 10 recommendations for revitalizing the defense S&T enterprise. 
Because the authors are especially familiar with the DON and have 
access to much of the relevant data, a considerable portion of what 
follows will use that Service as a framework. However, given the great 
similarities among the DON, Army, and Air Force in-house S&T 
management issues, many of the steps recommended here could apply to 
those Services as well. 
6.2 The Global Connectivity Imperative 
Recommendation 1: Expand ONR Global activities to include all the 
major players on the international S&T scene. 
 
 As S&T breakthroughs become more and more the product of 
collaborators often scattered around the world, the DOD is becoming a 
relatively small player in the global enterprise. To track, assess, and 
apply the products to address new warfighting needs, the DOD will have 
to open its window wide. Put another way, it must engage the enterprise 
on a global scale, staying connected to all relevant prospecting 
communities regardless of location. To do this, members of the 
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workforce must be “card-carrying” members of those communities—
credible publications are the ante for playing at the global S&T table. 
 Recognizing this need, ONR has reached out to the world S&T 
community through its ONR Global organization, with offices in 
London, Santiago, Tokyo, Australia, and Singapore. They employ some 
40 scientists, technologists, and engineers to help work with R&D 
communities in a broad range of technical areas worldwide to provide 
solutions to Naval challenges. The S&T division engages academia, 
defense and commercial industries, and government agencies. It 
encourages information exchange and collaboration with international 
scientists and organizations whose interests are of mutual benefit. At 
present, the division utilizes several vehicles, including the Visiting 
Scientist Program (VSIP), the Conference Support Program (CSP), and 
the Naval International Cooperative Opportunities in S&T Program 
(NICOP). 
• The VSIP supports short visits among DON personnel, 
contractors and grantees, and international S&Es to explore 
collaborative opportunities, exchange information between DON 
and international programs, assist ONR Global with international 
liaison and assessment, and establish long-term relationships 
between DON and international funding agencies or next-
generation international S&T leaders. 
• The CSP financially supports workshops and conferences to plan 
collaborative international programs, exchange information 
between DON and international programs, identify and discuss 
issues of interest, develop relationships between DON and 
international S&T sponsors, and maintain international field 
office connectivity in core areas. 
• The NICOP encourages international collaboration by providing 
seed funds when ONR headquarters or other U.S. government 
agencies commit to outyear program funding. Priorities include 
supporting transformational initiatives and accelerating the 
introduction of breakthroughs into naval applications. 
 These efforts are a good start, but given the rapid pace of 
technological globalization, bolder steps are needed. ONR Global should 
be expanded dramatically to include sites in other countries emerging as 
major players, for example India and China. New forms of engagement 
could also be utilized. For example, scientists in former Soviet Union 
countries could be used to screen and assess technology flowing out of 
Russia, China, and India. For a relatively modest investment, highly 
skilled and highly educated S&Es in these countries could be employed 
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to do work themselves and to provide a first line of defense against 
technological surprise. 
 To reinforce and institutionalize this imperative, the DON should 
formalize the idea that S&Es must be globally connected.  Inserting 
appropriate language in the S&T strategy would help accomplish this, 
and also help ensure resources are available for the workforce to 
participate in global prospecting communities. Additionally, individual 
development plans could include requirements to further global 
connectivity.  In today’s business-oriented environment, foreign travel 
and attendance at international conferences are many times discouraged, 
but this climate must change for members of the S&T community to 
engage their international technical communities. 
6.3 A New Human Capital Strategy 
Recommendation 2: The DON should bring on board 500 S&Es per 
year over the next ten years to pursue research and technology areas 
of critical importance to developing future military capabilities. 
 
 Data previously presented demonstrated the shrinking of the DON 
in-house S&E workforce since the end of the Cold War, including that 
subset focused on S&T. In addition, that workforce has experienced a 
significant brain drain due to the loss of many of its most highly 
educated and knowledgeable members, a fact reflected in the drop in the 
number of Ph.D.s. To meet the increasing demands likely to be placed on 
this workforce, the DON should immediately act to stabilize its size and 
strengthen its quality. 
 Exactly how many S&Es the DON needs is of course dependent on 
many factors, some of which are either unknown or unknowable. They 
include things like forecasts of future workloads, attrition rates, and 
requirements in terms of education, training, and skills. The lack of solid 
information about these and other factors hinder accurate projections. 
 Nevertheless, there is enough information to produce usable 
estimates, and such estimates were the goal of a recent study the N-
STAR office commissioned to help with workforce planning.1 Utilizing 
an Office of Personnel Management workforce planning model, the 
study compared the current situation with estimated future requirements 
to identify hiring needs. Estimates of attrition rates were projected based 
on historical loss rates (about 20 percent per year). However, projecting 
future demands is more difficult owing in part to inconsistent and 
unpredictable congressional funding patterns. The N-STAR study effort 
was also limited in that its authors could obtain funding and attrition data 
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only from a subset of the overall DON laboratory/center community’s 
S&T enterprise (the NAWC, NUWC, and the SSC). To help overcome 
these uncertainties, the approach utilized best- and worst-case scenarios 
and other scaling methodologies. 
 Despite such difficulties, the ONR study authors combined their 
original research with other information to reach several conclusions. 
One, of the NLCCG community’s current population of some 21,000 
S&Es, about 4,000 of them work on S&T programs, including about 
1,900 who have Ph.D. degrees.2 Of these, a smaller subset consists of a 
highly talented group of so-called “Esteemed Fellows”3 that constitute an 
in-house cadre of intellectual capital responsible for a large portion of the 
future innovation the DON will need to support naval operations. These 
are much of the brain trust of the laboratory/center community, and its 
leading prospectors. 
 In addition to ensuring an adequate size of the S&T workforce, 
another aspect of revitalization that needs attention is refreshing it 
periodically to secure the right mix of technical capabilities. Staying 
abreast of today’s technology base requires constant acquisition of new 
skills and knowledge. This in turn requires a steady workforce shaping, 
which can be achieved in part through planned personnel turnover. In 
other words, a healthy, cutting-edge S&T workforce should exhibit a 
healthy rate of turnover. It is reasonable to expect that the entire 
workforce should turn over about every 10 years. This estimate is linked 
to academic refresh cycles, the currency of technology developments, a 
flexibility in the retirement system that encourages movement into and 
out of the federal sector, and the fact that technologists tend to migrate 
with projects into follow-on programs. In any case, turnover creates 
vacancies that must be filled on an on-going basis. 
 Given the estimated need in the NLCCG community for some 4,000 
S&Es, a 10-year refreshment cycle, and projected rates of turnover of 
about 100 each year, it is reasonable to assume that about 500 will have 
to be hired each year to build and maintain an in-house workforce. 
 The increased flow in the pipeline required for this many new hires 
necessitates a comprehensive human capital strategy, and unfortunately, 
DOD’s current system is unsuitable for today’s high technology 
organizations. Several recent studies have in fact commented on this, and 
recommended approaches equal to the task. A basic problem, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, is that one-size-fits-all approaches like those 
embodied in the CSS and the NSPS are simply too rigid for the dynamic 
needs of the laboratories and centers. In fact, many within the defense 
technical community fear the NSPS may actually take away many of the 
flexibilities and authorities the laboratories currently enjoy under various 
congressionally established personnel demonstration programs. The 
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DDR&E, other senior leaders of the OSD, and Service technical 
communities must ensure that the final version of the NSPS offers the 
centers not only what they have today, but in fact the additional 
flexibilities to operate as 21st-century technology enterprises. 
 A comprehensive human capital strategy for the laboratories and 
centers must incorporate a number of features. It must facilitate the 
hiring, training, and retention of the best technical talent, especially those 
individuals in cutting-edge efforts. It must foster acquisition of advanced 
technical degrees, interdisciplinary education, and continuing education. 
It must also focus on knowledge management (KM) issues, especially 
how to transfer a massive corporate memory from Baby Boomers to the 
next generation. 
 All this will of course require sufficient resources. In fact, the N-
STAR initiative has several components aimed at increasing the flow of 
new talent into the hiring pipeline, a full description of which is given in 
Appendix A-1, but money will also be required to fund these new 
employees. In fact, providing an assured level of funding for their first 
two years of employment is an incentive to accept a position and a 
magnet to help retain them. 
 In addition to the activities noted under the N-STAR umbrella, 
several other DOD-wide initiatives are geared to help fill the S&T 
recruiting pipeline. Prominent among these is the SMART scholarship 
program mentioned in the Introduction. Established by Congress in the 
FY 2005 National Defense Authorization Act, SMART promotes the 
education, recruitment, and retention of upperclassmen and graduate 
students in science, mathematics, and engineering. All scholarships are 
based on individual DOD laboratory/center needs. In FY 2005, Congress 
provided more than $2 million for scholarships of up to two years. 
 Impressed with the potential of the SMART initiative, Congress is 
expected to follow it up with the National Defense Education Program 
(NDEP) for 2006. Already, during consideration of the FY 2006 defense 
appropriations bill, the Senate agreed unanimously to an amendment to 
provide an additional $10 million for NDEP. It is anticipated this 
program will provide scholarships toward attaining a single degree, from 
the Associate’s to a Ph.D. 
 Figure 6.1 suggests a balanced approach for hiring the 500 new S&T 
workers needed each year. As discussed, the new personnel should either 
possess a Ph.D. or be on an educational track geared toward that level. 
The underlying concept is as follows. First, there would be 250 S&Es 
coming out of two-year undergraduate scholarship programs (DON 
funding for junior and senior years with payback requirement). Of these, 
100 will feed directly into the S&T workforce with the other 150 allowed 
to move directly into one-year M.S. programs. At that level there will be 
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funding for 250 students per year. Of these, 150 will come from the B.S. 
pool just described, while the other 100 will come from DON 
warfare/system center employees and former military officers who want 
to pursue graduate education. Of these 250 M.S. graduates, 200 will 
move into the centers each year to fulfill their service obligations. The 
top 50 can proceed directly to Ph.D. programs. At that level there will be 
200 new employees each year. The pool will include the 50 M.S. 
graduates with the balance of 150 coming from a combination of post-









100 BS into R&D Ctrs
200 MS into R&D Ctrs
200 PhD into R&D Ctrs
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50 From NDESG, 
NSF Fellows
Program Steady -State Output – 500 new technologists/year
 
Figure 6.1: Navy S&T Hiring Pipeline  
Recommendation 3: Institute a DON S&T community expectation 
that career path to journeyman level requires a Ph.D. or equivalent 
education. 
 
 As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the nature and rate of 
technological change today means those planning S&T careers will need 
a more highly, broadly-based, and multidisciplinary education than ever 
before. This situation has already prompted the National Academy of 
Engineering and other groups to recommend educational changes for the 
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new generation of S&Es. In fact, engineering organizations have 
recommended significant changes such as more interdisciplinary 
learning, and the NAE and others have suggested that a B.S. signifies an 
“engineer in training,” while an M.S. should be considered the 
“professional degree.”4 Indeed, because “the half -life of cutting-edge 
technical knowledge today is of the order of a few years,” universities 
need to offer advanced training to working engineers seeking to maintain 
their technical relevance.5 
 These requirements are just as applicable to the defense laboratories. 
Indeed, if the M.S. is the ante for getting into the DON’s S&T 
workforce, then a Ph.D. or equivalent should be the goal for each 
professional, especially those who aspire to become Esteemed Fellows.  
For that reason, new hires at the centers that do not already possess a 
Ph.D. should be expected to enter a career path to achieve that degree or 
its equivalent to reach the professional level. 
 While the goal should be a S&T workforce comprised wholly of 
Ph.D.s, the reality is that many new hires will enter the workforce below 
that educational level. Therefore, each of the laboratories and centers 
must offer a vigorous program of continuing education opportunities. At 
a minimum, all S&T workers should receive the equivalent of a Ph.D. 
through various educational and on the job training opportunities. 
 Examples of how this continuing education could be provided have 
been given. They include distance learning methods as well as 
collaborative ventures with colleges and universities, such as the one 
between NSWC’s Indian Head Division and the University of 
Maryland’s CECD. In addition, new hires should also be expected to 
remain connected with academia, either as a student, teacher, or 
participant in some joint outreach effort aimed at creating and sustaining 
more interest in science and engineering as an occupation.  N-STAR’s 
“Virginia Demonstration Program” is an excellent model for such 
outreach. S&E staff at DON warfare center sites in Virginia mentor 
students and collaborate with teachers. The program has the principal 
goal of generating enthusiasm among 7th graders in science, engineering, 
and mathematics. It also aims to invigorate the science and math 
curricula in Virginia schools and contribute to the professional 
development of middle -school science and mathematics teachers, while 
developing a number of Ph.D. researchers in fields of interest to the 
DON.  Such activities should be part and parcel of individual 
development plans for S&T community members. 
  Because women and many minorities are under-represented today in 
many fields of science, engineering, and mathematics, special care must 
be taken to increase their participation. It is simply in the national 
interest to do so. Several efforts with this goal are already underway, for 
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example the DOD’s Historically Black Colleges and Universities/ 
Minority Institutions program. Also, the public -private partnership BEST 
(Building Engineering and Science Talent) was launched in 2001 at the 
recommendation of the Congressional Commission on the Advancement 
of Women and Minorities in Science, Engineering and Technology 
Development. BEST convened some of the nation’s most respected 
practitioners, researchers, and policy makers to identify best practices for 
developing the technical talent of under-represented groups, from pre-K 
through higher education and the workplace. The results can be found in 
the several reports linked on the BEST web site.6 Other initiatives should 
also be undertaken, and long-term relationships between minority 
academic institutions and DON technical organizations cultivated. 
Importantly, all outreach programs should be fully integrated to attain 
their maximum benefit. 
 
Recommendation 4: Create a DOD S&T Academy, equivalent in 
prestige to National Academies in Science and Engineering. 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, because there are limited opportunities for 
membership in the national academies for those in the DOD’s in-house 
S&T workforce, the Department needs some institutional mechanism to 
recognize its top researchers for their outstanding contributions to 
national defense. One solution would be for the Department to establish 
an S&T academy that carries an analogous recognition. Election to 
membership would entail public recognition by top national and DOD 
leaders and various prizes or other privileges. For instance, election 
could provide a stipend for work on other pressing technical problems, or 
a sabbatical for work with outstanding researchers. This would of course 
require an appropriate funding line.  In fact, one could envision members 
of this select fraternity being allocated funds to develop teams of 
researchers working on particularly difficult defense problems, with the 
long-term result of developing a pool of new, prospective members. 
 A good illustration of the necessity of appropriately resourcing such 
a program is the authority granted to the three Services in the National 
Defense Authorization Act for 2001. The provision, Section 1113 
(Extension, Expansion, and Revision of Authority For Experimental 
Personnel Program for Scientific and Technical Personnel), extended to 
the Services the same authority previously granted to the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency. In effect, the authority allowed the 
agency to carry out an experimental five-year program to “facilitate 
recruitment of eminent experts in science and engineering for research 
and development projects.” More specifically, it allowed appointment of 
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20 S&Es from outside the civil service and uniformed Services “without 
regard to any provision of title 5, United States Code, governing the 
appointment of employees in the civil service.” Essentially, Section 1113 
gave each of the Services 40 such positions. However, Congress 
provided no funding to support the incumbents. As a result, there have 
been few appointments, rendering the authority of little use. 
6.4 Resourcing the DON S&T Enterprise 
Recommendation 5: Increase the annual DON S&T budget to 3 
percent of TOA, and reallocate amongst community members 
(academia, in-house centers and industry) to ensure viability of each 
sector. 
 
 The new S&T enterprise must have adequate financial and human 
resources. The financial resources must support the in-house technical 
work and initiatives aimed at attracting, training, and retaining new 
employees. Today, the DON S&T workforce includes approximately 
4,000 S&Es.7  To revitalize this workforce and build the skills needed for 
the future, the DON should hire about 500 new S&Es each year, 
emphasizing Ph.D.-level talent. As noted in Chapter 2, discretionary 
dollars in the hands of TDs greatly enhance the recruitment and retention 
of high-quality, productive personnel. Consequently, a suitable portion of 
funding should be distributed at the discretion of the TD for work 
deemed important. Again, the resources should come from stable funding 
sources, because most S&T efforts span years. Funding instabilities 
disrupt program planning and execution, compel the workforce to fritter 
away precious time chasing new funding, and lead to erratic hiring 
patterns that disrupt strategic workforce planning. 
 Despite overwhelming evidence that relying on the private sector is 
risky business, many policy makers still prefer to believe it can be done, 
and why not? After all, almost daily the news seems to announce yet 
another innovation. This implies that most innovations come from 
commercially funded R&D rather than some defense laboratory. In fact, 
Americans enjoy a flood of new products made possible by innovations 
in the electronics, materials, information, and health fields. Many of 
these have also transformed military operations—advances in 
communications and electronics, for example, have enabled network-
centric warfare. Not surprisingly, the commercial sector’s performance 
has impressed military planners, especially those involved with front-line 
military operations who are, after all, only interested in functional 
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capability. Besides, it is easier to see a new piece of hardware than a new 
idea about nanotubes. 
 Although the commercial sector pumps a great deal of money into 
innovation, is it planting the seeds that grow into this seemingly constant 
harvest of new technologies? An illuminating and forcefully argued 
recent paper called The S&T Innovation Conundrum helps answer that 
question.8 Importantly, it also demonstrates the risk inherent in a defense 
strategy that relies too heavily on the private sector for breakthrough 
technologies. 
 Surprisingly, the authors found that a breakthrough innovation takes 
15-20 years to progress through the early, or “prospecting” phase—the 
same amount of time it took 100 years ago. In examining the histories of 
some major S&T innovations over the last century, they found that the 
nature of human creative timescales is rate limited. In other words, 
technology has not sped up the rate at which scientists process 
information and create new knowledge. The only way to create new 
knowledge faster, then, is to fund more prospectors. This will enhance 
the probability, but not the certainty, of discoveries. 
 With a compelling distinction between this early prospecting phase 
and the later “mining” phase, the authors show how technological 
advances are largely an extraction (mining), the success and speed of 
which depend on the long-term heavy lifting of the prospecting. Indeed, 
there is often no useful functional capability produced during the 
prospecting phase, which is why few companies risk their capital on 
basic and applied research that may not provide a return on their 
investment. Instead, most capability results from well-funded 
commercial sector development programs that exploit the prospecting. 
Further, the mining phase is not rate limited, but can be sped up. 
 Lack of awareness about the differences between these phases has 
fueled misperceptions about funding defense S&T.  The authors note that 
many DOD planners incorrectly assume that rapid advances in a general 
functional capability also represent the tempo and time scales for 
breakthroughs in the prospecting phase. Additionally, few are aware that 
if more prospecting is not done now, the miners in 20 years will find a 
barren science landscape from which to draw. 
 It is important to note that while both the prospecting and mining 
phases require basic and applied research as well as exploratory 
development, they involve different mixes. Therefore, efficiency requires 
different forms of governance. That is, each phase requires its own 
approach for allocating resources such as people and dollars. As the 
authors explain:  
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Economists, understanding the important role that technology 
plays in economic growth, have begun developing theories 
regarding the impact on economic growth where R&D 
investments are determined so as to maximize profits. This is 
referred to as an endogenous investment strategy. These theories 
help in discussing how economic conditions combined with an 
endogenous investment strategy for R&D affect the scientific and 
technical talent pool and the generation of knowledge as well as 
economic growth…. It seems clear that a solely endogenous 
approach to determine R&D investments results in too little 
long-term research being funded. Talent and resources gravitate 
to the mining phase at the expense of the prospecting phase and 
at the expense of knowledge generation needed to sustain 
economic growth in the long term. 
 
 Simply stated, if economic forces alone dictate allocation of 
resources, then those resources will migrate to where money is to be 
made from innovation that produces new functional capability, because 
that is what grabs market share. No wonder commercial firms today 
(including defense companies) shun long-term, high-risk prospecting 
ventures—they simply prefer that someone else underwrite them. In fact, 
only the Federal Government has both the motivation and the deep 
pockets to fund most basic and applied research. This is all the more the 
case with S&T spending for national defense. 
 The next question, then, is what form of governance will achieve a 
satisfactory return on investment, especially considering that in this early 
prospecting phase it is impossible to predict exactly where innovations 
will emerge. Increasing the number of prospectors certainly increases the 
probability of breakthroughs, but the undertaking still involves a large 
dose of serendipity. So what is the best course? Here the authors provide 
excellent advice: 
 
Organizations that are in the business of actually making things 
or actually using things need to staff their organizations with this 
in mind. Since information technology has not reached the point 
where it can or should replace human creativity it is necessary 
to actually engage the relevant prospecting communities. The 
most effective way to do this is to have staff who are card-
carrying members of those communities. This is necessary in 
order to understand what the state of the art is and to have 
access to it. If one is not a card-carrying member one gets no 
respect in such communities, and therefore no serious entry. 
Furthermore, since science and technology is a global 
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undertaking (and becoming more so) it is essential to engage on 
a global scale.  This is true for DOD as well as commercial 
businesses. 
 
The U.S. is becoming a relatively smaller player in this global 
enterprise. It is not possible for any one organization, including 
DOD, to conduct science and technology effort in all areas of 
this global science and technology undertaking. It is possible, 
however, for large organizations like DOD to employ a large 
enough science and engineering workforce to gain entry into 
most areas of prospecting space. This will provide the best 
window on what is going on out there and for evaluating its 
importance. The strategy should be to have a workforce that has 
the stature to be welcome and the broad competence (scientific 
and military) to recognize something that is important to DOD 
when it sees it. This should be DOD’s science and engineering 
brain trust. 
 
 Such a “brain trust” is critical to future defense needs, and must be 
revitalized now and treated as the precious commodity it is. 
 In the DON, the in-house S&T workforce constitutes this brain 
trust—just how many workers are needed for it to be adequate? For the 
reasons just mentioned, it cannot be large enough to do everything on its 
own. Still, it must sustain a presence in all of the prospecting 
communities important to the DON. Only those members who do hands-
on S&T can acquire the bona fides to gain entry as prospectors; contract 
monitoring of outsourced work will not suffice. 
 Given, then, that the primary job of the DON in-house S&T 
workforce should be prospecting, not mining—a task better left to the 
commercial sector—just how many workers are needed? As stated, the 
current best estimate is around 4,000. Moreover, accounting for annual 
workforce attrition rates, sustaining and refreshing this number probably 
require about 500 new hires per year over a 10-year cycle. 
 Providing adequate resources for the in-house community and 
enhancing the prospecting component of the S&T portfolio—without 
jeopardizing industry’s participation—requires a budget increase. The 
job simply cannot be done with existing resources. The 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review argued, “DOD should maintain a strong 
[S&T] program in order to support evolving military needs and to 
ensure technological superiority over potential adversaries.” Doing this 
entails an “increase in funding for S&T programs to a level of three 
percent of DOD spending per year.”9 Recall that several DSB studies 
also set this three percent goal.10 
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 The Congress too supports a robust defense S&T program funded at 
this three percent goal: 
• “Our present military strength is the result of substantial S&T 
investments made a generation ago…. In a similar vein, our 
nation’s prospective security and military dominance ultimately 
depends on its ability to perpetuate technological advantages 
over the next few decades. S&T programs will enable us to 
maintain this advantage…. It is imperative, therefore, that we act 
to fund S&T at 3 percent of the total defense budget.”11 
• “The committee commends the Department of Defense 
commitment to a goal of 3 percent of the budget request for the 
defense science and technology program and progress toward 
this goal. The committee views [such] investments as critical to 
maintaining U.S. military technological superiority in the face of 
growing and changing threats…and believes that both the 
defense agencies and the military departments have vital roles in 
DOD’s science and technology investment strategy.”12 
• “The Committee feels that a robust defense science and 
technology program is a requirement in order to develop the new 
systems and operational concepts that will enable 
transformation…. The Committee fully supports the 
Department’s stated goal of investing 3 percent of the defense 
budget in science and technology programs [and] urges the 
Department and each of the military services to achieve the 3 
percent goal as soon as practicable.”13 [Emphasis added] 
 Given the strong, consistent, widespread support for this goal, 
funding annually at 3 percent of DON S&T is recommended. The DOD 
and the Services should strive to achieve it as soon as practicable, 
particularly because, as Chief of Naval Research Cohen himself recently 
stated, “In the war against terrorism, S&T is the enabler which links 
innovative research to warfighter and homeland defense 
requirements.”14 Under-funding such a vital requirement is not tenable at 
this critical juncture. 
 Given that laboratories and centers conduct research in all three 
phases of S&T (BA 1, BA 2, BA 3) and that they are part of a three-
partner team that includes academia and industry, how should the roles 
be balanced among the three categories? Chapter 2 discussed the partners 
in the defense technology base, noting that DOD has historically relied 
on universities and non-profits for the largest share of its basic and 
applied research. The arrangement allows access to some of the world’s 
best minds and newest ideas, and also to facilities DOD does not have to 
support unilaterally. It also engages students in defense work, thereby 
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providing access to the next generation of technologists, engineers, and 
managers. Industry, on the other hand, is well suited to work in the later 
stages of the RDT&E process. Recently, it has had a growing role in 
S&T as well, for example by participating in large demonstration and 
evaluation efforts. 
 The roles of the DOD in-house laboratories and centers are based on 
their fundamental duty to support a broad range of national security 
efforts. For example, they are best able to translate between 
technological opportunities and the warfighter’s needs, integrate 
technologies across life cycles and generations of equipment, respond 
rapidly to warfighting needs, provide facilities that private companies 
cannot or will not, and offer the Services the yardstick capability 
necessary to become smart buyers and users of technology. To satisfy 
these varied needs, they must carry out S&T effort in all its phases as 
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Table 6.1: DON S&T Performance by Defense Technology Base 
Partner 
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 Table 6.1 shows the current and recommended distribution of S&T 
among the private and public sector partners. Based on FY 2004 data, 
universities and non-profits perform the largest share of basic research 
(BA1) (54 percent), while industry predominates in applied research 
(BA2) (44 percent) and advanced technology development (BA3) (61 
percent). Of total actual dollars received by the different participants 
aggregated across all three budget categories, universities and non-profits 
received $614 million, in-house laboratories/centers $624 million, and 
industry $1,011 million.   
 The table 6.1 suggests what the authors believe would be a more 
appropriate distribution. The current situation regarding applied research 
undercuts the ability of the in-house laboratories to bring new ideas to 
fruition in new military capability. Centers could be more productive at 
this transitioning if they received an increased share of applied research 
funding. As recommended, universities and non-profits would still 
predominate in basic research (55 percent) and industry in advanced 
technology development (62 percent). However, the share of applied 
research (BA 2) in-house would increase from 35 to 56 percent.  Using a 
FY 2004 TOA of $115 billion, the three percent recommendation and 
this suggested distribution would result in the following funding totals: 
Universities and non-profits ($993 million), in-house laboratories/centers 
($1,335 million), and industry ($1,123 million). 
 The net result of this change would be a significant increase in the 
budget aimed at the prospecting phase of innovation the commercial 
sector currently ignores, accompanied by a strengthening and 
revitalization of the overall in-house S&T enterprise.  Finally, it would 
institutionalize the idea that each sector of the S&T community has a 
“power alley.”  For academia, non-profits and the NRL it would be 6.1 
(basic research), for the in-house centers it would be 6.2 (applied 
research), and for industry it would be 6.3 (advanced technology 
development). 
 As mentioned, attracting the necessary human resources requires 
hiring about 500 new S&Es (preferably with Ph.D.s) annually, and 
providing incentives to train and retain them. One of the best ways to 
attract technical talent is simply to offer the opportunity and the means to 
carry out first class research. That is, promising new hires a stable 
funding source during their transition from academia to the government, 
and also access to the best facilities and equipment, would create a strong 
incentive for them to work for the DON. 
 The tri-service NRAC report Science and Technology Community in 
Crisis, which looked at the corporate laboratories owned and operated by 
the three Services, discussed this issue at length. The study panel visited 
each of the Service’s research laboratories and interviewed a cross 
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section of their new hires, most of whom had Ph.D.s. The panel 
remarked: 
 
One of the issues that came up…was that of funding, especially 
for new or recent hires. Lack of stable funding for new hires, 
especially those engaged in basic research, can impede efforts to 
recruit. Part of the problem is that many managers (who are key 
to recruiting new employees) worry that they will be unable to 
provide funding for new hires. This makes them cautious about 
hiring, and so less willing to actively recruit. 
 
During its visits, the Panel also heard concerns from some of the 
new hires over pressure to obtain funding for themselves. 
Turnover is high in the first few years of employment under any 
circumstances and can be exacerbated by the lack of stable 
funding. Therefore, the Panel considers that there may be value 
in establishing mechanisms for ensuring (at least) partial 
support for new S&E hires, especially those working in basic 
research. This would relieve some pressure on new hires to 
obtain their own funding, and create an environment more 
attuned to hiring and retention at the entry level.15 
 
 The ability of TDs to provide new hires with a stable source of 
funding, at least for the first two years, would indeed be a strong 
recruitment and retention tool. It would also allow new hires to focus 
only on their research. This in turn would both ease their transition and 
expedite the rate at which they acquire the skills and knowledge to reach 
the full performance level. Last but not least, it would reduce the heavy 
attrition in the first few years after hiring. 
 
Recommendation 6: Provide a $50 million laboratory and 
equipment-funding source in the DON S&T account to be focused on 
S&T frontiers. 
 
 For reasons outlined in detail in Chapter 4, it is becoming nearly 
impossible to acquire the facilities and equipment that could attract 
potential new members of the S&T workforce. Indeed, such tools are the 
fundamental element of world-class research itself. In a rapidly evolving 
global technology base, where equipment can become obsolete almost 
overnight, even an outstanding researcher cannot do his best work 
without state of the art facilities. Considering that many current DON in-
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house facilities are unique, they must be furnished with adequate funding 
for necessary upgrades and enhancements. 
 There are many possible ways to address the problem. Table 6.2 
suggests three options but there are certainly others. Option 1 would 
restrict the competitive field for the laboratories and centers to a group 
consisting only of RDT&E-related MILCON projects. They would not 
have to compete head-to-head with readiness-related projects. Option 2 
would give the laboratories and centers a vote in the CNI/N4 MILCON 
ranking process. Option 3 would essentially give them a champion for 
their MILCON needs in the form of the Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N6/N7). 
Encouraged by the ASN (RDA), this office would argue for facility 
needs during the larger prioritization process. 
 
Option 1 NLCCG MILCON compete in a “fenced” CNO 
RDT&E programmatic category with the resulting 
Integrated Priority List endorsed by the ASN (RDA) 
Option 2 CNI give mission claimants a MILCON vote in the 
new ranking process 
Option 3 ASN (RDA) pursue more N6/N7 sponsorship for 
RDT&E projects 
Table 6.2: Some Options for Addressing NLCCG Community 
MILCON Needs  
 Why should DOD’s in-house researchers be deprived of essential 
tools when their counterparts have many avenues for acquiring facilities 
and equipment and seeking funds from parent institutions? The NSF, for 
example, provides academia such funds through its Major Research 
Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC) account. Its rationale 
for doing so is succinctly summarized in its 2005 facility plan: 
 
Successful exploration—whether in uncharted wilderness or at 
the frontiers of knowledge—demands commitment, vision, daring 
and ingenuity. But those qualities alone are not always 
sufficient. Progress also requires the right kind of equipment. 
Often new territory is accessible only with new tools; and 
sometimes even a seemingly unstoppable rush of discovery must 
halt to await novel means of seeing, manipulating and analyzing 
natural phenomena…. That is why the [NSF] supports not only 
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research and education, but also the physical implements that 
make both possible .”16 
 
 The MREFC budget line supports investments that range from 
modest laboratory instruments and information technology resources to 
world-class projects. Its budget in FY 2004 was $173.7 million, and the 
Bush Administration requested an FY 2005 budget of $250 million. FY 
2004 projects ranged in size from $8 million to $50.7 million, enabling 
construction of several very large facilities. 
 The DOD itself also provides funding to academic institutions 
through the Defense University Research Instrumentation Program 
(DURIP).17 Part of DOD’s University Research Initiative, this program 
helps colleges and universities improve their research capabilities and 
educate S&Es in areas important to national defense. Funds can be used 
to acquire major equipment to augment capabilities or develop new ones. 
Proposals for equipment purchase—which can range from $50,000 to 
$1,000,000—are evaluated competitively. Overall, for FY 2006 the DOD 
intends to award approximately $41 million via grants from the Services’ 
respective research offices. In FY 2005, 212 awards totaled $43.9 
million, and individual awards ranged from about $60,000 to $990,000, 
with an average of $207,000. 
 The DON centers should also have access to a funding line for 
laboratories and scientific equipment. It is therefore proposed that the 
DON create a $50 million funding source in the S&T account to be 
focused on new frontiers. The S&T Governance Council, recommended 
earlier in this chapter, could oversee the annual proposal process. 
6.5 Inter-Generational Transfer of Knowledge 
Recommendation 7: Launch an aggressive DON-wide program to 
ensure inter-generational transfer of corporate knowledge. 
 
 Today, both the DOD centers and many American companies are 
failing to transfer critical knowledge from older employees approaching 
retirement. One recent study found that few organizations are even 
capable of doing this. Based on a survey of more than 500 full-time U.S. 
workers between 40 and 50 years of age, the study discovered that 45 per 
cent have no formal planning processes or tools to capture their 
knowledge. Moreover, a quarter said their employers will let them retire 
without any prescribed transfer. Only one in five said they anticipated an 
intensive, months-long method of knowledge transfer, while only 28 per 
cent said they expected a formal process lasting one or two weeks. A 
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further 16 percent anticipated only some informal discussion with others 
prior to retirement. The study also found that few companies take 
advantage of the experience and expertise of their retired workforce.18 
 Given that more than 25 percent of the working U.S. population will 
reach retirement age by 2010, these companies must act soon or face a 
major exodus of institutional knowledge. The study recommended three 
critical steps: First, companies “must understand the extent of the 
problem, including the skills at risk, and their organization's ability to 
tackle it.” Second, they need “a strategy to capture and transfer core 
skills from retiring employees and to identify, attract and retain new 
workers with critical skills.” And third, they must proactively manage 
the effort. “The bottom line is that leaders in this arena know that 
capturing critical workforce knowledge and skills can’t be left to 
chance.” 
 As discussed at length in Chapter 4, the impending retirement of the 
Baby Boom S&Es in the DOD coupled with the dwindling pool of 
potential new hires is creating this same problem of knowledge 
management, a term that applies to practices that create, organize and 
leverage collective knowledge to enhance organizational performance.19 
Generally, there are three forms of organizational knowledge: tacit (held 
by people), explicit (codified in documents and databases), and social 
(personal networks). As with the related issue of corporate memory, 
nothing has been done on a broad scale in the DOD to facilitate the 
spread of this knowledge, meaning it will be nearly impossible for 
laboratories and centers to build new core competencies or even maintain 
their current ones. 
 In fact, evidence suggests they are not even doing the job they once 
did to preserve their explicit knowledge. For example, an ONR text 
mining effort looked at how many publications the DON technical 
community deposited with the DTIC during three time intervals. Table 
6.3 records the dramatic drop off in the DTIC database. While there 
could be multiple reasons for the decline, they are all likely related to the 
recent, significant loss of intellectual capital experienced as a result of 
personnel reductions imposed by cost-savings initiatives and several 
BRAC actions. Regardless of the cause, the result is a failure to record 
much of the community’s important explicit knowledge. 
 While explicit knowledge is key, much of the important 
organizational knowledge in the DOD laboratories and centers is tacit in 
nature. Once this knowledge base is gone, reconstitution may not be 
achievable, or it may take years. It is important that the DON act now to 
ensure it is passed along to new employees before the sand runs out of 
the hourglass. 
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 Another simple but potentially effective tool is an exit questionnaire, 
a record of key contacts and learning stories, processes, and practices. 
Most of the important tacit knowledge, however, is best transferred 
through formally established programs. In this regard, mentoring could 
be an explicit element of the job description for key carriers of corporate 
knowledge. For those highly knowledgeable S&T workers nearing 
retirement, it could even be a full-time effort. Regardless of the 
strategies, they must be formally planned, and underpinned by necessary 
financial resources. Only in this way can experienced employees teach 
new ones the explicit and tacit knowledge that constitute the 
organization’s Deep Smarts. 
 
  
Year DON Activity 
1980 - 1985 1990 - 1995 2000 - 2005 Total 
NSWC 3,203 2,953 1,195 30,827 
NAWC 3,601 2,837 871 36,877 
NUWC 1,497 587 282 7,424 
SSC 1,775 3,025 578 17,759 
Warfare Center Subtotal 10,076 9,402 2,926 92,887 
NRL 2,661 3,000 1,279 20,171 
DON Lab/Center Subtotal 12,737 12,402 4,205 113,058 
U.S. Naval Academy  87 106 87 637 
Naval Post Graduate School 3,478 5,663 3,842 25,164 
DON Total 16,302 18,171 8,134 138,859 
Table 6.3: DON Technical Publications in DTIC Database 
 The issue is especially acute in the world of research, where much of 
the knowledge is retained in the individual.  A few private sector 
companies have addressed this, realizing that one of the best ways to 
pass along corporate knowledge is to have mentors working closely with 
young researchers. It has long been recognized that transitioning 
scientific and technological information is a “contact sport,” and the gray 
beards must be brought together with the new people in S&T to ensure 
corporate information that has been obtained, many times at great 
expense, is passed along. Indeed, it is more cost effective to preserve 
now than to try to reconstitute later. 
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 As just one example, consider the research area of EMs, where the 
S&E workforce is shrinking dangerously. In such areas, where the DOD 
must retain in-house technical capability, it is imperative to act now. In-
house mentoring efforts and collaborative arrangements with private 
sector partners such as the CECD are crucial. Also, innovative hiring 
measures could be used to bring back key personnel after they retire, 
specifically to facilitate knowledge transfer. 
6.6 A New S&T Enterprise Requires Visionary Leadership 
Recommendation 8: Create an S&T Governance Council chaired by 
the ASN (RDA) with membership that includes all major 
stakeholders, including the ONR, the NRL, the Warfare/Systems 
Centers and UARCs. 
 
 The creation and successful operation of a new DON S&T enterprise 
will require the sustained leadership of individuals at the headquarters 
level of both the OSD and the Services, and at the laboratory/center TD 
level as well. This leadership must provide both a compelling vision of 
what this new enterprise should look like as well as the guidance and 
inspiration to translate it into reality. This undertaking will not be an easy 
one, nor will the final result be achieved swiftly. Indeed, few worthwhile 
transformation efforts are achieved quickly or easily. Consequently , if it 
is to be successful, the leadership that guides it must remain in place long 
enough to provide the necessary follow-through on implementation 
plans. In the past, this lack of leadership continuity has been a significant 
impediment to change because the often short tenure of senior leaders—
civilian and military—failed to provide the consistent, unqualified 
support and advocacy needed to achieve it. 
 In recent years the Secretary of Defense has said little about the 
importance of in-house S&T, and instead, that task has been largely left 
to DDR&E, a situation unsuited for consistent, high-level, advocacy 
within overall budget priorities. As mentioned in Chapter 4, lack of 
strong DDR&E leadership has concerned many in the Congress and 
prompted a Section (911) in the FY 2005 National Defense 
Authorization Act that called for a study of that office. In the report that 
accompanied the authorization bill, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee expressed concern ”about the gradual deterioration of the 
authority and stature of the ODDRE over the last decade. In the past, 
this position, or its equivalent, played the leading role in planning, 
programming, and coordinating the research and technology programs 
of the Department. Historically, [it] also had considerable budgetary 
A Road Map to Action                                                                                                     161                                                          
                                                    
authority to invest in critical defense technologies and significant 
access to the highest levels of defense leadership. More recently…the 
DDRE plays more of a consultation and liaison role with the services 
and S&T components and has struggled to raise the profile of S&T 
priorities…especially within acquisition program offices and the 
warfighting community. As the Department continues to pursue 
transformational capabilities, which are heavily dependent on 
technology, a strong S&T advocate is critical.20 [Emphasis added] 
 The intent of this recommendation is not to replace the mission and 
functions of the ONR, but merely to provide the comprehensive 
Secretariat-level attention sorely lacking for the laboratory/center 
community. The DON especially needs such a champion for S&T 
investments with longer-term payoffs. In a budget-constrained 
environment, this is vital to help the D&I portion of the investment 
“compete” with other claimants for scarce resources by providing the 
technical community comparable access to senior decision-makers. 
 
Recommendation 9: Establish SES-level TD positions at the 
warfare/systems center division sites, and invest them with authority 
and responsibility for the entire technical output of the organization. 
 
 Most analysts agree on the elements of effective leadership in an 
R&D organization. The 1991 Adolph Commission, for example, argued 
that an essential component of a world-class technical institution is “an 
inspired, empowered, highly qualified leadership committed to technical 
excellence through support for excellence, creativity, and high-risk/high-
payoff initiatives.”21 Effective leaders must know how to balance long-
range challenges against immediate technology needs, and costs to 
benefits. They must also be adept at choosing the technical areas in 
which to work, divesting work more appropriate for other performers 
(transition), judging scientific and technical merit, and orchestrating the 
conditions that foster innovation. Given the long horizon for much of the 
work, leadership continuity is also essential. 
 Because the TD position proved especially important to cutting edge 
technical institutions, credentials for the job have been widely discussed. 
Qualifications enumerated include not only a strong technical 
background but also technology management experience; a commitment 
to a creative work environment that encourages individual initiative; a 
long-term perspective of planning, accomplishment, and resource 
commitment, because breakthroughs can take many years to mature into 
operational applications; and a willingness to undertake work recognized 
as being high risk and having high payoff potential. It is worth noting in 
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this regard that the DOE appoints only internationally recognized 
scientists and engineers to head its national laboratories. 
 In addition to the TD’s authority, overall technical leadership at the 
warfare/system centers has been allowed to deteriorate as well. Consider 
for example NSWC’s Carderock, Maryland division. Ten years ago, the 
civilian leadership consisted of 13 Senior Executive Service (SES) level 
individuals: the TD, six technical department heads, two senior staff 
positions (Director of Strategic Planning and S&T Director), and four 
senior technical (ST) positions. Today, the division has two SES 
department heads, one Senior Scientific Technical Manager (who serves 
as the technical operations manager) and four STs. 
 To remedy this situation, the DON should formally re-establish the 
dual executive management approach. Importantly, it should reinstitute 
the position of TD at each warfare/system center division site and ensure 
the position has responsibility and authority for the entire technical 
program. Given its importance and responsibilities, the TD job should be 
an SES position. Moreover, the incumbent should be of outstanding 
ability and achievement, and have the respect of peers throughout the 
technical community. 
 The position of TD is essential because, regardless of the 
competency of commanding officers, they do not have the same bond 
with either the scientific community at large or the S&Es who work for 
them. Nor does their rotation allow for continuity of technical oversight. 
In fact, many laboratory/center commanders have expressed this view. 
For example, VADM William J. Moran, USN retired, asserted: 
 
I'm a real believer in a strong Technical Director with 
competence and knowledge of the Navy's problems and, 
hopefully, if not an aggressive personality, at least an affirmative 
personality…. 
 
One [reason] is that any effort…is going to take so many more 
years to completion than it used to that someone in the 
laboratory in a senior position…has to be there to provide the 
continuity and the memory from the beginning to the end of a 
program…. If we had…a large group of uniformed officers who 
had operational experience and knowledge of the operating 
problems and advanced technical education and technical depth 
and had grown up working in the material side of the house or 
the laboratory system…if we had a group of officers who fit that 
descrip tion, I'd be much more enthusiastic about the 
commanding officer of a laboratory having a strong voice in the 
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technical programs.  But, the kind of background I just described 
would take you 40 years to get.  Now, we just can't get there.... 
 
We have, in the record, any number of cases where the new CO 
comes aboard and he decides everything that was done in the 
last two years or three years was done incorrectly, or shouldn't 
be done at all, and you get major reorientations and wrenching 
of the program.22 
 
 Admiral Moran, like many other naval officers, recognizes the 
necessity of oversight continuity in long-term S&T efforts. Given this 
need, all appointments to the TD position must be at least five years in 
duration. 
6.7 Military Officers as an Asset for the S&T Community 
Recommendation 10 Institute within military career paths a cadre of 
“Military Technology Officers.” 
 
 As noted, DOD laboratories and centers have benefited greatly from 
having young military officers with technical backgrounds working 
along side civilian S&Es. Civilians gained a greater appreciation of the 
warfighters’ perspective while the officers gained appreciation of how 
S&T develops future military capability. As many studies have observed, 
however, the number of young officers in the community has dwindled. 
 The Air Force, where the decline was especially noticeable, has 
acted decisively to reverse it.23 When the Air Force was created in 1947, 
Dr. Theodore Von Karmen set it on a course where officer knowledge of 
technology was essential. That attitude began to atrophy in the mid-
1980s and reached bottom in the early 1990s, when senior leadership 
made it clear that operational experience was the best path to promotion. 
However, there has been a turnabout. For example, enrollments at the 
AFIT have nearly tripled since the late 1990s when the Secretary of the 
Air Force tried to close it. There are now some 400 officers in M.S. 
engineering programs there and 35 in Ph.D. programs. The budget 
suggests higher numbers in the out years, due largely to a special 
initiative by former Air Force Secretary Roach. Most of these officers go 
either to the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) or to program special 
project offices, and the ratio of officers to civilians in AFRL is slowly 
climbing. Although hard data are elusive, some evidence suggests that 
promotions for Ph.D. and M.S. degree S&E officers are now on a par 
with the remainder of the Air Force line officers. Further, the Service 
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now sends almost 1,000 majors and lieutenant colonels to command and 
staff school at Maxwell Air Force Base, the mid-level of professional 
military education. Some 100 from each class (regardless of academic 
background) are sent to AFIT for technical courses for one year in 
addition to the policy doctrine courses.  The hope is that they will obtain 
and appreciate technical knowledge as they assume senior staff and 
command positions. 
 There is some effort in the Navy along similar lines. Very few young 
officers have advanced technical degrees, nor even an appreciation for 
the role of S&T in providing warfighting capability. This is one reason 
N-STAR cultivates relationships and continuous interactions between 
U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) midshipmen and young S&Es throughout 
the DON laboratory/center community. For example, at the inaugural N-
STAR Conference at the USNA in September of 2005, over 70 guest 
speakers from the warfare centers lectured and conducted technical 
sessions with USNA professors and Trident Scholars on topics related to 
emerging S&T. Representatives from throughout the Naval Research 
Enterprise gave hands-on previews of what is in store for the 
midshipmen, including demonstrations of cutting-edge technology under 
development. 
 Even so, much more needs to be done. Examples could include an 
internship program for midshipmen that included at least one summer 
tour at a DON laboratory or center, or a broader USNA/Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) summer faculty program wherein the schools 
collaborate on research projects with laboratory/center personnel. 
Besides the obvious advantage of carrying out meaningful research, there 
would be other benefits from such arrangements. For example, faculty 
who work in the technical community would likely bring success stories 
back to the students, conveying a better understanding of the applications 
of science and engineering to military problems. Such communication 
and confidence-building efforts would provide a significant BtC ratio. 
 Because high technology organizations like the ONR, NRL, and the 
warfare/systems centers need a cadre of technically sophisticated officers 
to work with civilian S&Es in line organizations, the DON should create 
within appropriate military career paths a cadre of “Military Technology 
Officers.” There is a particular need for more officers with Ph.D. 
degrees. As in the case of the Air Force, these changes would require that 
senior leadership recognize the importance of this career path and ensure 
that those who follow it are appropriately promoted. 
 Officers who have retired or mustered out of service form another 
valuable reservoir of talent the laboratories and centers could tap to help 
fill the S&T hiring pipeline. In fact, one component of N-STAR seeks to 
send former officers back to school for advanced technical degrees. In 
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return for having their degree funded, they would be required to work at 
a DON laboratory or center. In FY 2006 the first of this pool will start a 
Ph.D. program at the NPS, where the candidate will have both an advisor 
at NPS and a mentor at one of the DON’s laboratories or centers.  This is 
but one example of how such talent can be recycled, and of how such 
initiatives must be underwritten with necessary resources. 
6.8 Final Thoughts 
 Despite a track record of success in planting the seeds for future 
military capabilities, the DOD’s in-house S&T effort continues to reel 
from nearly 15 years of downsizing, consolidation, closure, and 
outsourcing. Reversing the decline will not be easy, as this book has 
demonstrated. In fact, the growing shortage of young S&Es and rapid 
globalization threaten not only the defense S&T effort, but also 
America’s economic and national security. 
 Recently, the Congress asked the National Academies how to meet 
these challenges. Their answer came in the form of a major report called 
Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America 
for a Brighter Economic Future.  Principal among their 
recommendations were the following:24 
• Increase America’s pool of technical talent through K-12 
education initiatives 
• Sustain and strengthen America’s commitment to long-term 
basic research 
• Make American the most attractive setting in which to research, 
thereby making it an attractor of the world’s best talent 
• Provide incentives to create and sustain an innovation 
environment 
 The Academies’ proposals are aligned with many of those made 
here, and indeed, it is hoped this book will help the DON rise above its 
own approaching storm, and thereby help America remain secure and 
prosperous. 
 The recommendations here focus on revitalizing the DON’s in-house 
laboratories and centers, in particular the S&T effort. As has been noted, 
may of the suggestions are not unique, nor the list provided intended to 
be complete. Indeed, a major purpose of this book is to stimulate a 
dialogue and elicit other constructive steps. However, the roadmap 
proffered here would put the DON S&T enterprise on a good path to the 
future. While the benefits of revitalizing the in-house S&T effort would 
indeed be enormous, and would outweigh any costs, the consequences of 
failing to ensure its vitality could well be catastrophic. 
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 In the early days of World War II, Hitler’s U-Boats wreaked havoc 
on Allied merchant and military ships. Fortunately, allied scientists 
developed an answer—SONAR. But sonar was no overnight invention. It 
was the accumulated result of years of research by scientific prospectors 
on both sides of the Atlantic. As Norman Cousins, the well-known editor 
and essayist, observed, “History is a vast early warning system.”25 In this 
sense, sonar aptly represents the entire issue: like sonar, and like 
Cousins’ history, the S&T enterprise is a kind of early warning system, 
which can not only prevent but also defeat aggression by insuring 






The N-STAR Program and Portfolio 
 
 Evidence was accumulating that the United States is facing an 
impending shortage of scientists, engineers, and technical workers in the 
21st century.  The generation of scientists and engineers (S&Es) that had 
answered the national call after Sputnik was beginning to retire, and the 
American educational system was not producing enough technical talent 
to replace them.  These problems appeared to be particularly acute within 
the U.S. defense establishment, whose science and technology (S&T) 
workforce had been further diminished by hiring freezes and the lure of 
the private sector.  A crisis was looming and its implications for our 
nation’s technological leadership and defense readiness were becoming 
only too clear.   
 To revitalize the research enterprise within the Navy and reverse the 
downward trend in S&T workforce availability, the N-STAR program 
was conceived under the leadership of Rear Admiral Jay M. Cohen, then 
Chief of Naval Research (CNR), and Dr. Fred Saalfeld, then Technical 
Director of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the leadership of the 
warfare center community. 
 The initial ideas grew out of discussions among members of the 
Navy Laboratory/Center Coordinating Group, which consisted of the 
military commanders and civilian directors of the warfare centers and the 
Naval Research Laboratory.  Dr. Robert Kolb, then Technical Director of 
the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego, and Dr. David 
Skinner, then Executive Director of the Naval Coastal Systems Center in 
Panama City, Florida, took the lead in formulating and presenting the 
proposals to the CNR.  Their efforts convinced Admiral Cohen of the 
strategic importance to the Navy and Marine Corps of strengthening and 
replenishing its S&T enterprise in the warfare centers. 
                                                                                                                                         Appendix 168
N-STAR Launches 
 
 The CNR’s new program organization that became formally known 
as N-STAR (Naval Research — Science & Technology for America’s 
Readiness)was established in 2002 within the Office of Naval Research 
(ONR).  The initial vision for N-STAR  was broadly stated: 
 
Provide a Department of Navy civilian S&T workforce that 
focuses on rapid transition of science and technology into the 
Naval forces of today and the future. 
 
 This vision was never seen as having a single focus.  Rather, N-
STAR’s organizers understood that they sought the reversal of a problem 
that had multiple causes and was rooted in American generational 
culture, policy trends, and budget constraints.  It would require a 
multifaceted solution that tackled, in an integrated fashion, the diverse 
causes of the warfare center S&T dilemma.  As envisioned, the effort 
would also contribute to rebuilding a strong national technology core for 
the future. 
 N-STAR rapidly scaled up to lead an array of programs and 
initiatives within the framework of its S&T revitalization mission.  As a 
baseline position, N-STAR set out to develop a strategy to bring on 
board 4,000 new scientists and engineers throughout the Naval Research 
Enterprise — 400 every year over a 10-year period.  The activities that 
N-STAR pursued to meet this overall objective fall into three broad 
mission areas: 
 
•  Value Perception 
 Greater professional recognition for warfare center S&T 
accomplishments and broader appreciation for the pioneering 
work accomplished by the Navy’s technical workforce is seen as a 
key means of revitalizing S&T in those centers.  Therefore, N-
STAR set out to raise the visibility of the warfare centers by 
bringing their talent and accomplishments to the attention of naval 
leadership, the broader defense establishment, and the public. 
 N-STAR initiated a first-of-its-kind analysis that measures the 
“benefits-to-cost” of basic and applied research at the warfare 
centers.  It has generally been thought that the payoffs of early, 
high-risk research could not be quantified and must be supported 
as a matter of “faith.”  However, results from these studies began 
to document the economic and operational value to the Navy and 
Marine Corps of the research performed at the warfare centers. 
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•  Future Workforce  
 One of the primary goals of N-STAR is to attract and retain 
premier technical talent.  N-STAR’s recruitment and retention 
programs range from feeding the entry port of the workforce 
pipeline with educational and scholarship initia tives, to supporting 
and sustaining veteran S&Es with advanced degree opportunities 
and new sources of funds supporting in-house research. 
 N-STAR’s long-range workforce development initiatives include 
coordination of academic partnerships with schools, community 
colleges, and universities to upgrade education in the “STEM 
disciplines:” science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.  
Besides channeling assistance to undergraduate and graduate 
students working in areas of interest to the Navy, N-STAR’s 
programs include learning experiences for youngsters interested in 
technology as well as training opportunities for the Navy 
laboratory technician workforce. 
 N-STAR also promotes mentoring as a critical means to preserve 
and pass on the collective knowledge and experience of the 
Navy’s seasoned S&T workforce.  Proactive mentoring 
mechanisms are built into many of N-STAR’s workforce 
development programs. 
 
•  Military Officer Connectivity 
 N-STAR also addresses the need for technologically savvy 
military officers in an era when warfighting capabilities are largely 
technology-based.  This aspect of the N-STAR mission seeks to 
forge stronger relationships between the warfare center 
community and military operators. 
 When the Fleet and Forces have a better appreciation for the 
massive and long-term research, development, test, and evaluation 
efforts that go into the development of warfighting technologies 
— and when they have input to those efforts — they will be more 
likely to support and advocate for the Navy’s unique in-house 
S&T capabilities.  Thus, an important approach to revitalizing 
S&T is to acquaint more Navy and Marine Corps officers with the 
vital work of the warfare centers. 
 
A Diversified Portfolio 
 
 N-STAR’s portfolio consists of programs and initiatives that fall into 
one of the three broad mission areas described above.  As with any 
investment portfolio, diversification is central to an investor’s ability to 
achieve the desired payoffs.  But there must also be an overarching 
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investment purpose and framework that tie the investments together into 
a cohesive strategy.  The components of N-STAR’s portfolio within each 
mission area are briefly described next. 
 
I. Value Perception 
 
 1. Benefits-to-Cost Analyses 
 N-STAR commissioned a benefits-to-cost (BtC) study in 2005 to 
measure payoffs to the Navy from ILIR- and IAR-funded programs at 
the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Newport, Rhode Island.  The 
study attempted to capture the direct benefits to the military in terms of 
performance and reliability gains, cost savings and/or cost avoidance, 
accelerated readiness, and the development of human capital with unique 
expertise. 
 The pilot BtC study, performed by Delta Research Co., quantified 
benefits from three ILIR- and IAR-funded programs: the quieting of 
ADCAP torpedoes; acoustic performance of submarine towed arrays 
used for long-range detection of adversaries; and the use of solid oxide 
fuel cells (SOFCs) to improve the endurance of unmanned underwater 
vehicles (UUVs). 
 These studies yielded many first-time insights for quantifying the full 
value of the Navy’s investments in S&T.  Moreover, the specific 
benefits-to-cost ratios of ILIR/IAR research exceeded even the most 
optimistic expectations. 
 For example, NUWC’s investment in torpedo quieting technology 
yielded excellent performance gains with cost savings of over $1 billion.  
The BtC ratio calculated for this research program was 260 to 1.  The 
study also projected that the research leading to development of the 
SOFC will enhance UUV endurance by over 300 percent relative to 
currently available battery technology. 
 A similar BtC study is now underway at the Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Center San Diego, and additional studies should be 
performed at other warfare centers in the future. 
 
 2. Communications Strategy 
 To increase awareness of the contributions made by the warfare 
centers and their gifted scientists and engineers, N-STAR adopted a 
multi-pronged communications strategy.  These outreach efforts include 
STARLINK, a bimonthly newsletter distributed electronically to the 
broader Navy and DoD audiences, defense contractors, university 
researchers, and many others with an interest in Navy-relevant S&T. 
 N-STAR also launched a website (www.nstarweb.com) and 
promotes public awareness of the naval S&T community by placing 
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opinion and informational pieces in major newspapers and defense 
publications.  N-STAR also nurtures relationships with congressional 
offices and exhibits at defense-related conferences and shows.  Persistent 
and thorough communications activities are viewed a critical activity 
within N-STAR. 
 
 3. S&T Database 
 N-STAR is constructing an S&T database of information that, for the 
first time, captures in a systematic manner Navy-relevant basic and 
applied research results and transitions of those results to relevant 
programs.  The database includes reports, summaries, abstracts, patents, 
points of contact, and other information on ILIR- and IAR-funded 
research projects.  It enables the S&T community and others to track, 
analyze, and integrate information that was previously scattered among 
the different laboratories.  It also supports data mining techniques to help 
identify new knowledge that may arise from connecting seemingly 
unrelated projects in a unique fashion. 
 
II. Future Workforce  
 
 1. ILIR Program 
 N-STAR bears management authority for the In-house Laboratory 
Independent Research (ILIR) program, which is a critical source of 
research funding used by the warfare centers to explore new ideas 
pertinent to the Navy’s future mission requirements.  The ILIR program 
produces benefits that occur over time and in four dimensions: 
technology solutions, cost avoidance, subject matter expertise, and 
workforce development. 
 
• First, ILIR funds are used by the warfare centers for high-risk, 
basic research in areas relevant to the Navy-and-Marine-Corps-
After-Next and to address near-term challenges (such as biological 
threats and improvised explosive devices) facing today’s Fleet and 
Forces. 
• Second, ILIR has a long track record of saving the Navy millions 
of dollars in acquisition cost avoidance by discovering lower cost 
alternatives for program managers as noted in the value 
proposition section. 
• Third, ILIR funds help the warfare centers build subject matter 
expertise in emerging technologies that will have importance for 
the future Navy and Marine Corps mission. 
• Fourth, the ILIR program functions as a powerful workforce 
development tool by providing technical training for S&Es 
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embarking on their careers in the Naval Research Enterprise.  ILIR 
funding also offers an attractive benefit to veteran scientists who 
wish to pursue new ideas borne of their long experience with 
meeting the Fleet’s needs. 
 
 2. IAR Program 
 The In-House Applied Research (IAR) program was inaugurated in 
fiscal year 2002 to bridge the gap between basic research and near-term 
advanced technology development projects.  For IAR-funded projects, 
young researchers are paired with senior mentors who work with them in 
a team environment on challenging technical problems.  These hands-on 
research opportunities help transfer precious corporate knowledge 
residing in our current generation of senior S&Es. 
 Managed by N-STAR, the IAR program has funded numerous 
applied research projects that have resulted in direct transitions to naval 
programs.  The warfare centers have been able to hire a new crop of 
young scientists and engineers specifically to work on IAR-funded 
projects. 
 
 3. Navy - National Science Foundation Partnership 
 N-STAR teamed with the National Science Foundation to create the 
NSF-Navy Civilian Service (NNCS), a collaborative scholarship-for-
service program unique to the Navy.  The NNCS provides scholarships 
and fellowships to top students in science and engineering at our nation’s 
universities.  Key features of this program are: 
 
• Internships during which students spend at least one summer 
working at a Navy R&D center and become involved in hands-on 
technical work, which often ends up being a distinct project they 
can call their own. 
• Leadership development activities consisting of a two-part 
symposium in which all the NNCS recipients gather for two, three-
day workshops.  The symposium exposes the students to self-
assessment tools and encourages them to briefly step away from 
their research activities to reflect on their careers and their roles as 
future leaders in the S&T community. 
 The first symposium in October 2005 was held at the Naval 
Surface Warfare Center Carde rock Division.  The second was held 
in October 2006 at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center 
San Diego. 
• A service obligation that requires NNCS scholarship/fellowship 
recipients to “pay back” their awards with civilian service time at a 
Naval laboratory or warfare center after completing their studies.  
Appendix 173
These service payback periods often translate into hiring the 
participants as permanent professional employees. 
  
 To date, the ONR and NSF have collectively committed $9 million 
to the NNCS program, and an additional $5 million was budgeted for 
fiscal year 2007.  Twenty-five students are engaged in the first class of 
NNCS, and five graduates have been placed at Navy R&D Centers. 
 
 4. Virginia Demonstration Project (VDP) 
 This unique and extremely successful collaborative program matches 
volunteer S&Es from NSWC Dahlgren Division with teachers in 
Virginia  public middle schools for the purpose of introducing seventh- 
and eighth-graders to the wonders of scientific inquiry and problem-
solving.  The long-term goal is to generate enthusiasm among young 
students in someday pursuing degree programs in science, engineering, 
and mathematics.  Having become familiar with a naval warfare center 
through the VDP, many of these students could ultimately choose a 
career in the Naval Research Enterprise. 
 N-STAR coordinates the VDP program in cooperation with the 
Stafford County, Virginia, Public School system.  Initially, the program 
provided in-class and “summer camp” learning experiences for seventh 
graders at several middle schools.  The project was then expanded to 
eighth-grade in Stafford County and then across jurisdictional boundaries 
to two other local school systems in Virginia: King George County and 
Spotsylvania County. 
 Other states, including Maryland, Rhode Island, California and 
Florida have expressed interest in similar cooperative educational 
programs with the Naval warfare centers within their boundaries.  In 
addition, a national advisory committee that includes three national 
leaders in education has been formed to explore a national demonstration 
project. 
 The VDP includes special outreach efforts to draw more young girls 
and minority students to science and math.  The demonstration program 
also functions to help invigorate the science and math curricula in 
Virginia public schools by contributing to the professional development 
of middle school science and math teachers.  In terms of workforce 
development, the VDP includes funding for volunteer S&Es to pursue 
their doctoral studies. 
 The VDP has greatly benefited from the interest of Senator John 
Warner (R-VA).  Experts from the College of William and Mary and 
Virginia Tech collaborated with N-STAR to plan, execute, and evaluate 
the program. 
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 5. Naval Research Enterprise Internship Program (NREIP) 
 The NREIP was the brainchild of Admiral Cohen.  It aims to attract 
talented science and engineering students at the undergraduate and 
graduate levels to the Naval Research Enterprise by exposing them to 
Navy R&D centers through summer internships. 
 When junior, senior, and graduate students apply to the NREIP, they 
identify one or two centers in which they are interested.  Once selected 
for an internship appointment, they work with a mentor on a 10-week 
summer research project in exchange for a stipend of up the $5,000 plus 
travel/living expenses. 
 Each year, roughly 200 students are selected for NREIP internships.  
Over the course of the program, applications have grown from 800 the 
first year to over 2,000 in recent years.  These participation rates attest to 
the popularity of this approach among both the students and the Naval 
R&D centers working with them.  Again, the long-term intent is to attract 
the most talented students to S&T careers in the Navy. 
 
 6. University/Laboratory Initiative (ULI) in Undersea 
Technology 
 Undersea weapons technology is unique to the Navy; no other 
service branch, governmental unit, or private sector entity has an 
operational interest in undersea weapons.  This research area must 
therefore be fostered in-house.  ONR’s mechanism for supporting the 
development of Navy-unique technologies is the ULI program. 
 The ULI in Undersea Technology sponsors graduate-level research 
performed jointly by universities and experienced Navy experts.  
Specifically, funds are provided for a university student and his or her 
academic adviser to perform research in undersea weapons technology, 
guided and assisted by a Navy mentor from one of the R&D centers. 
 The ULI program contains no formal payback requirement, but 
experience has shown that students frequently join Navy centers on a 
full-time basis upon earning their degrees.  N-STAR helps facilitate ULI 
relationships at the warfare centers. 
 
 7. SMART (Science, Mathematics and Research for 
Transformation) 
 N-STAR facilitates the participation of our naval R&D centers in 
this DoD-wide program managed by the Deputy Director for Research 
and Engineering (DDR&E). 
 The SMART program was authorized by Congress as part of the 
Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2005.  This legislation was crafted in response to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks and updated the National Defense Education Act of 1958, the law 
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that stimulated young people to go into “rocket science” after the 
launching of Sputnik in 1957.  
 For its first year, the SMART program operated as a pilot program 
but has now been converted to permanent funded status.  Each academic 
year, it provides junior and senior undergraduate and graduate students at 
colleges and universities with scholarships in fields of interest to the 
Navy and other DoD service branches. 
 Like the NNCS, the SMART program includes a specified payback 
period for award recipients as a means of attracting promising young 
S&Es to full-time careers upon earning their degrees.  Supported 
students are obligated to work one year in a defense lab for every year of 
tuition assistance received.  The DDR&E works with the American 
Society for Engineering Education to manage the application process, 
and the Naval Postgraduate School serves as the Executive Agent for the 
program.  Many of the program features of SMART were promulgated 
by N-STAR staff with the DDR&E as a way of enhancing the payoff of 
SMART to the DoD. 
 
II. Connectivity with Military Officers  
 
 1. Naval Academy S&T Conference 
 N-STAR’s initiatives in the area of military officer connectivity 
started with a pool of the Navy’s future leaders — Naval Academy 
midshipmen.  In September 2005, a highly successful conference was 
held over a three-day period at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) in 
Annapolis, Maryland.  The event brought 65 Navy S&Es from 
throughout the warfare center community into USNA classrooms for 
lectures and discussions about ongoing S&T work in support of the Fleet.  
Parallel technical sessions were held for USNA faculty and interested 
midshipmen. 
 A primary benefit of the event was to show faculty members and 
midshipmen how chemistry, physics, electrical engineering, and many 
other disciplines contribute to innovative naval capabilities and help 
solve military problems.  Poster sessions enhanced the amount of 
information conveyed to the students and faculty.  
 As a result of the conference, relationships have been formed that 
lead to collaborative work arrangements, summer internships, and other 
opportunities to connect midshipmen and their teachers (both civilian 
and military) with the warfare center community.  Many of those 
midshipmen, when they become commissioned officers and later assume 
leadership positions within the Navy and Marine Corps Commands, will 
thus have familiarity with a critical resource, the warfare center 
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community, when they encounter operational threats or challenges 
requiring technical solutions. 
 
 2. Naval Postgraduate School S&T Conference  
 The same concept demonstrated at the U.S. Naval Academy is being 
applied to naval officers who are further along in their careers.  In April 
2007, an N-STAR S&T Conference will be held at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California.  Again, members of 
the warfare systems/centers will brief the military officers attending NPS 
and their professors regarding their research. 
 The NPS graduate students will also have an opportunity to display 
their own research during poster sessions.  The intent, again, is to 
establish mutually beneficial relationships and foster two-way 
communication between military officers and Navy scientists and 
engineers. 
 
 3. Retiring/Separating Officers Retention 
 The Navy has over 50,000 military officers, many of whom will 
retire or leave the military service in the near future.  This manpower 
shift argues for an aggressive program to take advantage of this 
population by placing them in technical positions in the Navy’s R&D 
centers.  These officers bring a wealth of practical experience that 
provides a real-world perspective to the work of the civilian warfare 
centers. 
 N-STAR promotes efforts to enroll retiring mid-grade Naval officers, 
many of whom have bachelor’s degrees in science and engineering, at 
the Naval Postgraduate School and other universities to pursue advanced 
degrees.  A payback period ensures that these former officers will take 
positions as Navy civilian S&Es upon completion of their degrees. 
 
A Framework for the Future? 
 
 One of the critical challenges facing enterprises such as N-STAR is 
to properly integrate and leverage the various program components.  
Figure A.1 depicts an overarching view of N-STAR, and a framework 
for program management.  The three major circles in the Venn diagram 
depict the three overarching program concentrations: delivering S&T 
products to the fleet, creating the future S&T workforce within the 
Navy’s R&D centers and managing an aggressive and focused outreach 
program with schools and universities. 
 Answering the questions shown on the right side of Figure A.1 is 
critical to program sustainment and growth.  An observation developed 
over time within the N-STAR organization is that programs that work in 
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the intersection of the circles are some of the most powerful and effective 
efforts, in that they deliver “products” in two dimensions, thus creating a 
larger return on investment. 
 In looking at Figure A.1 from a national perspective, the N-STAR 
enterprise offers a model for other federal agencies, such as the 
Department of Homeland Security, NASA, etc. for how to incorporate 
seemingly disparate efforts into an effective and integrated framework 
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